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Influences of Frege’s Predicate Logic on Some Computational Models

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The purpose of this paper is to give some insights into the immense role of Frege’s first order logic (FOL) in the development of computer science. We argue that the FOL is fundamental in computer science, and that some computer science subfields could not have existed without their theoretical foundations built on this form of logic. Among these subfields, one can mention the Type Theory, Databases, Descriptive Complexity, Artificial Intelligence, Logic Programming, and Automated Theorem Proving.

To illustrate our point, an in-depth attention will in particular be given to the foundational development of the most popular logic programming language, PROLOG, and the Automated Theorem Proving (ATP) systems.

Importantly, when studying the interactions between logic and computer science in the literature, we can observe a significant gap in the provision of the appropriate abstraction level. Specifically, we often encounter two different levels of abstraction. The first of these is relatively high even when describing technical notions in computer science, which obviously produces a lack of precision. The second adopts a technical-oriented approach which easily makes the topic and discussion unintuitive or inaccessible to the non-specialist.

The paper attempts to remedy these problems by adopting a balanced approach that provides a moderate level of abstraction that targets a deeper understanding of the topic without imposing a very technical presentation on the reader.

Keywords: Frege, Predicate Logic, First Order Logic (FOL), Computer Science, Logic Programming Language, PROLOG, Resolution Principle, Kowalski’s interpretation, Automated Theorem Proving (ATP).

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Introduction

In his celebrated Begriffsschrift (or “concept notation”) published in 1879 [Frege,1879], Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) created a system of formal logic that generate a truth-functional propositional calculus and allows, among others, the analysis of a proposition into a function
and an argument instead of a subject and a predicate. This system, that mainly encompasses first order logic (FOL), introduces the notion of universal quantifiers, and implicitly that of existential quantifiers, allows performing any deduction based on the form of the expressions.

A century later, in his article on Computational Logic [Robinson, 2000], J.A. Robinson, who had introduced the Resolution Principle in 1965, considers FOL to be “all the logic we have and all the logic we need”. He points out to the central place of FOL in Logic as a discipline that had been developing since twenty centuries. He argued that “FOL can be used to set up, as first order theories, the many ’other logics’ such as modal logic, higher order logic, temporal logic, …, quantum logic; and so on and so on”. He considered that all these logics are based on One Logic: the first order logic; in his words “The ’other logics’ are simply notations reflecting syntactically sugared definitions of notions or limitations which can be formalized within FOL. There are certain universal reasoning patterns, based on the way that our minds actually work, and these are captured in FOL”.

The importance that Robinson gives to FOL in the development of Logic can be extended to other disciplines such as Philosophy, in general, and the Philosophy of Mathematics in particular, precisely because Frege’s main objective and so-called *programme* was to show that the whole of arithmetic can be deduced within his logical system that includes all the deductive inferences in mathematical use. In fact, Frege had a major target of reaching certainty and eliminating any conclusion uniquely based on intuition.

The direct consequence of Frege’s work was the creation of a syntactic system aiming at reducing, if not eliminating, deductive errors in that system. Based on all these ideas, logical inferences could consequently be done by a pure mechanical process. As is well-known his programme of deriving the whole of arithmetic within his system turned out to be inconsistent; however, its influences on the development of computer science, many decades later, were of immense importance and remains relevant 140 years after its first publication.

The term FOL, used equivalently in this paper with Predicate Logic PL, or First Order Predicate Calculus FOPC in some other resources, has provided an artificial language with precise grammar rules that could be considered “the ancestor of all programming languages in use today” as Martin Davis said in his book ‘The Universal Computer’ [Davis, 2000].

The notions of predicate logic, formalization, syntax, deductive reasoning and inference rules, made possible the idea of developing mechanical computational processes. These processes are simply the raison d’être in computing science. Consequently, FOL has been impacting a wide number of subfields in computer science. As we have mentioned in the abstract, the Logic Programming Languages, PROLOG, and the Automated Theorem Proving Systems will be brought into prominence in this paper.

After more than two decades of discoveries and development in computer science, J.A. Robinson defined in 1965 [Robinson, 1965] the clausal form, a special form of predicate logic, with a single rule of inference. Robinson’s *improved* resolution principle is a cornerstone in logic programming languages; it has initiated a decisive consequence in the development of PROLOG (Programming in Logic) by Colmerauer and Roussel [Colmerauer, 1972]. These developments including Kowalski’s interpretation [Kowalski, 1974] represented a decisive tool in implementing machine learning programs based on Muggleton’s notion of inductive logic programming [Muggleton, 1992]. In addition, the resolution principle turned out to be a very effective tool of Automated Theorem Proving, a sort of effective logic programs used to verify and prove important, usually hard, constraints. Most of these computer notions are the consequences of Frege’s predicate logic.
In the first part of this paper, we introduce Frege’s predicate Logic (often denoted by FOL) using its modern syntax and showing the high expressiveness it can have as opposite to what had been used before its introduction. In the second part, we expose Kowalski’s interpretation of the predicate logic as a programming language, followed by putting some notions, such as the Horn clauses and the resolution principle, at the center of PROLOG and the ATP developments. These two topics are respectively discussed in detail in the third and the fourth parts of the paper. The conclusion highlights some future investigations on the role of FOL in other subfields of computer science.

2. Overview of Frege’s predicate logic

This section introduces the main terms used in the predicate logic and shows its high level of expressiveness by giving some examples written in modern predicate logic that might not have been sufficiently precisely expressed before Frege’s development of his logic.

A term can be a simple name of object (‘5’), a complex term representing an object (‘5-2’), or a sentence which is a well-formed sequence of complex terms. These complex terms are usually considered as functions having arguments. Any concept is an n-place function which maps every argument to a truth-value, true or false, and produces a truth-value.

In Frege’s predicate logic, a predicate is analyzed as concept which is a special case of a function. In this sense, Frege’s logic is a functional application rather a predicate application which is exactly the opposite of the modern use of functions and predicates (or relations).

In addition, more complex expressions requiring for example the negation and the conditional are possible in the Frege’s notations. Frege used the identity sign to represent the equivalence of two conditions. This is usually replaced by the biconditional in the modern texts.

On the other hand, the quantification is fundamental in Frege’s logic. The use of ‘every’ and ‘some’ makes his logic deal with more complex inference rules. Note that Frege has not introduced the existential quantifier in his symbolic system, but this is obviously obtained by using the negation and the universal quantifier.

It is important to mention that in Frege’s logic a relation of the form \( \exists x, R(x, \text{instance}) \) or of the form \( \exists x, R(\text{instance}, x) \) are both instances of a single inference rule. Formally, this relation can capture these two inferences as follows: \( R(a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n) \rightarrow \exists x, R(a_1, \ldots, x, \ldots, a_n) \) where the relation R has possibly n arguments, and \( a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n \) are constants \( \forall a_i, 1 \leq i \leq n \).

This means that the variable \( x \) can precede or follow the constant \( \text{instance} \) in the list of arguments of \( R \) without modifying the structure of the inference rule. The variable \( x \) is bound (belonging to a values domain) by what is called variable-binding operators “some \( x \) is such that”.

In addition, Frege’s logic permits to express ideas like “every function \( f \) is such that” and “some function \( f \) is such that”. This possibility, that allows quantification over functions similarly over objects, describes, in fact, a second-order predicate calculus. For example, if the two arguments \( x \) and \( y \) fall under the concept function \( f \), then this second-order predicate calculus expression can be written as \( \forall f, f(x) \leftrightarrow f(y) \).

Furthermore, the use of nested quantifiers in Frege’s logic is one of the most remarkable new possibilities. With Frege, the quantifiers can be combined to express more complex propositions. For example, the difference between the two sentences “Every man loves a woman” and “There is some woman whom every man loves” is easily expressed without any
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Ambiguity by using two nested quantifiers which was not possible to express accurately before Frege. These two sentences are, respectively, expressed as follows using modern symbols:

\[(\forall x)(\exists y) (\text{Man}(x) \to (\text{Woman}(y) \land \text{Loves}(x,y)))\]
\[(\exists y)(\forall x) (\text{Woman}(y) \land (\text{Man}(x) \to \text{Loves}(x,y)))\]

Based on this powerful expressiveness of the FOL, many definitions in Mathematics became very precise using nested quantifiers. A typical example in calculus is the difference between the definitions of the continuity and the uniform continuity of a function. Using the modern symbols of Frege’s predicate logic, these two definitions can be accurately expressed using nested quantifiers as follows:

The continuity of \( f \):
\[(\forall \varepsilon)(\forall x)(\exists \delta)(\forall y)(|x-y|<\delta \to |f(x)-f(y)|<\varepsilon)\]

The uniform continuity of \( f \):
\[(\forall \varepsilon)(\exists \delta)(\forall x)(\forall y)(|x-y|<\delta \to |f(x)-f(y)|<\varepsilon)\]

It is important to mention two fundamental properties in Frege’s predicate logic: the soundness and the completeness. A deductive system is called complete if every logically valid formula is the conclusion of some formal deduction. In other words, if the output is satisfiable, then the inputs must also have been satisfiable (if it is possible to assign an interpretation making the formula true).

Conversely, the soundness is the fact that only logically valid formulas are provable in the deductive system. This means if the inputs of an inference rule were satisfiable, then its output would also be satisfiable.

Fortunately, the predicate calculus is sound and refutation complete (the predicate logic system is able to derive false from every set of formulas which are unsatisfiable). This means that given a formula in predicate logic with no interpretation that can make it true, it follows that the system can derive false from that formula. The idea of refutation is central in automated theorem proving and will be discussed below in the text. These two fundamental properties of the predicate logic are primary due to the Herbrand and Gödel theorems.

Hence, based on these fundamental definitions, a syntactic and semantic correspondence between the predicate logic and programming languages can be shown now. This correspondence is known to be the Kowalski’s interpretation and is elaborated upon in the following section.

3. Predicate Logic as Programming Languages

It is fascinating to see how a formal first order logic system developed by Frege for a philosophical status of Mathematics is interpreted one century later as a computer programming language. Kowalski’s interpretation considers part of the predicate logic supplemented by Robinson’s principle discussed below to give, with Van Emden, syntactic and semantic meanings to the predicate logic which is understood as a programming language. In this section we start introducing this interpretation before discussing the Robinson’s principle.

3.1 Predicate logic and Kowalski’s interpretation

In his celebrated article “Predicate Logic as Programming Language” written in 1974, R. Kowalski gave an interpretation of Predicate Logic as a programming language based on the interpretation of the sentence \( A_1 \land A_2 \land \ldots \land A_n \to B \) as procedure declaration, where \( B \) represents the procedure name, and \( A_i \) to \( A_n \) are the procedure calls representing the body of the procedure.
In this interpretation, a problem to be solved is seen as a theorem to be proved, and a proof is a set of computations generated by a Theorem-Proving mechanism which executes the program put in the axioms.

Importantly, Kowalski’s interpretation is based on the notion of clausal form. An expression or sentence in clausal form is a set of clauses, and a single clause is a pair of sets of atomic formulas, called also literals, having the following form:

\[ A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_n \rightarrow B_1, B_2, \ldots, B_m \] (1)

In this context, an atomic formula is a \( k \)-place predicate symbol of \( k \) terms of the form \( P(t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_k) \). Every term \( t_i \) can be a variable or an \( h \)-place function symbol where the function’s arguments are terms. The predicate symbols, the function symbols, and the variables are mutually disjoint.

It is also important to interpret the semantic of the set of clauses as a conjunction \( C_1 \land C_2 \land \ldots \land C_n \) and each clause of the form (1) with \( k \) variables \( x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_k \) is interpreted as an implication using a universal quantifier. This clause can be described as \( \forall x_i, i = 1 \ldots k: A_1 \land A_2 \land \ldots \land A_n \rightarrow B_1 \lor B_2 \lor \ldots \lor B_m \).

Remark that the neutral truth-value of the conditional part \( A_1 \land A_2 \land \ldots \land A_n \) is true, and the neutral truth-value in the conclusion \( B_1 \lor B_2 \lor \ldots \lor B_m \) is False. This remark will be used below in the text when analyzing the different cases of these clausal forms.

Note that this form is equivalent to a disjunction of terms based on the fact that \( (p \rightarrow q) \leftrightarrow (\neg p \lor q) \), and a sentence of clauses, seen as conjunction of disjunctions, is usually called a CNF (Conjunctive Normal Form or Clausal Normal Form).

In the same paper, Kowalski considers that a clausal form constitutes a natural language that expresses thought in line with what Robinson has already done by introducing efficiently the resolution principle.

In the above, we have given an overview of the language’s syntax, i.e. the form in which a sentence can be written, of a predicate logic sublanguage. In order to understand the meaning of these sentences using a programming language terminology, another discussion of the semantic of that sublanguage is required. This is the purpose of the next section that matches every form of a predicate logic sentence with its behaviour when executed in a logic programming language.

Such a sentence is written in so-called Horn clauses, previously pointed to by A. Horn in 1951, turned out to be fundamental in Logic programming languages (see infra). These special sorts of clauses are discussed in the following subsection.

### 3.2 Horn clauses and programming semantics of Frege’s logic

In this paragraph, we analyse all the possibilities of a clausal form written in a suitable form, the Horn clause, which used in computer programming. This will prove helpful in understanding the functionalities of PROLOG language introduced in section 4.

A Horn clause is a clause with at most one positive literal in the conclusion (or equivalently at most one positive literal when the clause is written as a disjunction of terms. This definition, describing a sub-language of predicate logic, generates four different cases of a Horn clause.

The semantic interpretation of these cases in term of programming language meanings represents two ideas. The first is a basis theoretical correspondence of a subset of predicate
calculus form, written as a Horn clause, and programming language. The second is a fundamental contribution to the development of a Logic Programming Language, PROLOG. This point will be re-discussed below in the text.

The four cases of a Horn clause are the following:

1. The **null clause** where no literals are used in the condition neither in the conclusion. In programming language interpretation, it corresponds to a halting instruction or reaching-the-goal instruction. In a procedural meaning, it is an anonymous procedure without body.

2. No literals in the condition and one literal in the conclusion. This takes the form \[ \text{true} \rightarrow B \], which is equivalent to \[ \text{false} \lor B \] and also equivalent to \[ \text{true} \land B \] corresponding to exactly one positive literal \( B \). Again remember that True has replaced the empty part as a neutral truth-value among the conjunctions. The meaning of this form is simply a Fact. It corresponds to a procedure without body.

3. When there is \( n \) literals in the condition and no literals in the conclusion. The sentence form is \( (A_1 \land A_2 \land \ldots \land A_n) \rightarrow \); this is equivalent to \( (A_1 \land A_2 \u2228 \ldots \u2228 A_n) \rightarrow \text{false} \). Its interpretation is seen as a goal instruction. The goal consists of executing the list of procedure calls \( A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_n \). In this case, the main procedure is considered anonymous.

4. The more general case is \( (A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_n) \rightarrow B \). This case with exactly one positive literal \( B \) is usually called **definite clause**. As used before, the conclusion \( B \) corresponds to a procedure name, and the condition \( (A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_n) \), the procedure body, is a set of \( n \) calls.

This discussion leads us now to introduce the resolution principle, a powerful way to generate a solution from a set of clausal sentences by, roughly speaking, finding two identical predicates and trying to substitute a variable by a constant. We will see that these two operations, Matching/Instantiating, constitute the computational core of PROLOG.

### 3.3 The role of the resolution principle in logic of programming languages

As previously mentioned the importance of the resolution principle in logic programming language stems from the fact that it has been developed as specific operations applied on a subset of the predicate logic. Its main objective is to provide a powerful mechanical process in a computerized theorem-proving. This principle has been improved by Robinson and played a central role in Kowalski’s work discussed supra. Even though Robinson’s work precedes that of Kowalski, the high impact of this principle on PROLOG language led us to introduce these concepts in this order, on our way towards section 4 that will focus on PROLOG functioning in some detail.

The Resolution Principle (RP) is an inference rule used in theorem proving by refutation (i.e. tries to find a contradiction of the negated rule to be proven). This principle deals with Skolemized formulas of the form \( \forall x_1, \ldots, \forall x_n, X \), where \( X \) is a CNF formula without quantifiers.

In propositional logic, Modus Ponens can be considered as a special case of the resolution principle: \( (p \rightarrow q) \land p \rightarrow q \) or again \( (\neg p \lor q) \land p \rightarrow q \). The general case is a single inference rule that entails a new clause from two clauses containing complementary literals \( (p \land \neg p) \).

Interestingly, a generalized approach can be applied to clauses in predicate logic. The resolution principle in predicate logic is based on a key technique called the **Unification**. The Unification is a sort of matching operation that takes two terms and tries to make them identical by instantiating the variables in both terms.
For example, if we have $\forall x, (A(x) \rightarrow B(x)) \land A(t)$ we can obtain $B(t)$ when applying the resolution principle and using the unifier $[x/t]B(t)$.

Remark that usually this is written by omitting the quantifiers and by using the CNF form. It becomes $((\neg A(x) \lor B(x)) \land A(t)) \rightarrow B(t)$.

This Unification allows the creation of factors which reduce the duplication of terms.

For example, $P(x) \lor \neg(Q(f(x), a)) \lor P(g(y))$ is factored to $P(g(y)) \lor \neg(Q(f(g(y)), a))$.

In terms of Kowalski’s interpretation, the resolution principle is seen as procedural semantics.

The procedure invocation can be used to generate new procedure (or assertions). For example, given a procedure $A_i$ that matches a procedure name $B$ using a substitution function $f$ with $(A_1, A_2, ..., A_n) \rightarrow A$ and $(B_1, B_2, ..., B_m) \rightarrow B$, a new procedure is generated as follows: $(A_1, A_2, ..., A_{(i-1)}, B_1, B_2, ..., B_m, A_{(i+1)}, ..., A_n) f$ where $f$ is a function that substitutes a variable by a term.

The Horn clauses form and the resolution principle are of high importance in computational logic in general, and in the automated theorem proving in particular. One reason of the effectiveness of the Horn clauses in theorem proving is the fact that the resolvent, the produced clause by resolution, of two Horn clauses is itself a Horn clause, and the resolvent of a goal clause and a definite clause is a goal clause.

While it is known that the resolution principle was already discussed by Davis and Putnam in 1960, their algorithm worked unfortunately in an exhaustive instantiation way over a formula which creates what is called a “combinatorial explosion”. Robinson’s effective solution used a unification algorithm that allows the instantiation process to act during the proof until the finding of a contradiction. By doing that, this “combinatorial explosion” has been avoided.

In sum, the refined resolution principle, based primary on Frege’s first order logic, has perfectly prepared the theoretical foundations to create a new logic programming language. This language is called PROLOG and remains used today in Artificial intelligence and many other applications.

4. The place of Frege’s logic in PROLOG’S origin

PROLOG (Programming in Logic), a programming language based on the predicate logic is perhaps the most natural and representative example of the influences and the “success” of Frege’s logic in computer science. It was developed in 1972 by A. Colmerauer with P. Roussel with a first intention of creating a declarative language. The program is basically expressed as facts and rules to describe relations, and a query that generates a sequence of computations over these facts and rules. It is a sort of formulas assumed true and representing the premises in predicate logic. These formulas are written as Horn clauses. When trying to answer a query, PROLOG builds a search tree using the resolution and unification principle. The procedural semantics of PROLOG is a procedure trying to satisfy a set of goals. The procedure lists the truth or falsity of this set of goals and their respective unifications (or instantiations). A very important mechanism in PROLOG is the automatic backtracking in order to find other solutions. This idea is, by itself, a corn stone in the development of predicate logic evolving from a formal system describing truths to a sort of mechanical process to generate new truths from a set of premises and inference rules.

