

The Image of Philosophy in Indian Culture: Etymology and Untranslatability of Terms

Hanna Hnatovska

Ph.D., Associate Professor, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv
(Kyiv, Ukraine)

E-mail: gnatovskanna@gmail.com
<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9699-1037>

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The article is devoted to the analysis of etymology and semantic connotations of Sanskrit terms: anvīkṣiki, darśana, vidyā, tarkavidyā, tarka, tattvajñāna, jñāna, tattvavidyā, tattva, tārkatva, indriyāsaṅga for the purpose of disclosing the complete image of the philosophy in the Indian culture.

The author abandoned the most popular approach in the scientific literature, which is to clarify the philosophical content of the creative achievements of Indian thinkers by defining one term as close as possible to the meaning of the “Western” concept of philosophy. The article recognizes that each of the chosen terms is untranslatable, and the specificity of their meanings creates and explains the integrity of the general image of philosophy in Indian culture. The importance of the etymology in explaining the meanings of the vocabulary of Indian philosophy and in identifying common and distinct terms that are used for consideration has been demonstrated. The article reveals the connection between the meaning of “philosophy” and “science” and “logic” in Indian culture. It clarifies which terms are the key ones and which are marginal to the history of Indian philosophical thought.

Keywords: Indian culture and philosophy, etymology, untranslatability, anvīkṣiki, darśana, vidyā, tarka, tattva, jñāna, tārkatva, indriyāsaṅga

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Introduction

The instruction to “justify” the search for philosophical thought in Eastern cultures only by the presence of direct analogs with the categorical apparatus of Western philosophy is vulnerable and imperfect. The endeavor to find the literal equivalents of key categories of the philosophical lexicon of the history of philosophy of the West may lead to the reduction and distortion of the unique Oriental languages semantic structure, however, exploring the very possibility of translating the philosophical lexicon of the “Western world” into the

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languages of oriental cultures is a basis of learning the creative contribution of outstanding Asian thinkers.

Can we find in the vocabulary of the creative work of Indian thinkers a term which without any caveats translates the European term philosophy (ancient Greek Φιλοσοφία)? This question has been the subject of scientific research throughout the whole history of Indology in the “Western world.” Sanskrit, as a key language of the Indian spiritual tradition, offers us, in particular, the following terms: darśana (Sanskrit Devanagari — दर्शन); anvīkṣiki (Sanskrit Devanagari — अन्वीक्षिकी); vidyā (Sanskrit Devanagari — विद्या); tarkavidyā (Sanskrit Devanagari — तर्कविद्या); tattvajñāna (Sanskrit Devanagari — तत्त्वज्ञान); tattvavidyā (Sanskrit Devanagari — तत्त्वविद्या); tārīkīkī (Sanskrit Devanagari — तार्किकी); indriyāsāṅga (Sanskrit Devanagari — इन्द्रियसङ्ग). This list is probably not exhaustive, but we can take it as a basis for research as the most indicative one.

From the list mentioned above, the most frequently used in textbooks and guides in Indian philosophy are anvīkṣiki and darśana. At the same time, these terms, together with vidyā, are relatively “monolithic.” In contrast, the rest of the terms are a combination of at least two words, each of which is worthy of attention and is well known in the context of the analysis of other important philosophical concepts.

The questions of the accuracy of the literal definition of anvīkṣiki or darśana by philosophy have repeatedly become the subject of careful analysis. Among the most famous and authoritative we should take note of Paul Hacker’s (Hacker, 1958: 54-81) and Wilhelm Halbfass’s (Halbfass, 1988: 263-277) achievements, which have a significant influence on the formation of the position of modern researchers, in particular on Volodymyr Shokhin (Shokhin, 1994: 122-170). The predominance of attention to these terms creates the illusion that one of them should be chosen as the literal equivalent of the concept of philosophy in the Western world, however, the purpose of this study is to clarify the differences and concordances of meanings of all terms, which, among other things, can be translated as philosophy. We can agree with the Indologist Yurii Zavorodnii, who remarked: “...what European scholars in India call “philosophy” has no equivalent in Sanskrit, and therefore is overlapped with several similar in meaning concepts” (Zavorodnii, 2006: 93). The subject of our study is the etymology and specificity of the translation of the terms: anvīkṣiki, darśana, vidyā, tarkavidyā, tarka, tattvajñāna, jñāna, tattvavidyā, tattva, tārīkīkī, indriyāsāṅga, with the purpose to clarify the differences, which can be translated as philosophy.