In PROLOG, a definite clause works as a goal-reduction procedure, and its syntax is shown in reverse form as exactly used by Kowalski. For example, the definite clause $B \leftarrow (A_1 \land A_2 \land ... \land A_n)$ is interpreted as “to prove $B$, prove $(A_1 \land A_2 \land ... \land A_n)$” to highlight
the fact that to prove the goal \( B \), the literals \((A_1 \land A_2 \land \ldots \land A_n)\) have to be proved before. This corresponds again to Kowalski’s semantics interpretation discussed above when \( B \) represents the procedure name and \( A_i \) to \( A_n \) are the procedure calls. This Horn clause is represented in PROLOG as follows:

\[
B: - A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_n.
\]

On the other hand, the proof by refutation is a central idea in PROLOG processing. For example, to prove a goal clause \( C \) in a program \( P \), PROLOG adds the negation of \( C \) (\( \neg C \)) to the program and tries to find a contradiction (represented by false as result). So in order to prove \( C \), PROLOG refutes not \( C \). In the very used problem of solving the existential quantifier over a list of positive literals \((\exists x (a \land b \land \ldots \land k))\), the negation of this sentence will be treated as \((\forall x (\neg a \lor \neg b \lor \ldots \lor \neg k))\) or again \((\forall x (\text{false} \leftarrow (a \land b \land \ldots \land k)))\) and represented as “:- a, b, \ldots, k”.

Note once again that this existential clause (written here in Horn clause) was also replaced in the original Frege’s system by the universal quantifier over the negation of the clause.

In this context, it is pertinent to mention that the resolution-based theorem proving uses the proof by refutation approach. In order to prove a sentence, it can be more suitable to obtain a contradiction when its negation is added to the system. This is often the case in computational logic. For that reason, most automated theorem proving use the proof by refutation.

The following section algorithmically highlights how PROLOG performs its computation when receiving a set of premises and how it applies the resolution principle.

5. Predicate logic and computational aspects of the resolution principle

In this section, in addition to illustrating the resolution principle working in PROLOG through a detailed example, we develop a reflection on the comparison of the human-oriented and the machine-oriented reasoning in a deductive system. We will see, for example, why the predicate logic using the resolution principle is very effective when executed by a computer. In this sense, the computational aspect and relevance of applying such a principle on a first order logic is highlighted.

As we have seen, the Horn clauses, a subset language of predicate logic combined with the principle of resolution/unification constitute the heart of computation process in logic programming languages such as PROLOG.

The mechanical proof of a formula or the Resolution proof algorithm can be described as follows:

1. Given a set of theorems as a knowledge base (KB) written in conjunctive normal form (CNF), and a formula \( F \) to be proved, the negation of \( F \) is added to the KB.
2. Repeat until no more clauses to be resolved:
   - Find resolvable clauses by applying the resolution/unification principle (matching/instantiation) and add the result (the resolvant) to the KB.
   - If the resolvant is false (NIL), declare the formula \( F \) true (because its negation is false)
3. Declare the formula \( F \) false.
Note that in the preceding algorithm a decision of type True/False is given without explicitly listing the many possible solutions that a potential conjecture can generate. This is exactly the case in the following example in which we go a little further than finding a simple Yes/No answer. We introduce a KB having a main request conjecture with a variable. This means that the procedure’s objective is not only to check the validity of the conjecture, but also to generate all possible solutions (if they exist) by finding the list of values that can be instantiated to this variable. In particular, the sentence Loves (Marc, x) initiates a search process of all “values” of x that Marc loves.

Who does Marc love?
\[ \exists x: \text{Loves} (\text{Marc}, x) \]

The Knowledge base written in clausal form is as follows:
1. \(\neg \text{Sees} (\text{Marc}, v) \lor \text{Loves} (\text{Marc}, v)\)
2. \(\text{Sees} (\text{Marc}, \text{Mary})\)
3. \(\text{Sees} (y, \text{Alice})\)
4. \(\text{Sees} (z, \text{Mother}(z))\)

The given #5 is the negation of the original conjecture to be proved. Using a variable x it is seen as a question that calculates all possible values of x.

5. \(\neg \text{Loves} (\text{Marc}, x) \) (since \(\neg \exists x: \text{Loves} (\text{Marc}, x) \iff \forall x: \neg \text{Loves}(\text{Marc},x)\))

The resolution with 5 and 1 unify(Loves(Marc, x), Loves(Marc, v)) = \{x/v\} means x is substituted by v and gives:
6. \(\neg \text{Sees} (\text{Marc}, v)\)

Three possible resolutions can be calculated:
- With 6 and 2 unify(Sees(Marc, v), Sees(Marc, Mary))= \{v/Mary\}
- With 6 and 3 unify(Sees (Marc, v), Sees (y, Alice)) = \{y/Marc, v/Alice\}
- With 6 and 4 unify(Sees (Marc, v), Sees (z, Mother(z))) = \{z/Marc, v/Mother(z)\}

These 3 unifications give, respectively, three possible solutions:
- Loves(Marc,x) with \{x/v, v/Mary\} (i.e. Marc loves Mary)
- Loves(Marc,x) with \{x/v, y/Marc, v/Alice\} (i.e. Marc loves Alice)
- Loves(Marc,x) with \{x/v, z/Marc, v/Mother(z), } (i.e. Marc loves his mother)

This example shows at least two significant facts. The first of these is that it only uses the resolution principle based on Unifying/Instantiating rules written in clausal forms. Secondly, if these rules become much more complex, the mechanical deduction process remains exactly the same. These two points, complex rule/one mechanism, constitute a very suitable Machine-oriented approach in order to obtain new deductions. This approach, when implemented with specific search algorithm such as a backtracking procedure, can be executed in a very effective way.

Typically, a Human-oriented deduction is based on a sequence of simple deductive steps each of which is easy to be “humanly” verified based on the premises, the preceding steps, and also simple rules of inference. The number of steps generated to obtain a final deduction could be very long, but it is still possible to use by an intuitive-human mechanism.
However, this mechanism, due to various reasons, is absolutely ineffective when executed by a computer. The first of these is that computers, for instance!, have no “intuition”. Secondly, a potentially big number of steps based on different rules of inference easily creates a \textit{combinatorial explosion} in term of execution effectiveness. Additionally, a more complex but few number of inference rules are much better executed by a computer. This is exactly how and what a resolution principle produces when implemented in a modern computer. The combinatorial explosion is, then, avoided and more effective deductions are obtained. The resolution principle has also been already refined by Kowalski and Kuehner to obtain linear deductions (SL-Resolution) showing a very high performance in practical implementation. An example of implementing the linear resolution is the Edinburgh Structure-Sharing Linear Resolution Theorem Prover.

To give the reader a sense on the widespread disciplinary use of FOL, the following last part discusses one of the most successful applications of FOL in computer science, the automated theorem proving. Those powerful computer programs use, generally, many concepts discussed previously, in particular the proof by refutation combined with the resolution principle.

\section{6. Predicate logic and automated theorem proving systems}

Another significant consequence of the predicate logic development in computer science is the automated theorem proving systems.

In this section, we describe these systems by linking them mainly to the first order logic, and then we discuss the use of such programs to solve theoretical problems as well as solving industrial problems. We continue by giving some known ATP systems and representative applications where these systems are mostly used.

\subsection*{6.1 Description of automated theorem proving}

Automated Theorem Proving (ATP) aims at the implementation of software that proves a conjecture assumed to be a true statement, to be logically derived from a set of premises. If this proof succeeds, the conjecture is then called theorem. The most used logical language in which the conjecture and the premises are introduced is a first order logic, but it could be written in higher order logic or a different logic’s type.

In line with the preceding discussion showing the precision and the expressiveness of the first order logic, the formal way of accurately expressing the required statements (conjecture and premises) is a central strength of ATP. The problem is submitted without any ambiguity, and the proof mechanism of ATP tries to find a solution by applying exactly some of the computation approaches discussed above in this paper such as CNF, Resolution and Unification principle, etc.

In most of ATP systems, the proof of a theorem or the disproof of the conjecture is followed by a detailed description of the steps that lead to the final conclusion. The user, when following these, usually very large, steps, can better understand why the conclusion is derived or not from the premises. Moreover, sometimes these detailed steps constitute by themselves a more interesting solution to the problem than a simple Yes/No answer. For example, given an initial configuration of a game with an objective to check if another configuration can be reached (i.e. a winning configuration), the provided steps by the ATP proof constitute exactly the steps to follow in order to solve the problem (to win in this example). These points make, generally the ATP systems very powerful computer programs able to solve hard problems using an “acceptable” time complexity. The ATP techniques are diverse. The most popular
techniques are, among others, First-order resolution with unification, Model elimination (Loveland), Model checking, Higher-order unification.

6.2 Main applications of ATP systems

The ATP systems or what is called Provers are used in different domains, and the main successful uses were related to logic, mathematics, computer science, and engineering. Originally, the ATP systems have been implemented to prove mathematical conjectures. Nowadays, it covers a very large variety of domains, but the most used applications concern certainly formal methods for software verification and design, and hardware verification. The use of ATP in this type of application is of huge commercial importance. It could prevent costly many errors that potentially exist in, for example, a hardware integrated circuit implemented in any scientific machine’s component (medical instrument, robot, nuclear controller, space engine, etc.).

Many applied successful examples of ATP systems in mathematics, software and computer engineering are given below in the text.

6.3 Propositional provers versus first-order provers

The difference of expressiveness between the propositional logic and the first order logic remains significant when these two logics types are used to implement two different provers of the corresponding logics. This section discusses these two types of provers without ignoring some basic technical improvements that first order provers have realized.

A propositional prover (or SAT solver), based in propositional logic, is basically a Boolean satisfiability solver where the problem is expressed as Boolean terms. The SAT solvers (such as zChaff) are very useful but the Boolean expressions become rapidly very large and the expressiveness of such expressions is generally very limited. These two points constitute the basic weaknesses of a typical SAT solver. Note that the SAT problem turned out to be the first proved NP-complete problem, which generally takes an exponential complexity to solve a substantial problem.

On the other hand, a First order logic theorem prover, which includes quantifiers and predicates, is much more expressive than a SAT prover. The main strength is the Robinson’s resolution principle implemented in first order logic that makes the steps of a search proof mechanical. This category of provers is certainly one of the most mature and developed parts of the ATP systems. A problem is usually expressed in a natural way using an expressive specification.

It is useful to mention that some problems requiring equality for better expressiveness are not always running effectively under a classic first order logic prover. Consequently, many modern provers including equality (Equational theorem provers, such as E prover) have been developed to overcome this obstacle. In general, these sorts of provers implement specific search heuristics for a better performance. This approach that uses search heuristic and based on first order logic prover is very applied in modern machine learning, an ability given to computers that act and learn without being explicitly programmed.

Importantly, one of the most significant and first successes of first order logic provers was software verification. Specifically, the provers verify the correctness of programs written in different programming languages such as Ada, Pascal, or Java. One well-known example of program verification, Stanford Pascal Verifier, was implemented by David Luckham at Stanford University and based similarly on Robinson resolution principle.
Let us now select some renowned provers and discuss their characteristic and successes. The following section is dedicated for this objective.

### 6.4 Some well-known provers in historical prospects

In this paragraph, we discuss some basic examples FOL provers. One of the oldest provers (launched in 1989) is SETHEO, which was developed at the Technical University of Munich. It is a high-performance system based on the goal-directed model elimination calculus.

Another FOL ATP is Vampire, which was developed in 1994 by Voronkov-Hoder and formerly by Riazanov at Manchester University. Vampire is used to solve a large variety of problems, but it is well effective in software verification, hardware design and verification, knowledge representation and reasoning, and Mathematical theorem proving.

The E prover is yet another example of a high-performance prover and friendly reasoning system. It was developed in 1998 by S. Shulz at Technical University of Munich. It is a full first-order logic prover, but built on a purely equational calculus.

EQP is another first order and equational logic prover designed at Argonne National Laboratory and very known to have proved Robbins’ conjecture in 1998. One of its characteristics is the effectiveness of performing associative-commutative unification and matching operations.

As for the worth-mentioning Waldmeister prover is a unit-equational first-order logic developed at Max Planck Institute for Computer Science in 1998. It is known to have a high performance in terms of time and space complexity.

Another interesting example is that of W. McCune, at Argonne National Laboratory, who implemented Prover9 in 2004 as a successor of Otter and first-order and equational logic ATP. This prover has later been paired with Mace4.

Finally, SPASS, first order logic theorem prover with equality, has been launched in 2010 by Research Group Automation of Logic at Max Planck Institute for Computer Science, was extended to SPASS-XDB to incorporate facts from relational databases.

On the other hand, several higher order logic provers have been developed and accomplished, during the last 50 years, enormous number of tasks in, among others, Mathematics and engineering. ACL2, Coq, HOL, and Nqthm represent some of these provers.

As we have just seen, the use of provers based on Frege’s first order is widespread and represents an essential tool in computer science. The ATP systems are used in a very large number of applications. The next subsection shows different domains that successfully use the ATP systems.

### 6.5 ATP systems: some successful examples

Historically, ATP systems have been solicited to prove interesting and hard problems in Mathematics (Graph theory, Group theory, Algebra, Geometry, etc.), Software design and verification, hardware verification, etc. The following selected examples show the wide range of applications in which ATP systems, and particularly FOL provers, are increasingly used to prove harder and costly important problems.

In the following, we list some successful ATP systems in various disciplines and fields.

**Mathematics**

- The FOL prover Otter has proved many results in quasi-groups and used by K. Kunen.
The FOL prover Otter has also been used by McCune to find minimal axiom sets and to solve other problems in Algebraic structures.

The Japanese system ICOT helped to decide many quasi-groups problems and used by Fujuta-Slaney-Benett.

The EQP (the equational Prover), a FOL prover, has been used to finally solve the Robbin’s problem conjecturing that a specific set of axioms constitute a basis for Boolean Algebra.

Geometry Expert, a geometry prover, has proved new results in Euclidean geometry.

NUPRL, a higher order prover, has proved Higman’s lemma and Gerard’s paradox.

Software Design

The project Amphion, financed by NASA, using Knowledge-Based Software Engineering, and based on formal methods (roughly provers) in order to automate software reuse that improve software productivity and quality.

The system KIDS used to create scheduling algorithms using operations permitting the development of code from the specifications. This system was designed at Kestrel Institute.

Software verification

The PVS system deals with scheduling applications and specification of space flight control procedures.

The KIV (Karlsruhe Interactive Verifier) is used for different software verification applied to special functions, graph manipulation, verification of PROLOG program under WAM (Warren Abstract Machine).

The Key project deals with the verification process related to object-oriented paradigm.

Hardware verification

Bell laboratories used the higher order logic HOL system as interactive environment theorem proving for industrial hardware verification.

Some proofs of the correctness of codes related to the floating point division have been tested using the ACL2 system. These codes concerned specific types of AMD microprocessor. Similar type of verification has been done by Nqthm for the correctness of the FM9001 microprocessor.

This section has shown some representative fields in which the ATP systems are successfully used mainly by the experts for a research interest or for an industrial purpose. However, some ATP systems are now accessible online for different categories of users. The TPTP (Thousands of Problems for Theorem Provers) is an important example of an online library interface to many ATP systems developed at the University of Miami.

Conclusion

This paper has mainly shown the indispensable role Frege’s predicate logic has played in the foundations and development of the most popular logic programming language, PROLOG.
The predicate logic supplemented by logic programming languages has led to the development of one of the most significant successful FOL-based fields in computer science: the ATP systems. The list of computer science applications that have benefited from the predicate logic is very long. Probably, each of these applications deserves a dedicated investigation.

For example, the Machine Learning in artificial intelligence, a capacity of computer systems to learn and act without preceding exhaustive programming took originally its basis from the FOL and logic programming language. In particular, the works of Muggleton in the early 1990s led to develop a special form of Machine Learning, inductive supervised machine learning called Inductive Logic Programming (ILP) that has logic programs as inputs and outputs.

A fascinating example of ILP that also deserves more investigation is program induction. Its main objective becomes not only to deal with examples but to induce a program from many examples of inputs and outputs.

These modern applications of computer science that took their basis from Frege’s predicated logic and improved by other concepts prove, once again, that this logic type remains today relevant and fundamental in several computerized models.

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Culture of National Philosophical Communities: the Project Dedicated to the Research of Modern Ukrainian Philosophical Traditions

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The article introduces a new Ukrainian research project related to the preparation of a collective monograph. This monograph will highlight the activities of modern Ukrainian philosophical communities. Such communities in their totality constitute a modern national philosophical culture and its study belongs to the category of macro-humanitarian research.

The basis for a holistic observation of a culture is, on the one hand, digital technologies that enable technically to take into account practically all the studies that are carried out in a particular field in a certain period of time. On the other hand, new methodological developments are emerging that allow us to quickly process large text arrays. An example of such methodological innovations can be considered the study of American-Italian literary critic Franco Moretti. Moretti examines the opportunities that arise when using “distant reading.”

The article emphasizes that the main advantage of “distant reading” is the possibility of taking into account the whole body of texts, and not only its canonical kernel.

Introduces the idea of «compression reading» as a special kind of “rapid reading”, which allows you to get the most general idea of the text based on the analysis of the title of the text and its annotation. The development of compression reading technologies along with distant reading technologies will allow efficient and efficient processing of large array of texts.

The expediency of actualization of the whole textual array formed in this or that humanitarian field of research is associated with the development of a new ethic. This ethic is the ethic of collective labor. A new understanding of the collective is considered, which is possible only with careful consideration of any manifestation of the individual.

Keywords: macro-humanitarian studies, arrays of texts, philosophical culture, philosophical tradition, Ukrainian philosophical culture, compressed reading, distant reading

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Introduction

An attempt to view a particular national philosophical culture in its entirety and complexity up to the very last time seemed a task almost impracticable and unnecessary. Indeed, what can the new philosophers give to the global humanity who builds its arguments on the “edge of the philosophical mainstream”, far from the world’s philosophical trends, often with very strange and unusual methods? However, in recent years, researchers have arrived at the conclusion that modernity requires the consideration of every “shift in thought”, for all of them collectively characterize all the planetary mental processes. For example, the American-Italian literary critic Franco Moretti proposes to re-examine the influence of key European literary traditions on the development of literature around the world [Moretti, 2016].

Digital technologies and challenges of the “new ethics” (the ethics of a new man) stimulate the development of humanitarian macro-research, to which a Ukrainian project of studying contemporary Ukrainian philosophical traditions belongs.

Technical and methodological prerequisites of the project

The results of philosophical work settle in a multitude of texts: articles and monographs. Articles are published in journals of very different levels. Some of these publications are recognized in the national professional community and are included into the international science-metric databases. Others are known only in the narrow circle of those individuals who directly cooperate with them. And, nevertheless, the existence of such publications is justified, because with these publications many young researchers start their path to real science, to philosophy. Such journals are more tolerant towards various formal authorial innovations, and this fact stimulates the development of the entire research culture. However, unfortunately, many of the noted journals are practically “not visible”: neither within the national professional community, nor, especially, in the global world. Therefore, numerous texts settle “dead weight”. It is difficult to calculate how many such publications annually are out of experts’ sight.

Not the best fate awaits those texts that are published in the journals of a higher level. The reason is that they are also not read much. Alas, but “misunderstanding” seems to have become a characteristic feature of our time. The dependence turns out to be inversely proportional: the more people start to write, the less they read. In addition, in this situation it seems clear that it’s time to talk about new techniques of reading. Such techniques could be called, for example, “fast”, “compressed”, or “concise” reading.

A variant of the new reading technology is offered by the already mentioned Franco Moretti, who has called this reading “distant reading.”

Moretti actively promotes the introduction of digital methods into the human studies (“digital humanities” (DH)). Due to the possibilities of digital humanities, the problem of accounting for everything that had been already published within a particular topic in a certain period of time is easily solved. However, here the researchers confront with the problem of the analysis of the formed body of texts, that is to say more precisely, the problem of macroanalysis of the textual array. For the last twenty years, Franco Moretti has been trying to develop a similar line of research within the literary criticism. In this case, the texts are read not so much “in the depths” (“close reading”), as examined against the background of the whole text array.

Moretti’s innovations are interesting at least for two reasons. Firstly, thanks to the methods used by him, practically all the texts that were written down (for example, for one or another discipline at one time or another) can be taken into consideration. Moretti, while studying
British literature, notes the existence of some recognized “canon” in the whole body of texts which comprises approximately one percent of all the written. These texts Moretti calls “texts of the canon” [Moretti, 2016: 250], and all the rest texts he labels as “The Archive of the Great Unread” [Moretti, 2016: 249]. While reading those texts which were included into this archive, the researcher notes that “the usual coordinates are lost — only a lot of hybrids and oddities are visible, in relation to which the categories of literary taxonomy are useless” [Moretti, 2016: 249]. These texts can be called abnormal, unusual, and most often they do not fall into the field of researchers’ view because of their otherness, and marginality.

If we move from literature to any other humanitarian field of research, the results will most likely be the similar: there are texts that canonize this or that research, and practically unknown marginal text arrays.

The second reason why Moretti’s studies are viewed as very promising lies in the following. If “distant reading” is aimed at mastering not just one text but a whole text corpus, then it becomes possible to view this case as some kind of integrity and observe the various processes, which are characteristic for this particular integrity.

Thus, the technologies of macro-humanitarian analysis are actualized. It is clear that scientists need to create all these technologies as well as to develop ways for digital visualization of these or those subjects. There many other tasks arrive. Moretti’s works are still the first pioneer researches in the corresponding direction.

In numerous discussions of contemporary literary critics on Moretti’s innovations, we can often hear the question: why do we need all these macro-studies, macro-visualizations at all? What can they give to a particular person? And this question seems rather strange for modern scholars involved, for example, in the research on the dynamics of complex systems, complexity as such. For them, the main result of the efforts spent on the analysis of textual arrays is seen in the emerging possibility of some “taming of complexity”, mastering of infinite plurality as well as understanding the trends characteristic of modern humanities in general.

**Compressed reading.** Intellectual consideration of large text arrays actualizes the need for the development of special reading techniques, of which we have already spoken above, that is, “compact”, “compressed”, “fast”, “concise” reading.

We can try to show the difference between “compressed reading” (this term will be used later) and “distant reading.”

Compressed reading assumes the mastering of the text not in the fullness of its meaningful revelations but only in the most important direction of development of thought singled out and emphasized by the author of the text, which is fixed in: 1) the title; 2) text annotations. Compressed reading is to some extent a formal reading that allows a researcher to discover the relationship between these or those certain form-determining text units.

The technique of compressed reading can be based, at least, on two historical traditions. First, we are talking about the tradition of studying the “title phenomenon”. In this direction, one can pay attention to the existing Russian “school” of title research, which originates from Sisigmund Krzhizhanovsky’s work “Poetics of Titles” [Krzhizhanovsky, 1931] and now is being developed, for example, by researchers grouped around the conference “The Title Phenomenon”. This conference has been held for almost twenty years by the Russian State Humanitarian University. Moretti also gives considerable attention to the study of the title. For example, he writes: “The title becomes the place where the novel as language meets the novel as a product of consumption” [Moretti, 2016: 251]; or “it is interesting to identify clusters within a group of names, title styles” [Moretti, 2016: 269]. The works of F. Moretti
and all those scholars who are involved into this field of research constitute one of the modern traditions of studying the title.

As for the analysis of annotations, we can also point to the formation of a new research approach called SFTs (small sized texts, mini texts, short texts) (study of small text forms) (see, for example, a small paper on this subject [Dzykovych & Langer, 2017]).

“Compressed reading” implies the development of a methodology that allows to relate effectively not only the “title” and the “annotation”, but also the entire “title complex”, through which a kind of notional (semantic) compression is carried out.

“Compressed reading” should not be confused with the “distant reading” which is aimed at solving absolutely other problems. “distant reading” is aimed at simultaneous updating of a large bulk of texts as well as revealing ways to visualize them.

As for the “compressed reading”, it is aimed at a single text, the way it is read quickly, in some sense at “rough mastering”.

“Compressed” and “long distant” reading don’t diminish the traditionally accepted practices of working with texts, which in different humanitarian traditions can be named differently: “close reading”, “hermeneutic tradition of working with text”, “technique of deconstruction”. Each of these types of reading is aimed at solving various problems. None of the above-mentioned types of reading is better or worse than another one. It is just different.

Can all these processes interest philosophers? I dare to assume that “yes, they can” because philosophy in its original focuses on the comprehension of the Whole. Thanks to the power of modern computers, for example, it is possible to track macro-epidemiological processes. The complexity and ambition of this task requires the application of joint efforts of philosophers, literary scholars, mathematicians, historians, linguists etc.

Ethical challenges of the new era

A new world, the transition into which many people now feel, already reveals its distinctive features. One of these features I want to call “collectiveness”. Unfortunately, this Russian word is difficult to translate in all its semantic completeness into other languages. Any translation will be incomplete. For example, in Russian this term correlates with the word “conciliarity” which has deep orthodox roots. The famous Russian philosopher Vladimir Solovyov devoted his philosophical considerations to “conciliarity” [Soloviev, 1990]. Today, taking into account the challenges of the early 21st century, it seems that it is the experience of the conciliarity, a special kind of collectiveness that the Orthodox world can convey to the global humanity as a hard-won, gained value.

Collectiveness in the deepest sense of the word is a special human unity in which, on the one hand, every person is heard, and on the other — there is a union of individuals into a single wise Whole. Perhaps, it was this Whole that Stanislav Lem had foreseen and called it Ocean Solaris.

The wisdom of the Whole is that it does not suppress unique human individuality, but is tuned to the harmonious co-organization of billions of sentient beings into a “holistic oceanic sound”. Cultures in which this trend will be felt to some extent, probably, will be able to use more effectively the opportunities of the new time.

In his time, a very interesting Russian thinker, Nikolai Fedorov, proposed an unusual idea to the world, “the resurrection of the dead”. This thought seems profoundly utopian only at first glance. Modern reality shows that the “resurrection from the dead” has actually
begun. This kind of “resurrection” can be applied to the digitization of numerous texts lying for decades unread in various archives, “archives of the great unread”. Thanks to modern digital technologies, these texts acquire the possibility of an almost instantaneous “revival”. In addition, we can talk about this as a kind of “resurrection from the dead”. Thus, national and universal culture acquires its lost completeness.

Thus, the dictatorship of time is softened and the despair of some authors who fear that they may not be heard today, decreases, because such an opportunity may be provided tomorrow.

The mastery of the new Whole carries in itself and many other perspectives that will be revealed to the person who has embarked on the path of comprehending the collective experience.

The mastery of a complex whole, the understanding of the Other, unexpectedly updates the topic of “caring for oneself”.

For many centuries, the ethics and practice of “taking care of oneself” ripened in the depths of philosophy. It is possible to enumerate the names of philosophers who spoke about this directly or indirectly. However, in this text I want to draw attention to the two main thoughts of one of the founders of French existentialism, Gabriel Marcel.

Marcel wrote: “Only insofar as I assert myself as not being someone in particular, I can ... recognize the existence of someone else” [Marcel, 2003:150]. Unfortunately, in the modern world people seem to be forced to do the opposite. All are covered by the search of one or another identity, revealing a plan for being someone in particular. Discovering his next identity, a person moves away from himself, from the deep self, from a unique “inner melody”. Marcel speculates on this melody, stating that it is an attentive listening to this melody that gives the person experience to recognize the Other. Only a person who is accustomed to listen to himself in the practice of “taking care of oneself” can hear and distinguish the Other.

Failures, in fact, the “fiasco” of the collectivization experiments that took place at the early Soviet era (20-30-ies of the 20th century Soviet Russia), are precisely related to the fact that the government tried to “force collectivize” those people in whom it wanted to exterminate the individual principles.

While real collectiveness is possible only on condition of a trembling, patient, calm nurturing of the individual, it is “different”. Moreover, in this sense, “distant reading” techniques proposed by Moretti, are seen as a manifestation of a new collective ethics.

In this connection, another idea of Gabriel Marcel is interesting: “a man who has lost even a vague consciousness of the violence committed over him, is no longer a man in the full sense of the word” [Marcel, 2003:158]. Of course, it is dangerous and difficult to analyze this thought, torn from the general context of the philosopher’s speculations, and yet, even taken out from the context, it seems very important.

Awareness of the violence perpetrated against a man makes everyone even more a man. The lessons of “forced collectivization” that survived not only the peoples of the “Soviet world”, contributed much to the strengthening of the individual which is so necessary for joining the new collective.

Any real philosophy begins with finding your own melody, setting up your unique voice, which not only does not try to suppress the voices of others, but on the contrary, tries to organize harmonious consonance with them.

History shows that there cannot be a single right philosophical system, for all these systems exist in complementarity, mutual opening. It is for this reason, as paradoxical as it may seem, that it is the easiest way for real philosophers to accept the newly understood collective. A
philosopher feels in the most acute way the violence perpetrated on man, because he listens to his own source with intense and continuous attention.

Of course, scientists might object: while philosophers are just going to learn their collectiveness, scientists of various specialties are actively implementing a variety of interdisciplinary projects. This objection can be answered by the fact that interdisciplinary practices are inseparable from the universal culture, which reveals itself, including the Philosophical culture. However, this is a topic for a separate discussion.

**New Ukrainian project**

In the light of all that has been said, there is no need to specifically argue the relevance of the project to create a collective monograph “Modern Ukrainian Philosophical Traditions.” This is the supposed collective work of Ukrainian philosophers who follow the history of their own “philosophical way” and try to understand the intellectual role of philosophical communities in the formation of Ukrainian national culture, the culture of Ukrainian philosophical discourse, in educating those who aspire to go along the Path of Philosophy.

For any local culture, the emergence of a philosophical tradition plays a special role. On one hand, thanks to philosophy, the best that has been gained by world philosophical thought is brought into the national soil. On the other hand, in specific local cultures, some “unique”, “private”, absolutely inconspicuous and insignificant “local” philosophical deviations are always formed. Often, these deviations are not taken into account, are not considered; they are classified as a category of marginal manifestations. The fate of such response-deviations has already been described above. The participants of the intellectual process themselves say that their texts are buried in “mass graves”. Although every text is worth life, fate, thought. Many of these thoughts could and are intended to become infinitely fruitful for the development of a particular culture.

Describing the very idea of creating a collective monograph, it is necessary to focus on several of the most important goals for this project.

1. Formation of conditions for subsequent reflections of the history of modern Ukrainian philosophical discourse.
2. Attracting attention to the activities of philosophical communities as some peculiar nurseries of philosophical thought.
3. Creation of a collective monograph as an academic product of a special kind, suggesting readiness for joint intellectual actions that contribute to understanding the position of the Other.
4. Popularization of philosophical ideas, attracting a wide range of readers to the philosophy.

The monograph can become the beginning of the next phase for the project associated with a more detailed digitization of the actualized text bulks.

In the articles included into this monograph, the authors will focus their attention on the following very important moments: the characteristics of the causes and conditions that stimulated the emergence of a community; the figure of the “leader” around whom a group of followers was formed; detailed references to the most significant research results; information on published articles, monographs, and much more.

In the writing of this monograph, the researchers should take into account the experience of the American sociologist Randall Collins, who had prepared a fundamental and extremely

Modern political scholars are discussing the question of how many of the most important poles will be in the world in which we are all entering now — one, two, three or more? From philosophical point of view, I want to offer a different answer. The new world is a multidimensional world in which none of the dimensions is dominant. An exclusively economic or political dimension of the world will soon become a manifestation of the out-of-date onedimensionality that strangles humanity. A multidimensional world presupposes the development of multidimensional thinking skills (see the monograph “Multidimensional Thinking” on this subject) and specific multidimensional practices. It is these multidimensional practices that will constitute the draft of Ukrainian philosophers’ collective monograph.

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In Defense of Critical Democratic Pedagogy

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A powerful positivist and neoliberal ideology in education masquerades more or less unharmed as the meritocratic myth promised under the cloak of democracy. Yet some students and teachers are beginning to interrogate the success-only orientations of neoliberalism in the face of crumbling school systems where many students fail. These students and teachers are not oblivious to the stark realities that characterize their daily existence, as they live under a dark cloud of mass unemployment and inequality where many struggle to “succeed”. Additionally, trained consciousness reveals the pockmarked version of democracy that admits only a few and is attendant with an authoritarian, disciplinary practice that breeds resistance towards education rather than the envisioned freedom it is purported to usher in. These inconsistent positions as an experience of education, by especially marginal students, is intensifying within a neoliberal discourse and invites the intense consideration of the place of critical democratic pedagogy as a more appropriate approach toward democratic teaching and learning practices. Within this context, I explore the theoretical and practical dimensions of critical pedagogy to provide an expanded view of teaching and learning in post-democratic South African education.

Keywords: critical pedagogy, democracy, freedom, neoliberal, positivist, meritocracy, authoritarian

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Towards a critical pedagogy in South African education?

To consider schooling as an authoritarian, anti-democratic, disciplinary practice is tantamount to characterizing students and teachers in the theoretical model of oppressed/oppressor as argued by Freire (2005: 20). While pedagogy can be defined as leading children towards positive transformation (intellectually, affectively, and spiritually); in marked contrast authoritarian and controlling pedagogy victimizes, and is dehumanizing to students (Freire 2005: 44). In this context, the teacher oppresses the student through alienation and by silencing student voice by virtue of the asymmetrical power relations that exist in the teacher-student hierarchy (Freire 2005: 44; 88). This cultural and political hierarchy has been normalized by the state, the institution (school, university) and the teacher through non-negotiated policy and practices to ostensibly provide the students, as democratic citizens, with an assurance of their
rights and to maintain order and efficiency. However, rights in the absence of the necessary intellectual sophistication to appreciate the attendant responsibilities and obligations required of the one accorded those rights, could be considered a futile attempt at democratic enactment. To this Freire advocates that students (as the oppressed) must gain consciousness of their vulnerability and need to be weaned off of their dependence on the authoritarian teacher in an effort to be truly free and liberated (Freire 2005: 95).

He suggests that to employ reason fruitfully empowers students to reflect and criticize anti-democratic conventions; and this in turn creates an avenue to change undemocratic practices (Freire, 2005: 97). In Freire’s dialogical, co-intentional educational model, teachers and students are co-equal subjects in the task of unveiling reality, knowing it critically and recreating it as a participatory, committed and involved practice. Freire sharply contrasts the democratic personas and activities as described above to the management and manipulation of a controlling pedagogy where the teacher is: generally narrative; content is “lifeless and petrified”; teaching modalities are predictable and knowledge is compartmentalized and alien to the existential experience of students (Freire, 2005: 72). Furthermore, this paternalistic approach to education develops students as listening objects who suffer from “narration sickness”; and who un-creatively record, memorize, and repeat knowledge as stored deposits without making real meaning (Freire, 2005: 72).

According to Freire, this misguided system of education forestalls possibilities for knowledge invention and reinvention; as well as short circuiting the restless, impatient yet hopeful inquiry and curiosity towards the world and others that consciousness-raising pedagogy promotes (Freire, 2005: 18;72). The former mentioned banking pedagogy entrenches the classist, sexist, hierarchical nature of schooling premised on an ideology of oppression where the teacher strives to dominate and control student thinking and actions. As an alternative, Freire considers problem-posing pedagogy as a more equitable educational response that positions both educational agents in the classroom as operating simultaneously as both student and teacher, which is to mean the reinvention of teacher and student roles to the point where the traditional hierarchy is subverted (Freire, 2005: 79). In this more democratic and egalitarian classroom, power is negotiated and the student is positioned both as student and teacher by virtue of the fact that we all have lived experiences to share and to know, and at the same time have the potential for transforming ourselves and society. Yet, by the same token teacher roles vacillate between being the teacher and the student as she (the teacher) is constantly learning and relearning through continuous engagement with students. Despite the fact that we present critical pedagogy, as advanced by Freire as an alternative educational approach; in the South African context critical pedagogy could be thought of as an academic outcast, albeit that it emerges noticeably in the vocabulary of the official curriculum. With that in mind, the upcoming section will attempt to illuminate the position of critical pedagogy within the discourse of curriculum evolution pre- and post-democracy.

To begin with, curriculum reconstitution in South African education is typified by an aggressive stance away from Christian National Education (CNE) and Fundamental Pedagogics (FP) reminiscent of the old apartheid state’s response to education provisioning. Secondly, Outcomes-Based Education and its accompanying curriculum, Curriculum 2005 (OBE/C2005), which was implemented post-democracy was celebrated as a welcome alternative to CNE/FP. And subsequently, further curriculum revisions have culminated in National Curriculum Statement and Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statements NCS/CAPS. Historically, CNE and FP were the legislative devices used by the apartheid government to exercise power and
authority in education. On the one hand CNE was premised on Calvinist, racist policies that unite church and state, and that place God (thereafter the church, state, family, school etc.) at the top of a hierarchy to instill moral and legal supremacy (Eshak, 1987). And on the other hand, FP was to be recognized as a value-free, “scientific” approach to the only true education under apartheid and the only means by which education could be understood (Eshak, 1987). Thus, unsurprisingly, the notion of authority is borne out in the power to enforce obedience; moral supremacy; the power to influence conduct, the fact that titles and designations give the holder the authority to be believed; and that the title holder is an expert in any question asked (Eshak, 1987). Consequently, it could easily be argued that FP subscribes to a functionalist paradigm as its avowed allegiance to discipline, control and an authoritarian approach to education is visible in its belief in objectivity, and the understanding of social reality through observation without direct participation in the process (Naicker, 2000: 6). Furthermore, the functionalist claim to neutrality gives an impression that the researcher’s assessments are a-political and that it is possible to align human affairs to the natural world where relationships can be identified, studied and measured (Burrel & Morgan, 1979:26). Since the majority of Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) in South Africa subscribed to FP as the only way to study education, a further derivative of FP, Pedagogics influenced a great number of educators as university and college curricula embraced the tenets of this “science” (Naicker, 2000: 8). And whereas:

Fundamental Pedagogic interpretations of learning as being the process of enculturing children to the adult world in a moralistic enactment of principles of Christian national education (CNE), the goals of the former apartheid state (Samuel, 2002: 402);

OBE/C2005 was seen as the educational approach and curriculum policy that fore grounded education in post-apartheid South Africa, portrayed as a planned process and strategy of curriculum change underpinned by elements of redress, access, equity and development (Chisholm, 2001: 9). To achieve these targets, C2005 employed methodologies used in progressive pedagogy such as learner centeredness, teachers as facilitators, relevance, contextualized knowledge and cooperative learning (Chisholm, 2001: 9-10). In this way C2005 broke with the racist, authoritarian, rote learning of FP and Pedagogics; and was intended to promote egalitarianism and critical thinking. What is more, C2005 was participatory and inclusive as it saw teachers as curriculum planners, while it endorsed community participation.