Anvīkṣiki and Darśana

Anvīkṣiki is one of the important concepts of the philosophical culture of India, traditionally translated by the terms logic, logical philosophy, metaphysics (Monier-Williams, 1899: 142). In conjunction with buddhi (Sanskrit Devanagari — बुद्धि), this term obtains meaning: “argumentative mind” (Monier-Williams, 1899: 1319). Monier-Williams explained the etymology of this term by combining two components: anv (Sanskrit Devanagari — अन्व) and kṣā (Sanskrit devanagari — क्षा). The first is also the basis of such words as, in particular: anvī (Monier-Williams 1899: 47) (Sanskrit Devanagari — अन्वी) and anvīta (Monier-Williams, 1899: 47) (Sanskrit Devanagari — अन्विति) for which the value that indicates the connection, the combination is the common. The second is translated as earth. The designated version of the etymology of the term anvīkṣiki has not been admitted to the scientific community.

Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan in “Indian Philosophy” (Radhakrishnan, 1956: 30) by referring

to “Nyāya-bhāṣya,” stated that anvīkṣiki was formed by the combination of the prefix anu (Sanskrit devanagari — अनु), which may be translated as after, along, alongside, lengthwise, near to, under, subordinate to, with; according to, severally, one by one, orderly, methodically, one after another, repeatedly; over, near to, through, too, towards, at, in order, agreeably to, in regard to, inferior to; after, afterward, thereupon, again, further, then, next (Monier-Williams, 1899: 31); and the noun iksṣaṇa (Sanskrit devanagari — ईक्षण), which can be translated as a look, view, aspect sight; looking after, caring for; eye (Monier-Williams, 1899: 170), which is associated with the adjective iksīta (Sanskrit devanagari — ईक्षित), which can be translated as seen, beheld, looked; a look (Monier-Williams, 1899: 170). The same explanation of the etymology of this term as found in the English translation of the “Nyāya Sūtras” with the commentary of Vātsyāyana (Gautama’s, 1939: 6). Volodymyr Shokhin also agrees with it in the Russian translation of this work (Shokhin, 2001: 122). All these researchers have interpreted anvīkṣiki by viewing or studying or examining what was perceived in the senses and, according to Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, what was read in the sacred literature. This interpretation has a well-established and well-reasoned nature. It should also be clarified that the terms ikshana and ikshita are most likely related to the verb root iks (Sanskrit Devanagari — ईक्ष), which can be translated: to see, look, view; to watch over; to see in one’s mind, think, have a thought; to regard (Monier-Williams, 1899: 170). This verb root, according to Monier-Williams, is probably related to the noun akṣi (eye) (Sanskrit Devanagari — अक्षि).

One of the most prominent European researchers of Indian philosophy in the 19th the one century Max Müller (Müller, 1899: 99) defined the anvīkṣiki by the old name of philosophy and logic, and the instruction to regard this term as superseded by the term darśana remains well established and widespread. Satish Chandra Vidyabhusan stated that: “Anviksiki in its philosophical aspect is called Darsana” (Vidyabhusan, 1988: 6-7) and establishes the date of re-orientation to the use of the term darśana instead of anvīkṣiki, to 1 century B.C. and defined darśana as: “...literally signifies seeing: it is the true science that enables us to see our soul” (Vidyabhusan, 1988: 7). A common consideration among researchers is the use of the term anvīkṣiki in “Arthasāstra”: “Kautilya himself explains that Anvikshiki contains three studies of Samkhya, Yoga, and Lokayata” (Bhattacharya, 2011: 131). The question of why these teachings were chosen to characterize them as anvīkṣiki should be acknowledged as the open one.