And thirdly, still further curriculum review and reform of Revised National Curriculum Statement (RNCS 2004) due to the challenges inherent in OBE/C2005; was done with the following results in mind: that the curriculum be more accessible to teachers; for the mapping of assessment standards; to bring about changes in curriculum terminology, to facilitate the reduction of learning areas; and lastly for the development and distribution of textbooks (DHET, 2011). In other words, the revision of the National Curriculum Statement (NCS) resulted in CAPS, which demarcates what each teacher in every subject should teach, when to teach it, and how to do the accompanying assessments. What follows immediately below as the principles favored in the National Curriculum Statement (NCS):

social transformation; active and critical thinking; high knowledge and high skills; progression; human rights, valuing indigenous knowledge system; credibility; quality and efficiency; and providing an education that is comparable in quality, breadth and depth to those of other countries (DoE, 2011).
With the above understanding, as a whole in South Africa, curriculum approaches pre- and post democracy have swung from being functionalist, moralistic and teacher-centered to interpretivist, humane and child-centered; and now it may arguably be considered progressive (embracing critical theory such as social transformation and critical thinking, as well as epistemological diversity), yet it has some frightening neo-liberal overtures (competition, quality, efficiency) too. However, curriculum plans conceal far more in ideology than they might reveal on the functionalist level, as already indicated above: two incompatible discourses run concurrently through the NCS/CAPS, so in the upcoming section I endeavour to problematize the neoliberal discourse in the curriculum statement as it severely compromises the best attempts at fostering a critical democratic pedagogy.

**Neoliberal threats to education**

Kincheloe, a respected scholar in critical pedagogy, avers that public education is facing perilous times when a neoliberal ideology permeates education to the degree that political elites determine that education systems are failing, and are too expensive because schools cannot deliver satisfying results (read as return on investment) (Kincheloe & Steinberg, 2011: 1-2). Thus national governments engage in an exercise of public embarrassment by publishing test results and by punishing poor schools for underachievement, resulting in a winners/losers mentality to pervade schooling and that secretly justifies the value in privatizing schools —supposedly to enhance performance and success (Kincheloe & Steinberg, 2011: 2). Kincheloe admonishes us to look behind the words of curriculum statements and expose the ideological assumptions inherent therein to detect how unequal power relations are protected and how oppression takes place through the shaping of a particular consciousness (Kincheloe & Steinberg, 2011: 3). The salient question he highlights is: how is privatized power able to creep into the curriculum design of democratic governments and by extension, why are governments slow to defend freedom and democracy, especially in the case of non-elite students? The implications of educational inequality based on socio-economic class translates into a case where educational policies favor elite classes as they are privileged to gain better access to scientific, technological information and better professions (Kincheloe & Steinberg, 2011: 2). However, how do all these statements connect with teacher/student authority in classrooms? Neoliberal market dictates regulate commercial markets; manipulate public opinion; promote competition; individualism and consumption; at the same time as they control information and knowledge which affects our perception of the world (Kincheloe & Steinberg, 2011: 2). And according to Kincheloe and Steinberg, this coincides perfectly with the deskilled, minimally educated teacher who understands her job in the light of controlling students to behave, and think in the ways acceptable and prescribed in official state and school policy (Kincheloe & Steinberg, 2011: 8). In this way, teachers act as functionaries, carrying out a neoliberal agenda to direct student consciousness through information and knowledge (Kincheloe & Steinberg, 2011: 8). When in contrast, teachers concerned with critical democratic pedagogy accept a counter hegemonic stance that conveys alternative messages to students, empowering them to challenge corporate control and other anti-democratic practices (Kincheloe & Steinberg, 2011: 9). Thus, a neoliberal stronghold on education is an affront to democracy as it serves to control and manipulate teachers and students by regulating subject matter of schools and classroom interaction (Kincheloe & Steinberg, 2011: 10). And while the neoliberal model aims to have power over teachers’ work and academic freedom, it concurrently also trains...
students to follow directions, respect authority and ask fewer significant, (critical) questions that challenge the status quo (Kincheloe & Steinberg, 2011: 10). Consequently, critical (anti-positivist, alternative) knowledge is minimized or trivialized and knowledge is used as a tool of control in terms of ability and competency testing for teachers, and more especially for students. Moreover, Kincheloe exposes the arrogance of neoliberal ideology in education that tries to quantify the realities of everyday classroom life as he invites us to see the experimental model of teaching based on teacher/student prerogative and innovation, which could be contrasted against the over-determined tests that do not evaluate higher order or critical thinking, or that constructs compelling interpretations of reality (Kincheloe & Steinberg, 2011: 12). In this way qualitative insight from students and teachers replaces the restrictive forms of authoritarian and anti-democratic control of traditional classroom routines (Kincheloe & Steinberg, 2011: 13). Now that I have considered how the neoliberal discourse shapes institutional and teacher/student agency with regards to power, I turn to communicative and pedagogic interactions that promote a dialogical approach to teaching.

**Negotiating authority in critical pedagogy**

Shor (1996) presents a model of what a critical democratic classroom might look like when he tackles themes such as power-sharing, shared authority, co-governance and curriculum negotiation with his students in an under-resourced community college. He draws on the concept advanced by Kreisenberg (1992) and Holloway (2003) of “power with” and “power over” where the latter is seen as an alienating and disaffected practice separating the agent from her action (the thinker from her thinking); and where two rival camps compete for power (student and teacher, worker and owner, non-elite and elite) (Kreisenberg, 1992; Holloway, 2003:13). To this, Shor invites alternative pedagogy, critical teaching and experimental practice in his discourse on establishing a speech community in his classroom “to test civic values, critical pedagogy, as well as to challenge social forces pushing dehumanized thought and feeling” (Shor, 1996: 2). He problematizes technical rationality premised on the certitude of facts and dislodges positivist thinking by appealing to thinking that relies on unpredictability, the unknown and “untested feasibility” (Freire, 2005: 113) where power operates “at the margins and in the cracks of the established order”; and more importantly the nurturing of the kind of creative thinking that opens sites where teachers test the limits by “practicing theory and theorizing practice” (Shor, 1996: 3). Practically this was revealed in his analysis of classroom seating preferences as a significant bodily (spatial) text revealing the (unseen and invisible) power relations embedded in schooling; or the ideology of classroom furniture where student chairs for example, indicate a depressant environmental message to students that the institution has no respect for them (Shor, 1996: 4). Shor’s analysis of the ideological and environmental factors as well as bodily practices (hand raising, turn taking, etc.) resulted in his interpretation that these factors wordlessly speak to students and mirror the muted messages about the quality of learning; the limited impact of their degree programs; and the control of a “curriculum that barks rules and bellows facts” (Shor, 1996: 11). It is therefore small coincidence that schooling under such conditions resonates closely with a sense and ideology that students are disciplined into a status quo of inequality (“power over” of the institution and teachers), and that it delivers a pedagogic outcome of “uncritical, anti-dialogic silences” on the part of students (Shor, 1996: 11). Precisely because of the anti-democratic nature of curricular and classroom design, Shor set out to dislodge and challenge the architecture of control that
becomes part of the unquestioned, normative routines of schooling (Shor, 1996: 11). To shatter the anti-democratic nature of classroom hierarchies, he relied on a dialogical approach of negotiated meanings by engaging students to find out the purposes of them selecting the course; their expectations of the course; and their suggestions in making education work better for them (Shor, 1996: 35). In so doing, students were engaged as reflective constituents who contribute to the generative themes emerging from their suggestions, experiences, conditions and expressions (Shor, 1996: 35). Shor describes this pedagogic device as a literate social performance in an alternative and experimental approach to education set in a meaningful context, enacted in a language students possess, cast in a negotiated process, which encourages the questioning of assumptions in order to imagine alternatives to the status quo (Shor, 1996:40). The anti-authoritarian teacher in the above pedagogic encounter is characterized and defined as “frontloading student discourse and backloading teacher commentary” which already signifies a rupture of the traditional teacher role in “banking pedagogy”. In marked contrast, the critically democratic teacher considers how to carefully discipline herself so as to follow rather than discipline students in a pre-emptive lecture (predominantly teacher-talk) premised on control and certainty (Shor, 1996: 41). Contrary to what one might imagine in a pedagogy of negotiated power, the teacher’s authority does not completely dissolve but enters dialogically according to the shape of the students’ discourse, requiring participants (students and teachers) to simultaneously lead and follow (Shor, 1996: 41). Shor therefore understands this complex process to proceed successfully on condition that the teacher assumes an interrogative rather than a declarative posture (Shor, 1996: 42). Consequently, a pedagogy of questions as proposed above allows students sufficient time to reason and speak up; and the use of generative themes sets priorities that open up avenues for constructing student discourse related to the syllabus, their intellectual lives and their social reality and concerns. To be sure, a critical democratic pedagogy as proposed by Shor should not be confused with a permissive pedagogy which allows students to do whatever they want during class time, instead it is suggested as an alternative pedagogy focused on negotiating the curriculum and classroom practice through critical thinking and critical literacy practice in an educational model of co-governance and power-sharing (Shor, 1996: 48).

Thus far, I have attempted to present an understanding of how the potentials of critical pedagogy have been explored in a particular college program in an effort to develop a more lucid picture of what a critical democratic classroom might look like. What follows immediately below are theoretical positions that reinforce anti-democratic, monologic pedagogic interaction, as well as the classroom practices that provide a lens to observe how critical democratic pedagogy may (or may not) be conceived.

**The role of institutional identities in critical democratic pedagogy**

Pretorius (2003) suggests that Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) can be characterized under five structural identities; therefore different structural arrangements produce different approaches to academic practice and knowledge generation (Pretorius, 2003: 14). The first institutional arrangement is characterized by internal self-determination, where the HEI possesses institutional autonomy, independence and freedom to pursue its own agenda (Pretorius, 2003: 16). This may be evidenced in individualized, self-centered, self-indulgent academic pursuits that have little relevance to the society wherein they are located (Pretorius, 2003: 16). Subsequently, the curriculum, content and pedagogy are ratified by the university.
senate, respective faculty, schools and departments (Pretorius, 2003: 16). Thus knowledge production at these institutions is seen as ends in themselves and not beholden to society for solving social problems (Pretorius, 2003: 17), which informs an account of a dissociated, private institution wedded to a neoliberal, capitalist (private property) framework and does not inspire critical democratic pedagogy toward social transformation. Secondly, HEIs identified as having external determination are owned by the church, the state, commerce or a particular community (Pretorius, 2003: 17). The organizational arrangement in this case answers to an external social group who controls decisions on the university’s practice and mission, making this a relationship of domination and subordination (Pretorius, 2003: 17). With limited institutional autonomy, this type of HEI serves the needs and interests of the controlling group and has to conform to the imposed ideology of the external party (Pretorius, 2003: 17). The problematic in such an arrangement with regards to critical democratic pedagogy is that the lack of autonomy and the domination from external overlords means that pedagogy too is externally influenced through a particular ideology. Thirdly, HEIs acknowledged as having limited or pseudo engagement subscribe to an underdeveloped notion of engagement and do not connect with the state or society in a reciprocal manner (Pretorius, 2003: 18). Thus, this type of HEI is committed to knowledge generation on the traditional science model, whereas they generally serve the community in a welfare, non-caring way as their primary interest is the pursuit of revenue (Pretorius, 2003: 19). In this instance, an over-reliance on positivism might shape formulaic pedagogical frameworks that see education as a closed system or process that can be learned and perfected without true qualitative interaction turned toward social change and a vibrant democracy.

Fourthly, Pretorius recognizes the “promiscuous engagement” between HEIs and society, where the focus is on information and knowledge to be used for producing market and social value (Pretorius, 2003: 19). This type of approach employs science for innovation, productivity and competitiveness in global markets (Pretorius, 2003: 19). Thus, there is no boundary between the university and society, and the production and application of knowledge may occur in a trans-disciplinary fashion as the university is accountable to diverse markets and the society; and is not obligated to peer-review for quality evaluation (Pretorius, 2003: 20). Taken as such, knowledge generation is not purely guided by scientific rules, it occurs more swiftly to reduce intervals between innovation and commercialization, and it annihilates the need for lengthy abstract theoretical reflection (Pretorius, 2003: 20). This HEI and the subsequent one below (as will be revealed shortly) adhere to a strong neoliberal and functionalist concept of knowledge production and pedagogical application. Such frameworks are identified by their faith in a certain body of knowledge, rigid and de-contextualized pedagogy, and teacher-led and teacher-focused exercises of content mastery based on functional monologism. And lastly, the corporate university is owned by a corporate entity and holds no internal autonomy or integrity in knowledge generation (Pretorius, 2003: 20). This category of institution works in the interest of corporate needs and abides by corporate culture with regards to the specific requirements and mission thereof (Pretorius, 2003: 20). The limitation of such engagement is grounded in the fact that such a HEI is loyal to a pedagogical model fashioned after the corporate model based on efficiency and continuity, rather than seeing democratic pedagogy as an activity that accommodates difference and diversity in a commitment to intellectual and democratic social growth (not purely economic growth). In this section I have attempted to illustrate the pedagogical implications of the hazardous neoliberal features of NCS/CAPS and the attendant classroom practices that may flow under institutional arrangements that show
a lack of academic freedom and intellectual autonomy for HEI teachers, presenting small hope that critical democratic pedagogy can survive in such restrictive conditions. With the above in mind, I now shift our attention to classroom practices in schools to help understand whether a more socially responsive and critical democratic pedagogy might be evident.

Molteno argues that within even a mechanistic educational model, agentive students may not inevitably reproduce capitalist social relations, and that they may in fact through conscious agency contradict, struggle, and fight for self-determination (Molteno, 1987: 6). He bases this claim on his study and analysis of the student boycotts of 1980 in the Cape Peninsula where a student-initiated and student-led class struggle against racialized, poorly resourced, authoritarian education (Molteno, 1987: 3) was instituted. To begin with, localized student mobilization meant that students took control of schools by deposing adult, authoritarian management, and installing student representative councils (Molteno, 1987: 9). In this way, students were able to balance asymmetrical power relations and demand more respect and autonomy from the adults in the school. Next, as a counter-hegemonic measure, student councils organized “awareness programs” and led talks and guided discussions on socially relevant topics as noted by this student below:

We tried to get them to read their newspaper effectively, to criticize it, and not to be misled. (Molteno, 1987:10).

Additionally, in their awareness of the broader social struggles students showed solidarity with the injustice suffered by their community members in general, by actively supporting a local meat workers’ strike and bus boycott as they saw their issues for social justice aligned. (Molteno, 1987: 11). And finally, the impact made by the boycott was materially marginal in the sense that the students’ short term goals were met in the provisioning of books and building repairs, yet the larger, systemic, structural concerns were not addressed by the state (Molteno, 1987: 13). However, the symbolical significance of the boycott can be summed up by this student:

It was not anything that was granted by the authorities which was felt to be important but rather the spirit and what had happened amongst the people (Molteno, 1987: 14).

However, as Molteno avers, students’ social resistance contributed to the mobilization and conscientization (consciousness-raising or awareness) of adults not only then, but it was antecedent to the 1984 student movements that took place in South Africa (Molteno, 1987: 16).

Pedagogical encounters that might reveal critical democratic pedagogy: Grade 1 OBE/C2005 Classroom

Almost two decades after the Cape Peninsula student boycott brings us to a researcher’s observation during data collection in a Grade 1 class in 1998. What follows emanated from research field notes that were captured while collecting raw data in preparation of a report on the implementation (whether it was or was not being implemented) of OBE in 32 classes in two provinces in South Africa. The significance of this case is the teacher-student interaction that ensues provides insight into how critical democratic pedagogy might be revealed.
She spent most of the time punishing the kids. She hits them on the forehead, on their buttocks, on their hands and bodies, for [a] not being able to read, write or do numeracy; and [b] for not erasing what they have already written....When the teacher asks a question, the learners start shivering. Even if they are making words from cards, they are scared to show the teacher because they are scared of the punishment they will get. (Jansen, 1999: 15).

The researcher’s observation reveals some shocking pedagogical practice that literally petrifies and fossilizes young children in a Grade 1 class. In this instance, the teacher has internalized the moralistic ideology of Fundamental Pedagogics and acts in an ultra-authoritarian way, much like the way the apartheid state repressed citizens through the state apparatuses of the military and the police force (SAHO, 2014). The teacher inflicts physical abuse by hitting these young children on their bodies and mid to upper extremities for actions as trivial as not erasing work. Further to this, she dehumanizes the students by brutalizing them for not being able to read, write and compute, when it could be understood that Grade 1 being an inception year, not all students may have had sufficient exposure to formal schooling to be competent in mathematics and reading yet. Whereas OBE (which it can be loosely argued, embraces and is premised upon elements of critical pedagogy) calls for group work, self-learning, learner-centered instruction, activity-based learning, learning by discovery, less direct teaching and more teacher facilitation, less of a focus on content coverage, learning by doing etc. (Jansen, 1999: 8); the teacher in the above example defies all conditions for any fruitful pedagogic engagement. She has stultified the young students to the point where it seems implausible that any activity based learning, discovery learning or learner-centered instruction can survive. In this situation, the teacher’s violence and ability to instil paralyzing fear in the students has foreclosed on any attempt at meaningful direct teaching and teacher facilitation, to the point that one is inclined even to welcome more content coverage in place of “spending most of the time punishing the kids”. The teacher actions are objectionable and reprehensible as she uses her physical and chronological age advantage, as well as her professional (authoritarian) position to inhibit and immobilize student agency to the point where students dare not take risks, discover, create, and be active in their own learning. The example presented exhibits extreme inequality in providing an optimally safe and compassionate pedagogic encounter, and transgresses the most basic premise of democracy: freedom and justice. Ultimately, the teacher in this scenario can be described as an oppressor according to Freire, as she seeks to dehumanize by reserving humanity for herself and in a parallel manoeuvre to reserve teaching and learning for herself, as she incarcerates students with violence and fear (Freire, 2005:20-44). Not only does she transgress the conditions of basic democracy and the guidelines of OBE/C2005, but more importantly she contravenes the right to human dignity as enshrined in the constitution (Constitution of SA, 1997: Ch2, section 10).

Pedagogical encounters that might reveal critical democratic pedagogy:
Complex classroom encounters (Evans & Cleghorn, 2012)

The rationale of this study, as described by the researchers, was to understand the nature and complexity of language encounters in diverse instructional settings (Evans & Cleghorn, 2012: xvi). Set within a conceptual framework of language-in-education, the multi-literacies study focused on Foundation Phase pedagogic encounters between January 2008 and October 2011 in two English medium schools in Gauteng (Evans & Cleghorn, 2012: xvi). Methodologically,
the study is conceived from a reflective ethnographic and sociolinguistic perspective, while being interpretive and critical in approach (Evans & Cleghorn, 2012: xvi). Data collection was carried out via classroom-based observation in order to juxtapose the “language issue” in South African as representative of abstractions such as official policy, apartheid legacy, the inequality between rural and urban achievement (Evans & Cleghorn, 2012: xvi) versus authentic classroom pedagogy. In its turn, the study sought to demystify language encounters by highlighting the social and pedagogical implications of how learners are being taught with a view to develop appropriate curricula for teacher training (Evans & Cleghorn, 2012: xvi). The authors interpret the philosophy of official education policy as “guiding learners towards democratic citizenship” (Evans & Cleghorn, 2012: xvi). And such:

transformative pedagogy places the rights of the learner at centre and demands a reflective, critical approach from the teacher, an approach that is highly dependent on extensive training, usually to the Masters level or beyond (Evans & Cleghorn, 2012: 29).

However, pedagogic engagements revealed that teachers relied on the “banking method” of education while they set behavioral prescriptions that were linguistically difficult to understand, and conceptually and culturally unfamiliar and strange to students (Evans & Cleghorn, 2012: 30).

According to Evans & Cleghorn, three themes emerged from the interview and observational data viz. educational philosophies with a focus on control in the guise of discipline and obedience; the emphasis on Western education and the concomitant cultural tensions it wrought within the classroom; and lastly the apartheid era and post-apartheid realities as seen in trying to overcome the teacher-centered pedagogical approach (Evans & Cleghorn, 2012: 31). As it relates to the theme of control, the authors propose that teachers were not prepared for the diversity of learners and were preoccupied with control through discipline, as is evident in this teacher interview:

The pride that I am talking about is, you know, having children that are disciplined, that you can control … and now things are a bit problematic and then I do not think that we are going to get the discipline part of it back to where it was because our Government has introduced “children’s rights”. Now it seems like the children and the parents, they are more on the rights side of the children and not the responsibilities that go hand and hand with that (Evans & Cleghorn, 2012: 31).

In that regard, what follows below is the testimony of a student intern who herself was educated in a township school:

When I was in grade 1 there was still corporal punishment so they either shouted at you or hit you. … all these years I thought the only way that children would listen to you is if you shout at them or hit them, but then when I went to [school’s name] I noticed that … that’s not even necessary. Now I cannot even imagine myself hitting a child. … Be calm, speak to them like a little adult, I think they respect you more when you speak to them like a person who thinks, a person who has an opinion, and not be in control all the time (Evans & Cleghorn, 2012: 32).
Miss K noted the lack of opportunity for oral practice and interaction between the learners during language lessons (Evans & Cleghorn, 2012: 35):

No, it’s not given, [the opportunity to talk with each other]. Immediately they start talking and the teachers say; “You are making noise, Why are you not listening to me”? The teacher is not even waiting for the answer. “Why are you doing this, why are you playing with your friends? Focus sister, listen to me. I asked you a question, answer me”. At the end of the day they did not learn anything or they did not understand the content of what she was trying to teach them (Evans & Cleghorn, 2012: 35).

Consequently, the three scenarios illustrated above reveal that official educational policies and statements should be defined less and less by their legal frameworks and should rather be considered by how they bear meaning in classroom pedagogic encounters. With the above in mind, I plan to demonstrate how the abstraction of curriculum discourse collides with the learning engagements in college and school classroom.

Giroux (2011) contends that higher education institutions and schools could correctly be seen as repressive institutions in the way that teacher, and most importantly, student agency and freedom are compromised. He relates his theory directly to marginal students (as in the case of the language-in-education students mentioned above) and the inability of teachers to provide access to a critical language (Giroux, 2011). Instead, teachers are guilty of transgressing many ethical and political dimensions in their pedagogic practice since they themselves are impacted by many external ontological and epistemological registers (Giroux, 2011). Additionally, as Evans and Cleghorn have highlighted, there exists the deep necessity to develop appropriate curricula for teacher training, since teaching (at college and school level) is impacted by institutional culture (see Pretorius, 2003) and is directed by academics that are out of touch with the everyday culture of under-resourced students (Giroux, 2011). This dissociation from the lived reality of students reinforces the classist nature of schooling and entrenches a situation where elite cultural capital is normalized. As a result, critical democratic pedagogy in the form of radical education turned toward transformation and social justice is severely hamstrung. To this Giroux proposes that curricula be developed that provide a more expansive and democratic politics (see Shor above), removed from the practice of academics who could easily be labelled “uptight, politically conservative, personally arrogant”; and who are given to “pompous self-flattery, display a haughty indifference to human suffering and are divorced from pressing social issues” (Giroux, 2011, Pretorius, 2003:17). Furthermore, he reveals his own self-interest and claims that his origins as a non-elite student, provides him with the sensitivity to recognize non-dominant class positions (and those traditionally excluded from the academy), and the theoretical and practical insight of how to navigate this difficult class experience more successfully. These sensibilities and responsiveness to a critical democratic pedagogy transgress the neoliberal conventions that widen the gap in education in terms of economic inequality, access, as well as the promotion of an elite culture that excludes the histories, experiences, language and cultural backgrounds of working-class students (Giroux, 2011). For example, what could be considered an unproblematic demand in education is academic achievement and success, yet what gets obscured is that working-class students compete with elite students who have better resources (time, cultural capital, language) and have been better prepared for school culture (Giroux, 2011). It is imagined that democratic action in such an instance could be seen in the form of relentless critique and dialogue of
official power, yet universities have a notorious habit of silencing dissent, foreclosing on any defensible vestige of democratic practice focused on the common good (Giroux, 2011). In this case, Giroux and Pretorius’ theories coincide: knowledge becomes “commodified” in an “audit culture” where corporate values and interests; economic rationality and mathematical utility translate to national prosperity and economic growth (Giroux, 2011, Pretorius, 2003). The danger herein lay in the fact that technical innovation and market transformation do not alleviate social suffering (inequality, poverty, crime, homelessness etc.) as pledged and guaranteed in liberal democracy (Giroux, 2011). And the failure of teachers to engage with socially relevant topics, disallow students to engage in “democratic dreaming”; which simply means the social investment in critical dialogue that imagines another world outside of unbridled capital. It is in a state where alternatives are sought that student and teacher agency could be considered autonomous and critical; open to taking risks; and engaged in thoughtful dialogue for socially responsible action (Giroux, 2011). However, the cultural apparatus of the curriculum and its institutions disconnect education from critical thought to the degree that students are seen as consumers (of a product called technical knowledge) wherein new desires, needs, modes of identity and social relations should be mobilized (Giroux, 2011). Thus, an authoritarian, disciplinary culture pervades schooling to guard against the production of critical (as seen in critical pedagogy) knowledge, and to resist democratic modes of agency that take the responsibilities and obligations of citizenship seriously by engaging in public issues rather than merely enjoying private life (Giroux, 2011). Giroux confronts teachers with their responsibilities as public intellectuals to provide the template for students to engage in public scholarship that is rigorous and dialectical so as to inspire and develop new modes of civic agency where power is connected to action; and where the social relevance of knowledge and individual rights are not unhinged from social rights (and duties). Now that I have attempted to unpack pedagogical encounters that might reveal critical democratic pedagogy, as well as the theoretical frameworks that define critical democratic pedagogy, I transition into a discussion below of the implications all of this has for advancing a more socially defensible account of schooling.

**Critical democratic pedagogy challenges the correspondence principle**

Bowles and Gintis’ “correspondence principle” (Bowles & Gintis, 1976: 246) suggests at the social reproduction function of schooling that coincides with the capitalist economic structure, by entrenching inequality while creating the popular fiction of social mobility through meritocracy (Molteno, 1987:4). Consequently, capitalist structures reproduce social relations and structures that favor the dominant elite; while accommodating a mechanistic model (as seen through education) of supplying cheap labor for capital (Molteno, 1987:10). In this way schools and HEIs reflect the productive cycle where students (groomed to be workers) learn to be silenced, accept orders, obey institutional hierarchy and develop an unhealthy dependence on external authority to shape their reality. This approach to education closes off opportunities for students to consciously reflect and criticize anti-democratic behavior and inhibits pedagogical engagement premised on dialogical, co-intentional, co-equal problem-posing pedagogy. Instead, controlling pedagogy as advocated in CNE/FP seems to predominate classroom encounters as seen above in the research of Evans and Cleghorn, (2012) and Jansen (1999). And while OBE/C2005 and NCS/CAPS are considered progressive and critical curriculum plans, the latter does not escape the undesirable elements of a neoliberal discourse.
which undermines critical democratic pedagogy. On the basis, that neoliberalism favors social hierarchy predicated on classism, privatization, commercialism and market — driven technical rationality; the danger presented by a neoliberal mentality in education spells further anti-democratic action in schools. This is borne out by the fact that students and teachers are more likely to face oppression, inequality, and deskilling to meet the demands of capitalist logic, which prizes scientific knowledge for a skilled labor force, and a functionalist mentality that controls students and teachers to follow directions, respect authority and avoid critical questions. In the light of the above, Shor’s theorizing of critical democratic pedagogy has not been strongly evidenced in the classroom engagements previously highlighted, to help us determine how democratic South African classrooms are. While Shor envisions a democratic pedagogy to revolve around power-sharing, shared authority, co-governance and curriculum negotiation, only two cases come remotely close to democratic interaction. In the first case (the Cape Peninsula student boycott), I would like to venture the merits of the case are more profoundly an exhibition of critical student agency than democratic pedagogy. By virtue of the fact that students seize control of the pedagogic situation and enact self-motivated, self-organizing democratic action by challenging unequal power and transforming social reality, it could not be considered pedagogic power-sharing since teacher agency seems immobilized. In the second case, a trainee teacher critically reflects on undemocratic pedagogy by way of teacher authoritarian violence. Her abhorrence for this deplorable and abusive control, creates the promise of a fissure for her to adopt a more dialogical, co-equal and humane practice that is transformational and will allow students to develop to their full human potentiality as thinking beings. With the exception of these two cases, the rest of the encounters display the “discipline and control” (in the teacher’s own words) of unequal power and domination with regards to teacher behaviors, and the severe silencing of student voice. In one particular case, the teacher even problematizes the constitutional rights of students and parents; which implies that only she should be given power to exercise her rights, albeit that she sees these rights as central to protect her ability to exercise power over students and parents; as well her right to enforce order, restraint and punishment on students with impunity. In sum, teacher agency in university and schools seems to indicate a democratically deficient pedagogy closely modeled against the capitalist unidirectional current of authoritarian hierarchy which mirrors: the classist nature of capitalism (where elites dominate the superstructure); the chain of command in corporations (where the owner/boss governs and supervises the worker); and lastly the classroom where the teacher exercises power over younger students.

Conclusion

While critical democratic pedagogy seems like an enticing alternative educational practice that has been carried out successfully in other contexts, it has not truly been given much recognition in South African education. Taken in the light of a checkered and repressive educational past, one would imagine that critical democratic pedagogy would be embraced and allowed to flourish in South African education simply because the nation theoretically has one of the best-articulated constitutions, and two of the most recent curriculum statements are consonant with critical pedagogy. Having said the above, it however cannot simply be anticipated that decades of anti-democratic teaching and learning will be erased without a concerted effort in teacher training to usher in transformational, dialogical, democratic pedagogy. And if Giroux is to be taken seriously that education holds no guarantees since
(social) justice is never complete, and that democracy is never fully settled (Giroux, 2011), we can be inspired that the new age in South African education has only begun. Thus, the infancy of this new dawning is the opportune horizon whereupon alternative, experimental, transformational and democratic educational practices need to be highlighted and tested in order to develop new modes of agency, power and action.

**References**


The Next Paradigm

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In order to perceive the world, we need more than just raw sensory input: a subliminal paradigm of thought is required to interpret raw sensory data and, thereby, create the objects and events we perceive around ourselves. As such, the world we see reflects our own unexamined, culture-bound assumptions and expectations, which explains why every generation in history has believed that it more or less understood the world. Today, we perceive a world of objects and events outside and independent of mind, which merely reflects our current paradigm of thought. Anomalies that contradict this paradigm have been accumulated by physicists over the past couple of decades, which will eventually force our culture to move to a new paradigm. Under this new paradigm, a form of universal mind will be viewed as nature’s sole fundamental entity. In this paper, I offer a sketch of what the new paradigm may look like.

Keywords: scientific paradigm, figuration, quantum mechanics, quantum entanglement, non-contextuality, idealism, mind, consciousness, dissociation, dissociative identity disorder.

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Introduction

Every generation tends to believe that their views on the nature of reality are either true or at least quite close to the truth. They believe that previous generations, which held vastly differing views, were simply intellectually inferior and deluded.

True to this tendency, we today believe our ancestors held primitive, naïve, even absurd views about self and world. They were part of a less evolved culture incapable to discern the finer logical and empirical conclusions we have now formulated. Whereas we can see the world and our condition within it objectively, our ancestors were beset — or so we tell ourselves — by self-deception, wish fulfillment and superstition.
Although we know that, historically speaking, the views of an earlier generation were each time supplanted — and even ridiculed — by those of a later generation, we still believe that, this time, we must have gotten it right. Immersed as we are in our own cultural context — with its myriad unexamined assumptions and conceptual categories — we seem unable to raise our head above the water so to recognize the relativity of our situation. We do not realize that our contemporary views, too, are most likely just as plagued by the whole gamut of psychological mechanisms of self-deception as those of our ancestors.

Why are contemporary views always so spellbinding? It may have to do with the fact that what we perceive about the world is, in fact, already loaded and suffused with subliminal interpretations and fitted into culture-bound conceptual categories. What we ordinarily perceive is not really the world out there, but a representation thereof as much determined by our own intellectual baggage as by whatever is actually out there. Owen Barfield called this process ‘figuration’:

two operations are necessary … in order to produce the familiar world we know. First, the sense-organs must be related to [whatever is really out there] in such a way as to give rise to sensations; and secondly, those mere sensations must be combined and constructed by the percipient mind into the recognizable and nameable objects we call ‘things.’ (Barfield, 2011: 20, emphasis added.)

So there are no such things as cars, trees, tables and chairs without the percipient mind contributing something of its own — its subliminal assumptions, expectations, conceptual categories, etc. — to the resulting representation. Without this contribution, the sensed world would be just pixels without any discernible meaning.

To clarify this subtle but important point, it is worthwhile to quote Barfield more extensively:

I do not perceive any thing with my sense-organs alone, but with a great part of my whole human being. Thus, I may say, loosely, that I ‘hear a thrush singing.’ But in strict truth all that I ever merely ‘hear’ — all that I ever hear simply by virtue of having ears — is sound. When I ‘hear a thrush singing,’ I am hearing, not with my ears alone, but with all sorts of other things like mental habits, memory, imagination, feeling and (to the extent at least that the act of attention involves it) will. (Barfield 2011: 15-16, original emphasis.)

Thus, each generation is convinced of the accuracy of their worldview because the world they perceive — a world of representations, not raw sensation — is, in fact, constructed by this worldview. The things they see around themselves confirm their beliefs because those things are a product of these beliefs.

As argued by Thomas Kuhn (1996), even science falls pray to this inherent subjectivity of perception: science’s view of nature is also determined by a ‘paradigm,’ a set of underlying assumptions and beliefs that enables interpretation of empirical data. According to Kuhn, the data are themselves already suffused with a subjective paradigm the very moment they are collected:

No natural history can be interpreted in the absence of at least some implicit body of intertwined theoretical and methodological belief. (Kuhn, 1996: 16-17.)
So even the world measured by science is already loaded with, and molded by, the unexamined assumptions of the paradigm — the cultural belief system — of the time. Kuhn leaves no doubt here:

Surveying the rich experimental literature from which [historical examples of classic scientific experiments] are drawn makes one suspect that something like a paradigm is prerequisite to perception itself. What a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see. In the absence of such training there can only be, in William James’s phrase, “a bloomin’ buzzin’ confusion.” (Kuhn, 1996: 113, emphasis added.)

Our unreasonable trust in the accuracy of our contemporary scientific views may be due, at least partially, to the fact that the world we measure is as much a function of our subjective paradigm of thought as of what is really out there. There is a sense in which, even in science, we see what we expect to see.

Today, we look around ourselves and perceive a world made of matter outside and independent of mind. Based on culture-bound conceptual categories, we carve out this world into separate things — tables, chairs, trees, etc. — all of which we perceive to have autonomous existence independent of mentation. Might this view — just as the views of our ancestors, who perceived rocks as living beings, the Earth as a flat surface, etc. — be merely an illusion? May our generation be just as wrong about what is going on as our ancestors were? Will a future generation regard our present-day materialist view of nature as something as absurd and laughable as animism and flat-Earthism? If history is any indication, the answer is categorically ‘yes.’

Kuhn observed that, historically speaking, paradigms collapse when enough anomalies — phenomena that are empirically undeniable but cannot be accommodated by the reigning belief system — accumulate over time and reach a critical mass. Are there empirically verifiable anomalies today that foreshadow the end of materialist beliefs? As it turns out, there are plenty.

**Anomalies in quantum mechanics**

The present-day materialist view that the world is outside and independent of mind is an abstract explanatory model constructed in thought, not an empirical observation. After all, what we call ‘the world’ is available to us solely as ‘images’ — defined here broadly, so to include any sensory modality — on the screen of perception, which is itself mental. We subliminally interpret the contents of perception as coming from a world outside mind because this seems to explain the fact that we all share the same world beyond the boundary of our skin, as well as the fact that the laws that govern this world do not depend on our personal volition. Stanford physicist Prof. Andrei Linde, well known for his theories of cosmological inflation, summarized it thus:

Let us remember that our knowledge of the world begins not with matter but with perceptions. I know for sure that my pain exists, my “green” exists, and my “sweet” exists. I do not need any proof of their existence, because these events are a part of me; everything else is a theory. Later we find out that our perceptions obey some laws, which can be most
conveniently formulated if we assume that there is some underlying reality beyond our perceptions. This model of material world obeying laws of physics is so successful that soon we forget about our starting point and say that matter is the only reality, and perceptions are only helpful for its description. This assumption is almost as natural (and maybe as false) as our previous assumption that space is only a mathematical tool for the description of matter. But in fact we are substituting reality of our feelings by a successfully working theory of an independently existing material world. And the theory is so successful that we almost never think about its limitations until we must address some really deep issues, which do not fit into our model of reality. (Linde, 1998: 12.)

This model of reality has intuitive implications amenable to confirmation—or refutation—through subtle experimental arrangements, which Linde alluded to when he spoke of “some really deep issues.” Indeed, the properties of a materialist world should exist and have definite values even when this world is not being observed: the moon should exist and have whatever weight, shape, size and color it has even if nobody is looking at it. Moreover, a mere act of observation should not change the values of these properties: the weight, shape, size and color of the moon should not become different simply because someone happened to look at it.

Operationally, these intuitive tenets of materialism are translated into the notion of ‘non-contextuality’: the outcome of an observation should not depend on the way other, separate but simultaneous observations are performed. After all, the properties being observed are supposed to be independent of observation. What I perceive when I look at the night sky should not depend on the way other people look at the night sky along with me, for the properties of the night sky uncovered by my observation should not depend on theirs. Clearly—and in line with materialism—non-contextuality implies that the world is independent of perception, insofar as perception constitutes observation. My perceptions should simply reveal what the properties of the world are in and of themselves.

The problem is that, according to quantum theory, the outcome of an observation can depend on the way another, separate but simultaneous observation is performed. For instance, if two particles A and B are prepared in a special way, the properties of particle A as seen by a first observer—say, Alice—are predicted to correlate with the way another observer—say, Bob—simultaneously looks at particle B. This is so even when A and B—and, therefore, Alice and Bob—are separated by arbitrarily long distances.

For instance, what Alice sees when she looks at particle A in, say, London, depends on the way Bob concurrently looks at particle B in, say, Sydney. If the properties of the world were outside and independent of Alice’s and Bob’s minds—that is, outside and independent of their perceptions—this clearly shouldn’t be the case; unless there is some observation-independent hidden property, covertly shared by A and B and entirely missed by quantum theory, which could account for the correlations. This was Einstein’s point when he (in)famously suggested that quantum theory was incomplete (Einstein, Podolsky & Rosen, 1935). However, as mathematically proven by John Bell (1964), the correlations predicted by quantum theory cannot be accounted for by these kinds of observation-independent hidden properties.