Darśana (Sanskrit Devanagari — दर्शन) (Monier-Williams, 1899: 470) can be translated as showing, seeing, looking at; teaching, teaching; observing, noticing, observation, perception; ocular perception; the eye-sight; inspection, examination; visiting; audience, meeting; experiencing; foreseeing; contemplating; apprehension, judgment, discernment, understanding, intellect; opinion; intention; view, doctrine, philosophical system; the eye; the becoming visible or known, presence; appearance (before the judge); the being mentioned (in any authoritative text); a vision, dream; appearance, aspect, semblance; color; showing; a sacrifice. Its importance explains the volume of semantic connotations of darśana for the history of Indian intellectual discourse. Significant to us is the fact that darśana is not only “to see” but also “to tell,” “to present,” and “teach it.” The two-sidedness of the act of philosophizing is enshrined in the meaning of this term. First, it is both personal “immersion” and the gaining of personal vision. Secondly, it is the “appeal to others” and the experience of explaining in teaching and edification. No coincidence that the term darsana is often translated as “philosophical school.” The validity of this approach is underlined by the authority of such well-known works as Haribhadra’s “Shaddarshanamuchchaya,” where the Jain thinker (in V-VI or VII century) laid the foundations of doctrines: Buddhism, Nyaya, Sankhya, Jainism,

Vaisheshika, Mimamsa, and in case of the association of Vaisheshika and Nyaya, found it possible to supplement this list with Lokayata; and Madhavacharya's "Sarva-darsana-sangraha" where a representative of Advaita Vedanta (in the fourteenth century) outlined the following doctrines: Charvaka System, the Buddha System, the Jaina System, the Ramanuja System, the Purna-prajna System, the Nakulisa-Pasupata System, the Saiva System, the Pratyabhijna or Recognition System, the Resesvara or Mercurial System, the Vaiseshika or Anulukya System, the Akshapada or Nyaya System, the Jaiminy System, the Paniniya System, the Sanjhy System, the Patanjala or Yoga System, the Vedanta or System. In these works, we, first, find the use of the term darśana to refer to the most famous doctrines that formed the basis of the cohesion and identity of the thinkers who formed the intellectual discourse of that time India, which is recognized by us as philosophical; second, the emphasis on the interpretation of darśana by systems, which, in particular, the authority of Max Müller (Müller, 1899), became the basis for the widespread translation of this term with phrase "philosophical system."

The established explanation of the etymology of the term darśana does not raise any doubts and objections. The verbal root *drś* (Sanskrit Devanagari — दृश्) (Monier-Williams, 1899: 491), which is the basis of the word darśana, can be translated as to see, behold, look at, regard, consider, visit; to see with the mind, to learn, to understand; to notice, care for, look into, try, examine; to see by divine intuition, think or find out, compose, contrive; to be seen, to become visible, to appear; to be shown or manifested, to cause to see or be seen, to show a thing or person; to show = prove, demonstrate; to produce (money), i.e., pay; long to; wish to display; looking at, looking at, looking at; knowing, discerning; sight, view; look, appearance; the eye.

Except mentioned above, there are at least two verb roots in Sanskrit that, among other things, can be translated as "see": *loc* (Sanskrit Devanagari — लोच्) (Monier-Williams, 1899: 907) and *viṣk* (Sanskrit Devanagari — विष्क) (Monier-Williams 1899: 998). In contrast to the verbal roots that formed the basis of the terms *anvikṣiki* and *darśana*, these two have a much narrower meaning: *loc* — to see, behold, perceive, to speak; to shine, and *viṣk* — to see, perceive. This is likely the evidence of the lack of the context of their use. It is justified to assume about the connection between the verb root *Lok* with the name *Lokayata* (Sanskrit Devanagari — लोकायत), which is in Monier-Williams' dictionary explained as materialism or a system of atheistic philosophy (Monier-Williams, 1899: 907). Due to the fact that the term *anvikṣiki*, like *darśana*, has at its core a verbal root with the meaning of "to see" Panikkar Raimon noted that: "The roots *ikṣ* to see, could suggest we classify *anvikshiki* as belonging to the following group of worldviews, but the traditional use of the word is always stressed it's a logical or rather *logos* character, often analytical" (Panikkar, 1993: 59). At first glance, the three verbal roots of the same meaning have formed the basis of a minimum of three important for the history of Indian philosophy terms and names that have substantially different meanings. If the roots of *ikṣ* and *drś* can be interpreted as the ones appealing to the mentality in the sense of "mental vision," then *loc* is first and foremost a vision-perception. Therefore it seems quite natural that thinkers who recognized only one source of authentic cognition — empirical perception, were called *Lokayata*.

The difference between the etymology of the terms *anvikṣiki* and *darśana* may be illustrated by the specificity of the use of the prefix *anu* in the term *anumāna* (Monier-Williams, 1899: 36-37), which is largely translated in scientific literature as a conclusion and is a key to the study of Indian logic. The term *mana* (Sanskrit Devanagari — मनस्) (Monier-Williams, 1899: 783-784) and *mānasa* (Sanskrit Devanagari — मनसा) (Monier-Williams, 1899: 783) have incredibly complex semantics that had been substantially changing throughout the history

of Indian philosophy. Mana is also translated as mind (in its widest sense as applied to all mental powers), intellect, intelligence, understanding, perception, sense, conscience; the spirit or spiritual principle, the breath or living soul that escapes from the body at death; thought, imagination, excogitation, invention, reflection, opinion, intention, inclination, affection, desire, mood, temper, spirit. A mānasa: in mind; in thought or imagination with all the heart, willingly. In general, we must admit that in the languages of the Western world, we do not find a direct analog for this term. In particular, Monier-Williams noted that in the philosophical context: “the internal organ or अन्तःकरण [IAST — antahkarana, ed.] (Monier-Williams, 1899: 43) of perception and cognition, the faculty or instrument through which thoughts enter or by which objects of sense affect the soul” (Monier-Williams, 1899: 783). A similar definition we find in the works of domestic researcher Zavhorodnii: “manas is the internal organ of humans responsible for coordinating the senses” (Zavhorodnii, 2006: 108).

The verbal root used to explain the origin of the term — man (Monier-Williams, 1899: 783) can be translated as to think, believe, imagine, suppose, conjecture; to regard or consider anyone or anything (acc.); to think one’s self or be thought to be, appear as a pass for; to be of opinion, think fit or right; to agree or be of the same opinion with (acc.); to set the heart or mind on, honor, esteem; to think of (in prayer, either “remember, meditate on,” or “mention, declare”, or “excogitate, invent”); to perceive, observe, learn, know, understand, comprehend; to offer, present, to honor, esteem, value highly; to call in question, doubt. As we can see, the widespread in the textbooks and reference books statement that mānasa is derived from the verbal root man, which should only be translated as to think, does not reveal the full range of its possible meanings. The prefix anu in both “anvīkṣiki” and “anumāna” captures a certain relationship, which is a statement of true difference — distance with which this connection is stated. Both verbal roots of iksh and mann can be translated as — to think. At the same time, they both appeal to perception, as the first one can be translated as to see¹, and the second as to perceive. We can assume that the similarity of the etymologies of anvīkṣiki and anumāna is related to the importance in their meaningful reflections on the content of the perceived or thought. That means the cognitive direction of a remote study of already accomplished acts: perception, experience, reasoning, imagination. Therefore, it seems quite natural that the term anvīkṣiki, unlike darśana, is referred to as logically discursive.

Another interesting aspect is the fact that the terms darśana and anvīkṣiki, with their rootedness in the verbal meaning of “see,” have become a kind of antithesis of the dominant in the so-called “Vedic period” the verb “hear” — śruti (Sanskrit Devanagari — श्रुति) (Monier-Williams, 1899: 1101), which can be translated as: hearing, listening, the ear, organ or power of hearing. Monier-Williams stated that: “that which was heard or communicated from the beginning, sacred knowledge orally transmitted by the Brahmans from generation to generation, the वेद [Vedas auth.]” (Monier-Williams, 1899: 1101) and such an explanation does not raise any objections. Therefore, according to the traditional interpretation, the Vedic literature is that the sacred Rishis sages “heard” and revealed the rest of the people. This “heard” gives a special status to the mentioned above outdated name of Sanskrit — Śabda, which in the scientific literature is most often used in the sense of “authoritative testimony.”

The established in the Ukrainian linguistic and cultural environment proverb: “It is better to see once than to hear one hundred times” may be the starting point for explaining why in the most used and important terms — analogs to the European word “philosophy” we find roots of the verbs with the meaning “to see.”