Consequently, quantum theory appears to contradict non-contextuality and render materialism untenable. A conceivable way to avoid this conclusion while accepting quantum theory would be to posit that particles A and B, or Alice and Bob themselves, somehow ‘tip each other off’ during observation, instantaneously and at a distance, so to coordinate their
actions and produce the predicted correlations. This, however, would require faster-than-light communication and fly in the face of the overwhelmingly confirmed theory of special relativity.

Alternatively, a materialist could attempt to salvage non-contextuality and the notion of a world outside and independent of mind by rejecting quantum theory itself. Yet, as it turns out, since Alain Aspect’s seminal experiments (Aspect, Grangier & Roger, 1981; Aspect, Dalibard & Roger 1982; Aspect, Grangier & Roger 1982) the predictions of quantum theory in this regard have been repeatedly confirmed, with ever-increasing rigor. For instance, in an experiment performed in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1998 (Tittel et al.), the particles A and B were separated by more than 10 km — as opposed to the 12 meters of Aspect’s original experiment (1981) — reducing the already low likelihood that they could be creating the correlations predicted by quantum theory through some kind of signal exchange. Despite this greater separation, the predictions of quantum theory were again confirmed.

Then, still in 1998 but this time in Innsbruck, Austria, another experiment (Weihs et al.) was done to eliminate another far-fetched possibility: that, in advance of the preparation of particles A and B, ‘Alice,’ ‘Bob’ and the system responsible for the preparation could somehow be ‘pre-agreeing’ on a hidden plan of action, so to later create the correlations without need for faster-than-light communication (‘Alice’ and ‘Bob,’ in this case, were automated measurement apparatuses). To close this unlikely ‘conspiracy’ loophole, the behaviors of ‘Alice’ and ‘Bob’ were programmed randomly and only after particles A and B had already been prepared. Nonetheless, the correlations predicted by quantum theory were yet again confirmed.

Critics continued to speculate about other far-fetched loopholes in these experiments. In an effort to address and close all conceivable loopholes, Dutch researchers have recently performed an even more tightly controlled test, which — unsurprisingly by now — echoed the earlier results (Hensen et al., 2015). This latter effort was considered by the periodical Nature the “toughest test yet” (Merali, 2015). Given all this, it seems now untenable to argue against the veracity of quantum theory.

The only alternative left for materialists is to try to circumvent the need for faster-than-light signal exchanges by imagining and postulating some form of non-locality: nature must have — or so they speculate — observation-independent hidden properties that are not confined to particular regions of spacetime, such as particles A and B. In other words, the argument is that the observation-independent hidden properties allegedly missed by quantum theory are ‘smeared out’ across space and time. It is this omnipresent, invisible but objective background that supposedly orchestrates the correlations predicted by quantum mechanics. Non-contextuality and materialism can thus be salvaged; or can they?

The problem, of course, is that non-local hidden properties are arbitrary: they produce no predictions beyond those already made by standard quantum theory. As such, it could be argued that they represent an effort “to modify quantum mechanics to make it consistent with [one’s] view of the world,” so to avoid the need “to modify [one’s] view of the world to make it consistent with quantum mechanics” (Rovelli, 2008: 16).

Be it as it may, it turns out that certain specific correlations predicted by quantum theory are incompatible with non-contextuality even for large classes of non-local hidden properties (Leggett, 2003). Studies have now experimentally confirmed these correlations (Gröblacher et al., 2007; Romero et al., 2010), thus putting non-contextuality in even more serious jeopardy. To reconcile these results with materialism would require a profoundly counterintuitive redefinition.
of what we call ‘objectivity.’ And since our contemporary cultural mindset has come to associate objectivity with reality itself, the science press felt compelled to report on some of these results by pronouncing, “Quantum physics says goodbye to reality” (Cartwright, 2007).

More recent experiments have again contradicted non-contextuality and confirmed that, unlike what one would expect if the world were separate or distinct from mind, the observed properties of the world indeed cannot be said to exist prior to being observed (Lapkiewicz et al., 2011; Manning et al., 2015). For all intents and purposes, the world we perceive is physically—not only cognitively—a product of observation. Commenting on this, physicist Anton Zeilinger has been quoted as saying that “there is no sense in assuming that what we do not measure [that is, observe] about a system has [an independent] reality” (Ananthaswamy, 2011).

So the question now is: Can some form of materialism survive the failure of non-contextuality? We have seen earlier that the intuitive tenets of materialism are: (a) there exists a world outside mind; and (b) mere observation does not change this independently existing world. The failure of non-contextuality clearly rules out (b). Can (a) still make any sense in the absence of (b)? If it can, then the world outside mind must somehow physically change, instantaneously, every time it is observed. The plausibility of this notion aside, notice that one never gets to see the observation-independent world, for it supposedly changes instantly, in an observation-dependent manner, the moment one looks at it. Clearly, the only motivation to entertain this notion is to try to salvage some rather artificial and counterintuitive form of materialism. And even if such an attempt were to succeed, the world we actually experience would still be conditioned by mind, insofar as it would be an outcome of conscious perception. For our purposes here, therefore, the result would be indistinguishable from a truly mental world.

Already in 2005, Johns Hopkins physicist and astronomer Prof. Richard Conn Henry had seen enough. In an essay he penned for Nature, he claimed, “The universe is entirely mental. … There have been serious [theoretical] attempts to preserve a material world — but they produce no new physics, and serve only to preserve an illusion” (Henry, 2005: 29). The illusion he was referring to was, of course, that of a world outside and independent of mind.

Naturally, Conn Henry’s position is controversial and debate around it continues to unfold. Nonetheless, the experiments do show significant anomalies that cannot be accommodated by materialism.

Finally, notice that, although the argument in this section has been based on quantum mechanical experiments carried out on microscopic particles under laboratory conditions, we know that the implications of quantum theory apply to our macroscopic world of tables and chairs as well. Indeed, quantum effects have been experimentally demonstrated for macroscopic objects at room temperature (Lee et al., 2011; Klimov et al., 2015). As such, the failure of non-contextuality indicates that the seemingly mind-independent world we live in is a result of mental process at work and, as such, akin to a transpersonal dream: the tables, chairs, stars and galaxies we perceive within it do not have an existence independent of our minds.

**The continuity of mind and world**

In a famous paper titled “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences,” physicist Eugene Wigner (1960) discussed “the miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics.” Indeed, abstract
conclusions and methods derived purely in thought have, again and again, succeeded in precisely describing concrete phenomena in the world. That axiomatic intuitions turn out to correctly predict and model the structure and dynamics of the world at large is difficult to make sense of under materialism, this probably being the reason why Wigner used the word ‘miracle’ twelve times in his paper. After all, lest we incur the fallacy of circular reasoning, under materialism we cannot logically argue for the validity of logic beyond our own minds, so the world could very well be absurd (Albert, 1985). That it is not is Wigner’s “miracle.”

If the world is mental, however, the correspondence between the intuitive foundations of rational thought and the way the world works is perfectly natural. That we take the basic tenets of logic and mathematics to be self-evident truths betrays their archetypal nature in the Jungian sense: they reflect deeply ingrained mental templates according to which thought unfolds (Jung, 1991). As a matter of fact, psychologist Marie-Louise von Franz went as far as to argue that the natural numbers themselves are archetypal (1974). Then — and here is the key point — the fact that these archetypes extend into the world clearly indicates that the world itself is mental and continuous with our minds. If there is no intrinsic separation between our minds and the objects of perception, naturally these objects should comport themselves in a way consistent with mental archetypes. Perceptual objects should be an expression of archetypal patterns in just the same way that thoughts are, so the world should be consistent — as it is — with our logic and mathematics. The apparent eeriness of Wigner’s “miracle” melts away.

To visualize all this consider the following analogy: if mind is like a guitar string, then particular conscious experiences are like particular notes or patterns of vibration of the string. In this case, the mental archetypes discussed above are analogous to the elasticity, mass and length of the string, which determine its normal modes of vibration. Some of the archetypically-defined normal modes of mind thus correspond to the laws of nature, which we discern as regularities on the screen of perception: they reflect some of the ‘notes’ in which a transpersonal segment of mind naturally ‘plays’ in the world at large.

Wigner’s “miracle” is not only explainable by, but also constitutes further evidence for, the mental world hypothesis.

The next paradigm

Kuhn observed that paradigms are never simply abandoned, but instead replaced by a new paradigm that can accommodate the anomalies. In our present historical nexus, the next paradigm must be one that can accommodate the kinship and continuity between mind and world indicated by the anomalies just discussed. In other worlds, materialism will be replaced by a form of idealism: the view that a transpersonal mind is the sole fundamental aspect of reality, everything else being reduced to excitations of this mind.

If idealism is to supersede materialism as our culture’s reigning paradigm, it needs not only accommodate anomalies, but also make sense of ordinary observations that materialism purports to make sense of. In other words, idealism must make sense of all facts, not only the anomalies. As such, it will need to answer questions such as: If mind is not a product of physically objective arrangements of matter, how can there be such tight correlations between brain activity and experience? If the world is not made of matter outside our individual minds, how can we all share the same world beyond ourselves? If the world is not independent of mind, why can we not change the laws of nature simply by imagining them to be different?
Below, I briefly sketch an idealist framework that can potentially answer these questions and accommodate all relevant facts of nature.

The defining tenet of idealism is the notion that every thing and event exist in a universal form of mind — thus not bound to personal boundaries — arising as a pattern of excitation of this universal mind. Our personal psyche forms through a process of dissociation in universal mind, analogous to how the psyche of a person suffering from dissociative identity disorder (DID) differentiates itself into multiple co-conscious centers of self-awareness called alters (Braude, 1995; Kelly et al., 2009). Recent research has demonstrated the literally blinding power of dissociation (Strasburger & Waldvogel, 2015). This way, there is a sense in which each living creature is an alter — a dissociated personality — of universal mind, which explains why we are not aware of each other’s inner lives or of what happens across time and space at a universal scale.

The formation of an alter in universal mind creates a boundary — a “Markov Blanket” (Friston, Sengupta & Auletta, 2014: 430-432) — between phenomenality internal to the alter and that external to it. Phenomenality external to the alter — but still in its vicinity — impinges on the alter’s boundary from the outside. The plausibility of this kind of phenomenal impingement across a dissociative boundary is well established: we know, for instance, that dissociated feelings can dramatically affect our thoughts and, thereby, behaviors (Lynch & Kilmartin, 2013), whereas dissociated expectations routinely mold our perceptions (cf. Eagleman, 2011).

The impingement of external phenomenality on an alter’s boundary is what we call sense perception. The world we perceive around ourselves is thus a coded phenomenal representation (Friston, Sengupta & Auletta, 2014: 432-434) — which I shall call the extrinsic appearance — of equally phenomenal processes unfolding across the dissociative boundary of our alter.

A living biological body is the extrinsic appearance of an alter in universal mind. In particular, our sense organs — including our skin — are the extrinsic appearance of our alter’s boundary. As such, our brain and its electrochemical activity are part of what our subjective inner life looks like from across its dissociative boundary, which explains the observed correlations between experience and brain function. Indeed, it has been empirically shown that there is something rather specific that dissociative processes look like (Schlumpf et al., 2014). In this context, I submit that life — metabolism — is simply what dissociation in universal mind looks like; there is nothing more to it.

As we have seen, a person’s brain activity correlates with the person’s reported inner life simply because the former is but a coded representation of the latter. Moreover, we all inhabit the same world because our respective alters are surrounded by the same universal field of phenomenality, like whirlpools in a single stream. Finally, we cannot change the patterns and regularities that govern the world — that is, the laws of nature — because our volition, as part of our alter, is dissociated from the rest of nature.

See Figure 1 for a graphical depiction of all this.
All relevant facts about nature can be accommodated and made sense of by this parsimonious idealist framework. Moreover, unlike materialism, the framework can also be reconciled with the quantum mechanical anomalies discussed earlier. It thus offers a more promising alternative for elucidating the nature of reality than the materialist paradigm.

Conclusions

Our confidence in our present-day materialist worldview is as unwarrantable as the confidence our ancestor had in worldviews we now consider absurd, such as animism and flat-Earthism. We believe in materialism for reasons analogous to those why our ancestors believed in their now-outdated views: what we perceive about the world is partly a function of our own hidden assumptions and expectations. Our beliefs are confirmed by our perceptions largely because our perceptions are, in an important cognitive sense, constructed by those beliefs.

Today, when we look around ourselves, we see a world of matter outside and independent of mind. But this may be merely because we subliminally expect to see matter outside and independent of mind.

Empirically robust observations replicated by multiple experiments under controlled laboratory conditions are inconsistent with the materialist worldview. These observations constitute what Kuhn called ‘anomalies’: undeniable empirical facts that contradict the reigning paradigm of thought. They suggest that our culture may be on the verge of a paradigm change, a transition into a new view of the nature of reality and of our condition within it.

This new paradigm will necessarily entail some form of idealism: the notion that a universal mind is nature’s sole fundamental entity, everything else being reducible to excitations of universal mind. Idealism can not only accommodate all anomalies amassed to date, but also...
make sense of all other relevant empirical facts. It is a more parsimonious, empirically robust
and explanatorily powerful worldview than materialism.

Future generations will take idealism for granted, because they will grow up with it as the
basis of their paradigm of thought. The world they will perceive around themselves will be
a world of mental unfolding. They will look back at our present-day culture with alarm and
bewilderment, asking themselves how it was ever possible for human beings to give credence to
a worldview as flawed, inflationary, explanatorily limited and absurd as materialism. They will
know how unjustified our arrogant confidence in the accuracy of our views is. In all likelihood,
they will smile condescendingly at us just as we smile condescendingly at preliterate animists
and flat-Earthists.

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A Look at Informal Logic

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The challenges of the global time require new solutions and up-to-date ways of thinking and communication. These challenges call for the ability to use critical thinking to face the ever-changing world and the ability to maintain a dialog based on the effective skills of communication. Studies in the fields of logic and argumentation theory are of particular importance in this regard. Nowadays they can be presented as a mix of theoretical and practical approaches.

In this paper, I will present my reflections on informal logic, which was formed in the late 1970s. Unfortunately, in spite of numerous papers, books, and text-books published over the last forty years, consensus on many issues in this field has not been achieved so far. Therefore, it is difficult to treat informal logic as one of the well-defined approaches to argumentation. The goal of this paper is to take a look at the place of informal logic in state-of-the-art study of argumentation by clarifying its subject matter and figuring out the realm to which informal logic belongs.

Keywords: logic, informal logic, formal logic, theory of argumentation, epistemology, cognitive science, real argument

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Introduction

The challenges of the globalized world require new solutions and fresh ways of thinking and communication. These challenges call for the ability to study new issues and quick change your mind, the ability to use critical thinking to face the ever-changing world and to maintain a dialog based on the effective communication skills. Studies in the fields of logic and theory of argumentation are of particular importance in this regard.

It should be stated that until the middle of the 20th century, the dominant approach to the study of argumentation was logical, or rather formal-logical one. “Logic was for millennia seen as the skeleton of argument” [Hample, 2006: 2].
Logic is primarily concerned with reasoning and we can find in numerous text books on logic its definition as the science of reasoning. In order to summarize the traditional view of logic let’s look at such quote: “For over two millennia, since the days of Aristotle and Euclid, the notion of formal logic has figured centrally in conceptions of human reasoning, rationality, and adaptiveness. To be adaptive, the story goes, we must be rational about ends and means, truth and evidence. To be rational, we must reason about what means suit what ends, what evidence supports what conclusions. And to so reason, we must respect the canons of logic” [Perkins, 2002: 187].

However, as it turned out, the canons of standard logic had not been sufficient for the analysis of various situations from real life. That is why, in the late 20th century informal treatments appeared in argumentation area. The key reason of their development was the criticism of the possibilities of formal logic. First of all among neoclassical theoretical approaches to argumentation it is necessary to point out Toulmin’s concept of the ‘working logic’ [Toulmin, 1958] and Perelman’s treatment of the ‘new rhetoric’ [Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958].

Stephen Toulmin believed that the key problem of formal deductive logic is that it reduces arguments, used in different situation, to universal standards even though the procedure must depend on the realm of knowledge in which they are used. In his opinion, it is necessary to create a new logic similar to epistemology, which has broader subject matter including argumentative process in various spheres of human life and primarily in law. In this respect, he identified formal logic as the ‘ideal logic’ while informal one is the logic which operates or the ‘working logic.’

Chaim Perelman believed that rapid development of mathematical logic became the reason why logicians developed mainly the theories of mathematical proof and did not pay attention to the problem of proof in liberal arts. Natural sciences deal with the obvious statements or statements which may be deduced from their combinations. Unlike them, arts deal with the values. Thus, we cannot use the same proof scheme in natural science and liberal arts. In order to highlight this distinction, Perelman used ‘proof’ for natural science and ‘argument’ — for humanities. He held the position that formal logic is the ‘logic of proof’ and informal logic is the ‘logic of argument.’

As a result, Stephen Toulmin and Chaim Perelman concluded that most areas of intellectual and practical activities cannot be limited to formal-logical thinking and require a new logic as a theory of argumentation. Following this idea, Stephen Toulmin came up with ‘working logic’ while Chaim Perelman developed ‘new rhetoric.’

The approaches, discussed above, have inspired new interesting developments. It should be stated that nowadays informal studies of argumentation are topic within the scientific community. During the late 20th century and almost the past two decades of the 21st century their results are being actively discussed at the conferences, symposiums, and workshops.¹

Today a number of different streams can be identified as informal: American tradition of communication studies and rhetoric, linguistic approaches, pragma-dialectics, informal logic, pragmatic approach etc².

¹ Among them are well known International Symposium on Informal Logic (Canada); International Conference on Argumentation (Netherlands), European Conference of Argumentation (ECA) and others.
² It should be noted that more recently formal approaches in argumentation theory have been further developed too. As examples are formal dialectics and promising connections between approaches in fields of argumentation theory and artificial intelligence.
For my present purposes it is particularly important to take a look at informal logic. It was formed by a group of Canadian scholars in the late 1970s, who then called themselves informal logicians. J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. Johnson from the University of Windsor, Ontario, Canada were first and foremost among them. They “contributed the institutional conditions for the establishment of informal logic as a field of research.” [Eemeren et al., 2015: 373].

Unfortunately, in spite of numerous papers, books, and text-books on informal logic, published over the last forty years, consensus on many issues has not been achieved so far. In this regard it is difficult to consider informal logic as one of the well-defined visions of argumentation. Not coincidentally, in Handbook of Argumentation Theory, published in 2015, it was pointed out that the term informal logic cannot refer to one well-delineated approach. “It rather refers to a collection of attempts to develop and theoretically justify a method for the analysis and evaluation of natural language arguments in different context of use that is an alternative to formal logic.” [Eemeren et al., 2015, 2015: 374].

In this paper I would like to introduce my vision of informal logic by clarifying its subject matter and figuring out the realm to which informal logic belongs to.

**Informal logic versus Formal logic**

I begin with the question: is informal logic related to the area of logic? It is also important for the reason that the term ‘informal logic’ is still staying controversial and sometimes unacceptable for those who call themselves formal logicians. Researchers have divergent opinions about this problem.

Firstly, one of the responses is that informal logic does not belong to the realm of logic. This viewpoint can be illustrated with Hintikka’s quote: “I have a great deal of sympathy with the intensions of those philosophers who speak of ‘informal logic,’ but I do not think that any clarity is gained by using the term ‘logic’ for what they are doing” [Hintikka, 1999].

Secondly, logicians believe that informal logic is logic. For example, James B. Freeman thinks: “What is logic? To this, a classic answer is that logic is the appraisal of reasoning or argument…. According to this definition, there is no question that informal logic is logic.” [Freeman, 1994: 36].

Yet another view is that informal logic is closer to the discipline studying theoretical and practical problems of argumentation. In this regard Frans Hendrik van Eemeren writes: “the label informal logic covers a collection of normative approaches to the study of reasoning in ordinary language that remain closer to the practice of argumentation than formal logic” [Eemeren, 2009: 117].

This point can be found even in Blair’s and Johnson’s texts: “informal logic may be seen as a branch of argumentation theory. Put the other way around, any over-all theory of argumentation will need to contain as a component a theory of informal logic” [Johnson & Blair, 1994: 15].

David Hitchcock claims the following point of view about informal logic: “it might in fact better be called ‘theory of argument.’ Its questions have however traditionally been regarded as part of logic, broadly conceived. The name can thus be taken to refer to that part of logic as traditionally conceived that is not covered by contemporary formal logic.” [Hitchcock, 2007:101].

Summing up what comes from various views we can see that the question whether informal logic belongs to the realm of logic still remains open, unfortunately.
In order to clarify this problem I am going to compare formal and informal logic. The results we can see in the Table 1.

**Table1. Formal and Informal Logics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal Logic</th>
<th>Informal Logic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It develops formal standards, criteria, procedures.</td>
<td>It develops informal standards, criteria, procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasoning is considered as inferential structure.</td>
<td>Reasoning is considered as a type of dialog, type of speech act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It uses artificial language.</td>
<td>It uses natural language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It identifies logical form of reasoning.</td>
<td>It identifies structure and scheme of real argument.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It uses formal methods.</td>
<td>It uses methods of diagrams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It analyzes microstructure of reasoning.</td>
<td>It analyzes macrostructure of reasoning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It evaluates reasoning as valid/invalid.</td>
<td>It evaluates reasoning as good/bad.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Does Informal logic belong to Epistemology?**

Epistemology is the second realm in which informal logic is being often identified. The key issue which is being actively discussed in the literature is about whether informal logic is a part of epistemology, particularly applied epistemology. Some researchers have given a positive response to this question. Mark E. Battersby, James Freeman, Robert C. Pinto, Harvey Siegal, Mark Weinstein, and others [Battersby, 1989, 2006; Freeman, 1994, 2000; Pinto, 1994; Siegal, 1988a, 1994b; Weinstein, 1994] are among them.

For example, Harvey Siegel says: “The epistemology of informal logic is then a piece with the epistemology of formal logic and that of anything else. It involves spelling out the character of particular informal practice and principles, and making cases for regarding them as valid or invalid, justified or unjustified. These cases must in turn be evaluated in terms of our general theoretical understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of such cases. The project of enhancing that theoretical understanding is a primary strand of epistemology. It is in this sense that the epistemology of informal logic is of piece with epistemology generally” [Siegel, 1994: 136].

This point of view is also supported by Mark E. Battersby: “The term “informal logic” tends to “anchor” the study of arguments in formal logic. Such a nomenclature tempts us to use models of reasoning based on deduction and potentially to miss the actual nature of most reasoning. “Applied epistemology” focuses the discipline towards the actual practice of how people come to and should come to justified beliefs. In an analogy with applied ethics, the study of people’s actual epistemological practices can provide both information and challenges for the theoretician of reasoning.” [Battersby, 2006: 41].

Another researcher, James Freeman agrees with the previous authors and notes: “informal logic is epistemological. Two central questions concern premise acceptability and connection adequacy. Both may be explicated in terms of justification, a central epistemological concept.” [Freeman, 2000: 117].
All these points are coming together in the following way. Informal logic can be considered as an applied epistemology in a sense that it is an application of epistemological findings to the evaluation of arguments. It means that epistemological nature of informal logic is directly connected to the problem of argument evaluation.

In this respect, my next step would be to reflect on a question about determining what constitutes a good argument in logic. Unfortunately, no consensus has been reached so far in terms of defining the notion of such argument. Generally, it can be distinguished as two key approaches to the evaluation of the argument: fallacies approach and criteria approach.

Outsiders often link informal logic with the study of informal fallacies, which are not covered by formal logic. However, a lot of informal logicians feel skeptical towards such fallacies approach to the evaluation of arguments. The traditional fallacies (primarily including ad hominem) describe these arguments as perfectly reasonable. In this respect, many informal logicians try to clarify what makes an argumentative move legitimate as well as the conditions under which it is fallacious.

Now let’s look at criteria approaches. We covered various ways to separate a good argument from a bad one. For instance, speaking of traditional criteria we can talk about ‘soundness’ and ‘validity.’

An argument is good if and only if it is formally valid and its premises are true. It should be noted that ‘validity’ is a purely logical criterion because we can identify validity of an argument by the logical methods. Meanwhile, it is not possible to establish whether its premises and conclusion are true or not.

The fact that by following these criteria all good arguments are being reduced to deductive proves how strong they are. There are obvious counter-examples to the hypothesis that an argument is good if and only if it is sound in this technical sense. We can see that some arguments which we take to be good are not sound by reflecting on examples of perfectly acceptable arguments whose premises are not all true, or whose inferential step is not deductively valid. In this regard the point of view highlighting inadequacy of formal logic to be the tool for evaluating natural-language arguments is wide spread and recognized within informal logic.

In order to avoid such restriction researchers offered another approach to argument evaluation. For example, Charles Leonard Hamblin distinguishes alethic, epistemic, and dialectical criteria for good argument [Hamblin, 1970: 224-252]. Unfortunately, it should be noted that although given points were identified clear definition of good argument has not been provided.

Informal logicians have developed other criteria for assessing arguments. For instance, a triad of acceptability, relevance, and sufficiency is often used as a popular set of criteria in this regard. In order to be considered good premises of an argument must be acceptable, relevant to the conclusion and sufficient to support it. Let’s consider these criteria in more details. The main question in this regard is whether informal criteria should be considered as logical or epistemological.

From my point of view, these criteria bring argument appraisal much closer to epistemological approach than to formal logical one. Firstly all of these criteria are explicated via epistemological concepts such as belief, knowledge, common knowledge, justification, and others. For example, one of the standard tests for premises acceptability is whether a premise satisfies the common knowledge condition.

Secondly, informal researchers hold that these criteria are best conceived in a relation to a particular person in at a particular time and in a particular epistemological situation. For
example, acceptability is relative to the particular evaluator or to the particular audience that decides in an argument is there. This criterion refers not to the fact that the evaluator or audience accepts the premises, but to the fact that it is reasonable for the evaluator or audience to accept the premises, whether or not they in fact do so. Thus, premises can be acceptable to a particular person, even though the person does not really agree with them. Moreover, they can be acceptable even if they are false. Therefore, it is possible that a false premise would be acceptable to someone if that person has good reason to accept it.

Finally, this method does not have a proper logical back up to be used for identifying the goodness of an argument within informal logic. Let us consider relevance criterion. In short, relevance within informal logic is the relation between premises and conclusion of an argument. But the property of the premise to be relevant to its conclusion is called “premissary relevance” or “local probative relevance.” This relevance differs from logical relevance which can be defined as a relationship of entailment between a set of propositions.

Many informal logicians attack attempts to interpret relevance as a semantic relation as determined by logic. They try to interpret relevance as a pragmatic notion. In this regard relevance of each premise is not a necessary precondition for a good argument and depends on the particular epistemic situation. It means that a good argument cannot be turned into a bad one by adding an irrelevant premise. In typical cases adding an irrelevant premise to an argument will still leave the argument to be capable of fulfilling its function.

Informal logic and Cognitive science

At the beginning of my paper I have already noted that during a long time the dominant approach to the study of argumentation was formal-logical. Accordingly real argument may be good only if it are built, based on the canons of logic.

In this respect the question arises: what are these canons of logic? The answer we can found in numerous text books on logic. From a logical point of view, argumentation should be understood as a text with arguments produced by someone and available for logical reconstruction. You start by accepting certain premises; you then accept intermediate conclusions that follow from the premises or earlier intermediate conclusions in accordance with certain logical rules of inference. Let’s not forget that in order to be make logical analysis possible, these arguments must be “squeezed” into one or another logical form of reasoning, primarily deductive one. Finally, you end up with accepting new conclusions that you have inferred directly or indirectly from your original premises.

However, traditional view on reasoning poses a challenge as most people in daily life do not argue like that. Over the past 50 years cognitive psychology accumulated a lot of experimental data [Declerck & Reed, 2001; Evans, 1998; Fiddick et al., 2000; Ford, 1995]. We can see how ‘natural deduction’ is developing as a new way to look at reasoning. Scholars suggest that reasoning should rely not only on the logical form, but on the mental one as well. They testify to the discrepancy between the logical theory and the practice of reasoning, namely conditional, counterfactual and even syllogistic.

Moving on, let’s turn to the examples that confirm the fact that a person in daily life tends to be guided not only by the canons of logic, but by the context, cultural stereotypes, and others things. It should be noted that all of these points relate to human’s mental presentation of the world.
For the purposes of this paper I propose to examine the experimental results called “The Suppression Task”. The author of this experiment is Ruth M. Byrne and her results were published in the paper “Suppressing Valid Inferences with Conditionals” [Burne, 1989].

Everybody who has at least some sort of knowledge about formal logic knows one of the most recognizable inference rules — modus ponens. It is often defined as: if A implies B and A holds, we can conclude that B holds.

This poses a question whether this logical inference rule can be mental inference rule at the same time for personal usage in reasoning with conditional sentence?

Ruth M. Byrne begins with reasoning that has the form of modus ponens (Example 1).

Premise 1: If she has an essay to write then she will study late in the library.
Premise 2: She has an essay to write.
Conclusion: She will study late in the library.

As a result, 96% of subjects conclude that she will study late in the library.

Then Ruth M. Byrne replicated these results by presenting a second condition containing an alternative for the same consequent (Example 2).

Premise 1: If she has an essay to write then she will study late in the library.
Premise 2: She has an essay to write.
Premise 3: If she has a textbook to read she will study late in the library.
Conclusion: She will study late in the library.

She gets the same result. 96% of subjects chose the conclusion: She will study late in the library.

Further Ruth M. Byrne extends the experiment by introducing a second condition with an additional requirement that must also hold (Example 3).

Premise 1: If she has an essay to write then she will study late in the library.
Premise 2: She has an essay to write.
Premise 3: If the library stays open she will study late in the library.
Conclusion: She will study late in the library.

Now only 38% of subjects made modus ponens inferences, compared to 96% when a simple conditional or two conditionals with alternative conditions were presented.

Ruth M. Byrne concludes that either there are no mental rules for the valid inferences, or that “…suppression by itself tells us nothing about the existence or non-existence of rules of inference in the mind.” [Byrne, 1989: 76]

She admits that the results can still be explained in terms of mental rules if one assumes that the joint representation of both sentences makes the application of inference rules impossible. Her proposal is that: “Formal theories, therefore, need to be supplemented with a detailed account of the process of interpretation, because premises of the same apparent logical form are represented in different ways depending on their meaning.” [Byrne, 1989: 77]

Later on, she rejects mental rules in favor of the mental model theory.
Based the aforesaid, I believe that the study of mental (informal) schemes of reasoning that isn’t based on the deductive logical forms and rules, but mental presentation or mental picture of world may be a relevant task for informal logicians.

**What is Informal logic?**

We have already considered many interpretations of what informal logic is and its interrelations with various fields. Now it is time to define what informal logic actually is.

On my mind, informal logic is best considered as a study of real argument which includes development of certain standards, criteria, and procedures for its interpretation and evaluation. I use the term ‘real argument’ because informal logicians focus solely on this kind of reasoning. Thus, it can be claimed that such argument is a subject matter of informal logic.

In this regard some questions immediately arise: what are real arguments, what are their key features, what are the distinctions between terms ‘reasoning’ and ‘real argument’? Let’s try to answer these questions.

In spite of numerous papers, books, and textbooks published over the last years, it is disappointing that consensus as to what a real argument is has not been achieved yet. The only agreement is that argumentation theorists unite around the point that a real argument is a type of reasoning which is not a subject matter of formal logic.

A quick inspection of reasoning types by various theorists shows that the main differentiation is drawn between deductive and inductive reasoning. Several researchers add the third type — abductive reasoning. Thereby the question arises: could these instances of logical reasoning be considered as types of real argument?

Firstly, if the answer is ‘yes’, then how should we relate to the general idea of informal logic that key feature of a real argument is that it is not a subject matter of formal logic. This point could be illustrated with Johnson’s quote about the formal logic gap as: […] virtual disappearance from the mandate of logic of the focus on real argument.” [Johnson, 2000: 105].

Trudi Govier also part companies with Johnson’s claims: […] what should be obvious: that the understanding of natural arguments requires substantive knowledge and insight not captures in the rules of axiomatized systems [Govier, 1987: 204].

Secondly, the answer is ‘no’, then it is unclear what types of reasoning represent a notion ‘real argument’.

In my view, when answering this question it is important to draw a distinction between logical reasoning and real arguments. The distinction is based on the formal and informal understanding of the notion ‘reasoning’.

In general, reasoning is presented as an activity of human mind or as a special kind of thinking, interrelation of thoughts. Speaking of the formal understanding, reasoning can be defined as a system, composed of premises and conclusion. Certain thought (conclusion) is based on others (premises) or derive from others. We can distinguish various types of reasoning taking into account logical forms. In this sense scholars distinguish the following types of logical reasoning: deductive, inductive and abductive.

By now we have witnessed many attempts to produce a definition of real argument. However, in my view, none of them is clear enough. Let’s try to clarify the term ‘real argument’.

First, it should be pointed out that researchers use various labels for this term in informal studies. Here are some of them: real, natural, every day, actual, real-life, ordinary, mundane, marketplace argument.
For example, according to Blair and Johnson, real argument is an “actual natural language arguments used in public discourse, clothed in their native ambiguity, vagueness and incompleteness. […] arguments that have actually been used to try to persuade people, the sorts of arguments the student will encounter outside the classroom.” [Johnson & Blair 1994: 6].

Leo Groarke thinks that real arguments are “the arguments found in discussion, debate and disagreement as they manifest themselves in daily life.” [Groarke, 2017].

With regard to clarifying this term I consider it as a complex kind of reasoning, which is used in argumentation as a form of dialogical interaction, where arguers aim is to resolve a conflict of opinions expressed by verbal means.

In my view, we can highlight the key features of such arguments and it can be described in the following way.

1. Unlike formal logic, which uses artificial language, real argument is expressed by natural language.
2. Real argument is a dialogical argument. Arguing requires at least two arguers. They express to divergent points of view on certain question and at the same time should keep in mind objections, which they may have.
3. Real argument relates to everyday communication. In this regard the artificial reasoning from logic textbooks are not relevant to real arguments.
4. Real argument mostly is a defeasible argument. We can see that some arguments, which we consider to be good, are not sound by reflecting on examples of perfectly acceptable arguments whose premises are not all true, or whose inferential step is not deductively valid.
5. One of the key features of real argument is its incompleteness. Arguers often do not use all premises and conclusions in such arguments. Some of them do it on purpose to confusing the opponents, but sometimes this case occurs when arguers do not have sufficient skills to express their thoughts clearly.
6. Real argument depends on the context of utterance.

In addition, I would like to emphasize that informal logic cannot be viewed only as a branch of logic. From my point of view, it would be more reasonable to define it as a discipline that sits on the borderline between the interests of logic, epistemology, and cognitive science.

Three perspectives in study of real argument within informal logic can be suggested: logical, epistemic, and cognitive. The first relates to the normative standards, criteria, and procedures of real arguments interpretation. The issues concerning with construction and reconstruction, schemes and forms, unexpressed premises of real argument and others could be considered there.

The epistemic perspective focuses on studying the assessment of a real argument. The cognitive perspective concentrates on a descriptive study of argument, because empirical investigations are important as theoretical ones are in this area. Of the latter, survey data collection is especially noteworthy.

Thus, in my opinion, informal logic should be considered as a normative and descriptive discipline sitting on the borderline between the interests of logic, epistemology, and cognitive science, with a task to study the real arguments through the development of certain standards, criteria, and procedures for its interpretation and evaluation.
Conclusions

In this paper I try to present my reflections on informal logic as one of the informal streams in state-of-the-art study of argumentation. In conclusion, I would like to summarize the main points of my paper.

The appearance of informal investigations in argumentation field was preceded by the publication of two books: The Uses of Argument [Toulmin, 1958] and Traité de L’argumentation: La Nouvelle Rhétorique [Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958]. In my view Toulmin’s concept of the “working logic” and Perelman’s concept of the “new rhetoric” can be identified as the preconditions of informal research in modern theory of argumentation.

By considering various approaches I set the goal to identify the place of informal logic in state-of-the-art study of argumentation. In this way I want to create an adequate basis for providing a precise definition of informal logic. In my view, a suitable definition clarifying a subject matter of informal logic and identifying the realm to which informal logic belongs.

To answer the first question, real argument is the subject matter of informal logic. It is a complex kind of reasoning, which is used in argumentation as a form of dialogical interaction, where arguers aim is to resolve a conflict of opinions expressed by verbal means.

Next, it is important to highlight, the key features of such argument: (i) it is expressed in natural language; (ii) it is a dialogical argument; (iii) it relates to everyday communication; (iv) it mostly is a defeasible argument; (v) incompleteness remains one of the key features of a real argument; (vi) it depends on the context of utterance.

Furthermore, I emphasize that a real argument can be studied within informal logic from various perspectives: logical, epistemic and cognitive. The first relates to the normative standards, criteria, and procedures of interpreting real arguments. The second focuses on the problem of real argument assessment. The third concentrates on a descriptive study of argument. On my mind, informal logic involves appeals not only to the theoretical studies. Empirical research is important in this area as well.

Recapitulating, I can now propose a definition of informal logic, which is based on the one proposed by Ralf H. Johnson and J. Antony Blair [Johnson & Blair, 2000]. It clarifies and broadens our vision of informal logic and its place in contemporary study of argumentation. Here it is: informal logic can be viewed as a normative and descriptive discipline, sitting on the borderline between the interests of logic, epistemology, and cognitive science, with a task to study the real arguments through development of certain standards, criteria, and procedures for its interpretation and evaluation.

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3 “Informal logic designates that branch of logic whose task is to develop non-formal standards, criteria, procedures for analysis, interpretation, evaluation, critique and construction of argumentation in everyday language.” [Johnson & Blair, 2000: 102]


Implementation of Transformative Sustainability Learning into Engineering Curricular

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Nowadays an engineering profession is the most promising in terms of sustainability. Yet, there is a question if higher educational establishments are ready and possess necessary resources to prepare graduates in a sufficient way to create a life-sustainable future. Therefore, universities recognize the education for sustainable development as an essential and timely process of engineering training. The paper presents the characteristics of transformative sustainability learning as a key factor of advanced life-learning engineering education. The analysis of theoretical background signifies that the transformative sustainability learning concept is based on the theory of person’s transformations depending on such personality traits as the life experience, cognitive development, and critical reflection skills which foster personality changes towards sustainability. Thus, we can state that transformative sustainability learning (TSL) integrates such fields as transformative learning and Education for Sustainable Development and the combination impacts personal and societal transformations. This fact provides us with the opportunity to suggest the (TSL) concepts implementation into engineering educational process as an approach that enhances students’ motivation to studying, understanding of sustainability issues and high order thinking skills. If students experience personality transformations, we can find out the pedagogical strategy attributed to these transformations. Having conducted interviews and observations the teaching process at the university, we outlined the most used TSL pedagogical strategies at technical university (placed-based, problem-based, enquiry and service learning) assessed their efficacy, found out the barriers to successful implementation and suggested recommendations to overcome the barriers. Our paper demonstrates potential of TSL implementation as it not only benefits for students but also enhances sustainability-related pedagogies transformative power.