¹ Radhakrishnan S. translated the derived from this verb root term ikshita as perception.

Vidyā and complex terms

The term vidyā (Sanskrit Devanagari — वदिया) (Monier-Williams, 1899: 963-964) which can be translated as knowledge, science, learning, scholarship, philosophy; any knowledge whether true or false; a spell, incantation; magical skill; a kind of magical pill; a mystical, in the educational literature on philosophy of India is predominantly represented in the meaning of science. At its core, it is most likely the verbal root of sight (Monier-Williams, 1899: 963-965) which can be translated as to know, understand, perceive, learn, become or be acquainted with, be conscious of, have a correct notion of; take for, declare to be, call; to mind, notice, observe, remember; to experience, to feel; to wish to know, inquire about, to make known, announce, report, tell; to teach, to explain; to recognize or regard as, to take, to feel, experience, to wait; to find, discover, meet or fall in with, obtain, get, acquire, partake of, possess; to get or procure for; to look out, look for, attend to; to feel, to experience; to consider as; to come upon, befall, seize, visit; to contrive, accomplish, perform, effect, produce; to take to wife, marry. The reason for translating vidyā primarily as a science is that many names used to refer to different fields of knowledge contain this term. For example, Raj Kumar defines “Brahma vidyā” as philosophy, “Daiva vidyā” as theology, “Nakṣatra vidyā” as astronomy, and “Kṣatra vidyā” as science of rulership (Kumar, 2003: 47).

Tarkavidyā (Sanskrit Devanagari -तर्कवदिया) (Monier-Williams, 1899: 440), a term that can be translated as: “science of reasoning,” a manual of logic, philosophical treatise. In clarifying its etymology, in addition to the above-mentioned term vidyā, the term tarka (Sanskrit Devanagari — तर्क) is being actualized (Monier-Williams, 1899: 439), which can be translated as conjecture; reasoning, speculation, inquiry; doubt; system or doctrine based on speculation or reasoning, philosophical system; logic, confutation; desire, desire; supplying an; cause, motives; a philosophical system. This term is most likely derived from the verbal root tark (Sanskrit Devanagari — तर्क्) (Monier-Williams, 1899: 439), which is translated as to conjecture, guess, suspect, infer, try to discover or ascertain, reason or speculate about; to think as, to reflect, to think, to recollect, to have in one’s mind, to intend; to ascertain. It is noteworthy that this is the only verbal root, among those that have already been the subject of analysis in this study, which does not correlate with the value of “perception.”

The fact that the terms anvīkṣiki and tarka can be translated both as philosophy and as logic seems not to be coincidental in light of the specifics of their etymology and at the same time may be an interesting basis for explaining the specificity of the image of logic in Indian culture in future studies. Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, in Acharya Hemachandra Suri’s heritage study, found out that this thinker considered avīkṣiki and tarkavidya as synonymous (Bhattacharya, 2011: 165). It is worth noting that researchers often find it appropriate to use the meaning “philosophy” not only anvīkṣiki, tarka, tattvavidyā, but also other terms that have narrower logical inflection, such as hetuśāstra (Sanskrit Devanagari — हेतुशास्त्र) (Monier-Williams, 1899: 1304): “On the appropriateness of using anvīkṣiki as an equivalent for “philosophy” such as tarkavidya (“science of logic”) and hetusastra (“theory reasoning”) see Hacker (1958: 54-83), Halbfass (1988: 263-286) and Matilal (2002a: 358-369)” (Coseru, 2012: 20).

Tattvajñāna (Sanskrit Devanagari -तत् --ज्ञान) (Monier-Williams, 1899: 433) is a term that can be translated as: knowledge of the truth, thorough knowledge, insight into the true principles of, philosophy. Widespread in the scientific literature is the use of it in the sense of “right knowledge,” in particular: “Right knowledge (tattvajñana) brings liberation (apavarga) from all pain and suffering” (Maity, 1997: 357). The second part of this term is jñāna (Monier-

Williams, 1899: 426), a term that is predominantly used in the scientific literature with the meaning of “knowledge,” but can at the same time be translated as: knowing, becoming acquainted with, knowledge, the higher knowledge (derived from meditation on the one Universal Spirit); “knowledge about anything cognizance” conscience.

The verbal root *jñā* (Sanskrit Devanagari -ज्ना) (Monier-Williams, 1899: 425) can be translated as to know, know, become acquainted with, perceive, apprehend, understand, experience, recognize, ascertain, investigate; to know as, to know or perceive that, to regard or consider as; to acknowledge, approve, allow; to recognize as one’s own, take possession of; to visit as a friend; to engage in; to make known, announce, teach anything; to request; to wish to know or become acquainted with or to learn, investigate, examine; to wish for information about; to conjecture, to want to make known or inform. The delineated palette of meanings of the verbal roots *vid* and *jñā*, in the first place, can be interpreted by us as the one emphasizing the active position of the subject of the action, as opposed to the relative prudence and distance in *darśana* and *anvikṣiki*. In the etymology of the terms *vidyā* and *jñāna*, special attention is drawn to the connotation: possession. It is not only about perception and cognition, but also about active acquisition and appropriation of the known.

It is noteworthy also that the term *jñāna* is also the basis of the term *vijñāna* (Monier-Williams, 1899: 961), which in the scientific literature is mostly translated as consciousness, but at the same time can be translated as wisdom; discovery; the act of distinguishing or discerning, understanding, comprehending, recognizing, intelligence, knowledge; skill, proficiency, science, doctrine; worldly or profane knowledge; the faculty of discernment or right judgment; the body of knowledge; the understanding of (a particular meaning), regarding as; (with Buddhists) consciousness or thought-faculty. Along with that, the term *jñāna* is sometimes translated as “awareness” (Bilimoria, 1988: 236). Still, in conjunction with *tattva* it is mostly interpreted as knowledge: “*Tattva-jnana* — knowledge (experience) of the essential Principle” (Yogi Pranavananda, 1999: 156), “*Tattva-jnana* indicates knowledge of truth or the true principles of something” (Dalal, 2010: 410), “...of right knowledge (*tattva-jnana*)” (Dasgupta, 1933: 252).

Tattva (Sanskrit Devanagari — तत्त्व) (Monier-Williams, 1899: 432-433) a term often translated and used in the scientific literature in several meanings: essence, substance, reality. At the same time, we can translate it as true or real state, truth, reality; a true principle; the number; an element or elementary property of the essence or substance of anything; the being that; in truth, truly, really, accurately. We can assume that this term does not have any verbal root in its basis. Monier-Williams explains the etymology of this term by a combination of *tat* (Sanskrit Devanagari — तत्), the independent meaning of which he did not specify (Monier-Williams, 1899: 432, 435), and in modern English-Sanskrit dictionaries this word is translated as that,² and *tva* (Sanskrit Devanagari — त्व) (Monier-Williams, 1899: 463) which is translated as thy, your.

The word *tva* is also present in the structure of the term *tārkikatva* (Monier-Williams, 1899: 444), which we can translate as: skepticism or philosophy, which rarely attracts the attention of researchers. The first part of this term is *tārkika* (Monier-Williams, 1899: 444), which can be translated as: related or belonging to logic, a dialectician, logician, philosopher. The assumption about the etymological relationship between the term *tārkika* and the term *tarka* mentioned above seems to be justified.

² http://spokensanskrit.org/index.php?mode=3&script=hk&tran_input=%E0%A4%A4%E0%A4%A4%E0%A5%8D&direct=se&anz=100

The term *indriyāsaṅga* (Sanskrit Devanagari — इन्द्रयिसङ्ग) (Monier-Williams, 1899: 167) is also extremely rare attracts the attention of researchers and can be translated as: non-attachment to sensual objects, stoicism, philosophy. Monier-Williams translated this term with reference to “Manusmṛiti,” but the context of its use in this work needs further investigation. The etymology of *indriyāsaṅga* refers us to a term that is very important to the history of Indian philosophy — *indriya* (Monier-Williams, 1899: 167), which can be translated as: fit for or belonging to or agreeable to इन्द्र [indra auth.]; a companion of इन्द्र; power, force, the quality which belongs primarily to the mighty इन्द्र; exhibition of power, powerful; bodily power, power of the senses; virile power; semen virile; faculty of sense, sense, the organ of sense; the number five as symbolical of the five senses. *Indriya* is both an empirical body and, at the same time, a bodily force, which is understood as a manifestation of the vital active power of a certain subject. It should be noted that, for example, in Sankhya *indriya*, it is not only sight, hearing, taste, touch, smell, but also the *manas* mentioned above. It is interesting that the etymology of the term *indriya* is traditionally associated with the name of one of the main deities of Hinduism — *Indra* (Sanskrit Devanagari — इन्द्र) (Monier-Williams, 1899: 166) — the good god of heaven, to whom the Vedic tradition has attributed the most positive and constructive influence on the destiny of mankind.

The second part of the word *indriyāsaṅga* is the term *asaṅga* (Monier-Williams, 1899: 118), which can be translated as free from ties, independent; moving without obstacle; having no attachment or inclination for or interest in; non-attachment, non-inclination, which, in turn, is formed from the negative part *a* (Sanskrit Devanagari — अ) (Monier-Williams, 1899: 1) and *ṣaṅga* (Sanskrit Devanagari — सङ्ग) (Monier-Williams, 1899: 1132) sticking, clinging to, touch, contact with; relation to, association or intercourse with; addiction or devotion to, propensity for, (esp.) worldly or selfish attachment or affection, desire, wish, cupidity.

Conclusions

The verbal roots of *īkṣ* and *drś*, which are the basis of the terms *anvīkṣiki* and *darśana*, have the meanings of seeing, perceiving, and thinking. There is reason to state that these terms have become a kind of antithesis of the dominant in the so-called “Vedic period” of the verb “hear” — *śruti*. It is reasonable to assume that the transition from domination of the transpersonal Vedic “hear” to personal “see” is a sign of that significant changes when indirect testimony of inaccessible to most truth, in relationship with which a person is conditionally passive, supplants the notion of direct personal experience — a vision of truth that can be accessed by those who are actively seeking it.

An important argument in favor of attention to the terms *anvīkṣiki* and *darśana* is the fact that only they, from the list selected, were used in classical Indian literature to identify the most famous doctrines, which formed the basis for the cohesion and the definition of identity of the thinkers who formed the intellectual discourse of India of that times, that is recognized by us as a philosophical one.

The prefix *anu* in the term *anvīkṣiki* can be interpreted by us as an important component of the substantive difference between this term and *darśana*. The terms *anvīkṣiki*, *tarkavidyā*, *tarka* are translated both as philosophy and as logic. This can be explained by the fact that the verbal root *tark*, the only one of those that became the subject of analysis in this study, cannot be translated as “perception.” Instead, his translation is indicative of the subject’s personal

experience of explaining the “hidden” and “unknown,” that is not directly represented in perception. Due to the prefix *anu*, the term *anviksiki* also appeals to the manifestation of the “invisible” to what is “after” or “behind” the perception.

The reason for translating *vidyā* primarily as a science is that many names that are used to refer to different branches of knowledge contain this term. The term *jñāna* is mainly translated as knowledge, even though its content is more complex. The semantic connotations of the verbal roots *vid* and *jñā* emphasize the active position of the subject of the action, as opposed to the relative prudence and distance in *darśana* and *anvikṣiki*. It is not only about perception and comprehension, but also about active acquisition and appropriation of the known. The terms *tattva* and *tva*, in the structure of the terms *tārkikatva* and *tattvavidyā*, are an indication of one of the key subjects of consideration in Indian philosophy, for the explanation of which the word-formation of adverbs and pronouns, which emphasize the obviousness and directness of truth in its meaning, is used. The context of use of the terms *tārkikatva*, *indriyāsaṅga*, and the lack of attention given to them by the researchers, allows us to acknowledge their minorities. Still, the way of explaining the latter of them by the stoicism, which coincides with the specifics of its etymology, is an interesting aspect of the image of philosophy in the Indian culture.

Philosophy in the Indian culture emerges as a personal experience of purposeful contemplation, perception and reflection of the indisputable in its obviousness and completeness of truth, which is the basis of a system of statements that must be explained and substantiated in the teachings for students and dialogues with opponents. Philosophical knowledge is at the same time both individual and universal, and its content must be substantiated, both by personal practice and by rational evidence in “discarded” considerations and discussions.

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