Keywords: transformative learning, educational for sustainable development, placed-based learning, community service learning, problem-based learning, enquiry learning

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Introduction

The key terms, which describe the current processes in the education, are transformations and sustainability. The greatest challenge of the 21-st century is the issue of mind and nature integration in order to provide our future generations with sustainable living conditions. A new recognition of sustainability problems requires urgent solutions, which are not only technical or political but educational as well. Thus, only due to educational means it is possible to change thinking and cognition mode towards sustainability.

As it is stated in UNESCO (2010) Global Action Program on Education for Sustainable Development (ESD), the international acknowledgment of ESD as an essential part of a quality education is a priority for the modern system of education. ESD objective is to create more sustainable and viable society by changing the way of our thinking about the world we live in. The foremost characteristics of ESD are interdisciplinary, collaboration and transformation. Such background implies the involvement of full spectrum of educational establishments for all professions from colleges to doctoral departments at universities.

The World Federation of Engineering Organizations (WFEO) supports the ideas of sustainable development within the engineering education as engineers are qualified with relevant technical skills and knowledge. Thus, the objective of engineering education is to enhance graduate’s competencies in combining scientific innovations and business undertakings. Therefore, higher engineering education should be aimed at sustainable development and further environmentally mindful outlook, as well as a sense of ethical liability with a view to the training of decision-makers, leaders, and researchers. It is obvious that the valuable outcomes of ESD can be achieved through reflection, dialogues, contemplation, and creativity.

It implies that universities are responsible for a shift from a traditional transition of skills and knowledge by teaching and researching towards social needs as well as by generating new educational concepts such as student-centered, cooperative and transformative learning. It is not enough to change curriculum content, sustainable education demands greater changes. Transformative learning and pedagogy can provide the extent of changes regarding the development of analytical, context-related, interdisciplinary, holistic and reflective thinking skills in students. To integrate the ESD values and principles into higher education, we have to be aware of teaching approaches transformations which should be focused on the processes of learning and skills development rather than the knowledge presentation and accumulation.

Objective of the study

This paper is aimed at investigating how transformative sustainable learning strategies can emerge from an educational institution, students, and social interaction and enhance the students’ academic achievements. The paper presents the discussion of higher engineering education transformation necessity and urgency towards sustainability challenges, which come from industry, future graduates and society as well. The transformation should involve not only changes in the content of a curricular but the paradigm of teaching and knowledge acquisition.

The overall objective of the paper is to study the teaching strategies of Transformative Sustainability Learning employed at Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute in order to evaluate their efficiency, to investigate the degree to which they contribute to transformative sustainability education, to discuss barriers to their implementation and suggest solutions.
Theoretical framework

The significance and role of sustainability in higher education have been a mainstream and a policy concern for last fifteen years. The circumstantial challenges of sustainability have attracted the attention of transformative learning scholar as a pedagogic strategy that provides transformations of individuals and communities with the aim to create a sustainable society.

The literature on sustainable education shows a variety of disputative studies searching for the best implementation ways for ESD. Notable professors Stephan Sterling and Ian Thomas indicated three main educational notions that universities are supposed to perceive in order to develop sustainable education: education about sustainability, education for sustainability and sustainable education [Sterling & Thomas, 2006]. The scientists explain that education about sustainability is the representation of factual information; education in sustainability implies experimental and practical approaches to acquire new skills and knowledge; education for sustainability is focused on personal transformations when students adopt sustainability values and principles into their lives. The move toward sustainable education is a challenge for universities as it implies the combination of social, economic and environmental issues study and considering behavioral students’ changes as well.

Regarding the Engineering Department curricula content in the frame of sustainability, Association for the Advancement of Sustainability in Higher Education (2010) suggests that the basic courses for sustainable education should be Engineering, Materials Science, Environmental Science and English. It is explained by the fact that, Engineering and Materials Science deal with industrial processes, connected with consumption and production, while Language learning impacts students’ emotional perception of environmental realities in a critical way through fiction and non-fiction eco-literature and ecocompositions.

With a view to enforcing the education for sustainability in universities, Barbara de la Harpe and Ian Thomas suggested teaching approaches that will contribute to the development of such student’s skills like team work, problem-solving and multidisciplinary thinking [De la Harpe & Thomas, 2009]. They identified three main approaches the personal, re-connecting to reality and holistic thinking. The personal approach means teachers’ acting as role models for learners; re-connecting to real life situations implies real-life experience, enacting social changes and connecting with people and nature; and holistic thinking involves critical thinking development.

Well-known transformational learning theorist Jack Mezirow [Mezirow, 2011] explained the transformative learning as a theory of comprehension and experience altering. He considers the transformation as a natural phase of the personal development, which occurs, while every transition from one educational level to the other: from school to college, from university to working career. Meaningful shifts evolve in response to life experience, especially if it induces powerful emotional responses in the individual. The objective of transformative learning is to revise old assumptions and ways of interpreting experience through critical reflection and self-reflection. It means to empower individuals to change their perspectives and habit of minds (understanding of what is “right” or “wrong”).

Professional challenges, non-compliance with knowledge level and volume, interruption in professional career or promotion provide a starting point for transformative processes. Engineers realize their objectives and seek ways of their possible achievement that can complicate educational activities. Conscious altering enhances and accelerates self-actualization process
Thus, one of the transformative learning targets is to shift the control focus from the external environment into internal which ensures the awareness of own capabilities, enriches and masters professional skills. This idea is supported by Stephan Sterling who claims that transformative learning touches deeper levels of meaning which impact our immediate level of perception [Sterling, 2006]. According to the finding of mentioned above transformation theorists, the perceptual changes and following shifts to a more rational and ethical way of worldview inspire the emergence of new ideas and values.

Concerning Transformative Sustainability Learning (TSL), scholars Yona Sipos, Bryce Battisti, and Kurt Grimm outline transformative changes corresponding to cognitive, psychomotor and affective domains of learning [Sipos et al., 2008]. TSL combines sustainability and transformative learning in order to contribute to profound personal and societal changes which are reflected in upgraded skills, knowledge and attitude towards ecological, social and economic justice. This connection allows speaking about TSL as a separate pedagogical strategy, which employs transdisciplinary, experiential, and placed-based learning.

Due to the multidimensional and complex nature of sustainability, it would be beneficial if TSL were introduced by main ESD-related pedagogical strategies, defined by UNESCO [UNESCO, 2012]: discovery learning, transmissive learning, collaborative, problem-based, interdisciplinary learning, multi-stakeholder social learning, and critical thinking-based learning. Taking into account the variety of strategies, Yona Sipos, Bruce Battisti, and Kurt Grimm tried to match sustainability pedagogical strategies with learning domains [Sipos et al., 2008]. Thus, they suggest that problem-based learning, critical emancipator pedagogy and pedagogy for ecological justice should correspond to the development of cognitive domain; experiential, applied learning, action learning and research in combination with service learning facilitate psychomotor domain development; environmental and placed — based learning influence affective domain. By this division scholar offer the distinguishing of learning objectives as well:

a) Cognitive domain: critical, reflective, systemic thinking, understanding of sustainability and global citizenship issues;

b) Psychomotor domain: employment of acquired knowledge to engage in activities to solve problems local community might have;

c) Affective domain: formation of value-focused inclusive thinking, encouraging students to wish to form a meaningful collaboration with a view to creating better and more appealing alternatives for making sustainable solutions.

Noted scholars Marcus Jean, Nicolas Coops, Ellis Shona, and John Robinson have also arrived at conclusion that TSL strategies implementation efficiency depends on transformational changes in cognitive, psychomotor and affective domains [Jean et al., 2015]. They proposed such key points for TSL implementation:

a) Engaging a cognitive domain through academic learning, lectures, workshops, seminars, and so forth;

b) Engaging psychomotor domain through applying theoretical knowledge to solve practical problems such as designing, inventing, testing, building, and so forth;

c) Engaging affective domains through behavioral changes which are the main goal of TSL.

This approach provides us with evidence about the quality of conducted learning as we can see whether sustainability has just “been learned” regarding cognitive domain or it has been practiced and experienced with following transformational results.
Scholars from Luxembourg University highlight that the objective of transformative sustainability science is to study and investigate the process of society, enterprise, educational establishment, and government collaboration focused on transformation of human and environment relationships [König, 2015; Dyball & Davila, 2016]. Therefore, the research approach implies the combination of disciplines, knowledge, and skills: solution-oriented thinking skills from natural sciences and professional courses, knowledge of society functioning, cultural tolerance and communication skills from social sciences and humanities. By integration of concepts and skills, transformative learning can emerge as a social learning process rather than a science or discipline.

Thus, we can state that TSL approach contributes to the involvement of learners to employ principles, values, and goals of sustainability aimed at societal transformations. The TSL in combination with sustainability pedagogies is a powerful tool to plan, assess, and reflect on the efficiency of transformations.

**Research design and implementation**

Sustainable pedagogies, as well as TSL implementation, depend on teachers’ experience, motivation, comprehension of issues, and self-development abilities. This process requires courage to accept the challenge and implement new strategies. Thus, in order to apprehend teachers’ experience and opinion about TSL and sustainability pedagogies adaptation and implementation, we have designed a qualitative survey involving semi-structured interviews, questionnaires, and a workshop with the following discussion. The combination of these research methods ensured the most accurate interpretability of the data. Moreover, 10 semi-structured interviews and discussions of questionnaire about strategies gave us a wonderful opportunity to set an efficient interaction between participants. After the interviews, we conducted a workshop on TSL pedagogical strategies with the following discussion.

We surveyed on the basis of three faculties: Linguistics, Mechanical Engineering, and Environmental Engineering. The choice of the audience is explained by the range of classes and methods employed at the Faculties; a number of teachers involved in university sustainability programs and courses; interdisciplinary connections which are rather tight among teachers of these faculties as we are often engaged in transdisciplinary projects.

One of the goals of this research was to find out what sustainability pedagogies are used at the university and the level of their relevance to TSL. Taking into account our personal experience and finding of numerous studies, it is obvious that there is no single strategy that is employed for all subjects or for achieving learning outcomes. Teachers of our university apply a lot of educational traditional and alternative methods. To disclose the most applied methods, we provided participants with the list of twelve pedagogical strategies and the task was to point out the most used strategies during the learning process.

Another method of data collection in this study was a performing of interviews. We prepared a list of questions for teachers:

1. How long have you been teaching the subject?
2. What pedagogical strategies do you mostly use? Why?
3. Which pedagogical strategies are the most rewarding for teachers and students?
4. In light of your teaching experience: what aspects of your teaching need mastering or improving?
5. What TSL strategies do you apply?
6. What TSL strategies would you like to apply?
7. What are main barriers, which prevent from TSL strategies implementation?
8. What pedagogical knowledge or skills do you lack?
9. What information about TSL strategies would you like to get regarding professional development?
10. Why do you want to implement TSL strategies?

In the process of the interviewing, all participants (30 teachers in total: 10 from the department) were ensured of the anonymity of their responses, then, after obtaining permission from the participants, the interview was recorded and interpreted immediately. The interviews lasted for 30-45 minutes on average, and each interview was conducted in one session.

The last our step was a workshop with the following discussion on TSL learning and its strategies. During the workshop we explained TSL learning foundations, principles and values; demonstrated TSL pedagogical strategies, explained their methodology and limitations; discussed questions outlined during interviews. All teachers were provided with necessary sources and teaching materials.

Results and discussion

The survey revealed the most applied pedagogical methods used by teachers at the university, requirements and barriers for TSL strategies implementation. It should be noted that all participated teachers use student-centered methods and consider that the learning process is the responsibility of teachers as well as students. It implies that teachers demonstrate a profound teaching background for successful TSL strategies implementation. However, not all of them have a pedagogical education, so they studied methodology and didactics while practicing classes. Thus, TSL is a great challenge for such teachers to start from the scratch and achieve good results. Although, it was a good opportunity to interact with students and motivate them to study together.

Having conducted the first step of our research (completing the questionnaire about strategies application), determining the percentage of strategies application, we received results, which are demonstrated in the Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lectures</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentations</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshops and discussion</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group work activities</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiential activities</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulations/role plays</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem-based pedagogy</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placed-based learning</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action learning</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enquiry learning</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community problem solving learning</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is obvious from the results that traditional strategies (lectures, presentations, workshops, group work activities) are more widely used than TSL-related ones. Mostly lectures and presentation are used for introduction and presenting of the new educational material while workshops and discussions are for revising and mastering. However, according to a student-centered approach, teachers transform conventional lectures into interactive when students are free to ask, comment and doubt. Moreover, the role of a teacher completely differs from a teacher-centered approach, since a teacher should serve as a facilitator in the process of students knowledge acquiring.

On the other hand, such innovative strategies as placed-based, active and discovery learning are not often employed in classes. During the interviews, we asked teachers about these strategies and their attitude towards them. Most answers dealt with lack of knowledge and time to apply it. Teachers from Mechanical Engineering Faculty did not find the educational material, which can be taught in such way. Some teachers of language and environmental science have applied these strategies.

Placed-based learning is well suited for language education as it allows to speak about local, known for students problems promoting their engagement, so language classes become a platform for language skills acquiring as well as for discussions and finding solutions for local sustainability issues. This kind of learning provides students with knowledge that extends beyond the content of only engineering disciplines and content by employing authentic experience. The efficiency of this strategy rises in combination with the project-based learning, which is better suited for teaching engineering disciplines by taking as a background a locally relevant problem. For instance, teachers from Environmental Engineering courses suggested project about sustainability problems in students’ locality with developing real engineering solutions. The feedback from students demonstrated their great involvement and motivation and the community obtained human resources for finding better solutions. As they commented: “At last we have found real employment to our theoretical knowledge and made our native towns more sustainable.” After the project, during classes on English Language writing skills, students wrote project descriptions and reports, which were published in university students’ newspaper.

The outcomes of our survey are fully confirmed by the findings of Brian Johnson, Michael Duffin, and Michael Murphy that placed-based learning joint with personalized learning models provide highly functioning democracy of informed, engaged citizens [Johnson et al., 2012]. This statement corresponds to main goals of TSL to transform our students into involved and committed engineering leaders.

With mostly the same direction of educational goals and learning transformations, we outlined community serviced learning as a practical way of finding solutions to the local issues. Serviced learning involves experiential learning or practical activities which students are able to perform for the community. Due to service-learning students can connect personal, social and professional development. Community involvement usually occurs through cooperated projects between faculty and community representatives (non-governmental organizations, agencies) where course content is integrated into a real-world context. According to Kerissa Heffeman, service learning is considered as integrative, reflective, contextualized, reciprocal and lifelong educational strategy which outcomes are as follows: application of theory to practice, development of high order thinking skills, self-estimation rising through the
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development of personal efficacy and identity, improvement of communication and leadership skills, advancement of social responsibility, deeper cultural and citizenship understanding [Heffernan, 2001]. Faculties also gain some positive feedback and benefits: interdisciplinary which leads to new research and ideas, improvement of students learning outcomes, a connection of curriculum with real-world requirements, increased the level of students motivation and commitment to study.

There are a lot of possibilities how to integrate this learning type into a classroom. We will share some of those conducted at the university: collecting of stories about regional traditions and cultural features with following presentations, writing letters to environment protecting and granting organizations (Faculty of Linguistics); collecting of local water and soil samples to provide environmental impact factor report with following recommendations and solutions (Environmental Engineering Faculty); developing of survey of the most sustainable technologies, which could be used locally (Mechanical Engineering Faculty).

Enquiry learning is crucial for the development of high order thinking skills, which are vital for engineers. The abilities to analyze, synthesize and reflect change students habits of world perception from a single-side approach to extending multi-sides critical view on the problem. Students are not afraid of mistakes, and wrong solutions and teachers do not punish for weak attempts as everyone understands the value of experiential way for the truth discovery. The main idea of the strategy is that students process the data and information they obtain during experiments or research and afterward reach their own conclusions [Hutchings, 2007]. Students are responsible for the outcomes, teachers just direct and watch. It requires teacher-student partnership, high academic achievements and a wide range of necessary skills.

The results of interviews demonstrated that teachers mostly use this strategy at lab-classes, during experiments for scientific research, and for project performance. In UNESCO source for “Teaching and Learning for Sustainable Future”, we found suggested seven stages for this strategy implementation: tuning in, deciding directions; preparing to find out; finding out; sorting out; drawing conclusions; considering social action [UNESCO, 2010].

When we discussed this strategy and its steps during our workshops teachers confessed that it is difficult for them to believe in abilities, respect students’ ideas and give students mostly unlimited freedom. Another point that was mentioned in terms of steps, that almost all steps are understandable and applied except the last one about the social outcome of an experiment. It is often neglected or under evaluated as it takes much time to get a feedback from the community. However, teachers agreed that it is a necessary point for implementation of TSL strategies and motivating students to learn when they see positive results of their work.

Another sustainability pedagogy, interdisciplinary project-based learning, is aimed at the problem rather than at the separate discipline at a time. It emphasizes more complex and expanded awareness of the topic. A range of information source from different disciplines, active engagement, and integration of necessary skills allow students to acquire innovative and unexpected results. Furthermore, when students apply a variety of skills and perspectives, they admit the sense and value of what they are studying. The nature of PBL resembles the character of sustainable development, which is also multidimensional and integrated. Due to the implementation of the strategy, students are able to define sustainable problems, develop controversial discussion, find supportive evidence, acquire and process necessary information from a variety of resources and create argument-based solutions.

While discussing with students a problem of sustainability, we determined a lack of
interdisciplinarity through curricula within the frame of sustainability. Many students knew about this issue for the first time only at English classes opposite to students from universities of Europe or the USA, where sustainability development has already penetrated all courses of mostly all departments regardless the context of the training program on humanities, art or engineering. We consider it as the main drawback of Ukrainian universities to suggest sustainability courses mostly for Master degree students.

However, a beneficial example of TSL implementation is an interdisciplinary project-based approach related to students’ majors or future engineering carrier in terms of sustainability. It is worth mentioning that when students search for information relevant to their career, they are more motivated. For instance students were suggested topics for their choice: perform a sustainability audit for a campus, develop a plan for deconstruction of old university buildings or campus, develop programs for energy consumption reducing, develop green device or technology, develop and recycling and composting program for campus facilities, develop a sustainability Web site to coordinate and enhance students sustainability actions, provide guidelines for greening their future products manufacturing or tools design. At the beginning of a year, students were divided into groups for the project developing. Then students presented their projects to a jury of English teachers and major discipline teachers. The work on the project was performed by students themselves if they needed consultations teachers of major discipline organized such consultations. However, every English class students had to prepare a short report on actions, which had been done.

The present study confirms that TSL strategies motivate students to learn by setting them in situations where they feel as authors of changes and answers. However, while our interviews teachers admitted the presence of some barriers, which prevent successful implementation. Analyzing these barriers, we have to admit that these obstacles can be divided into two categories: originated from teacher’s behavior, outlook, and those related to educational management, curricular design, time and resources limitations, and some students in classes. We have outlined main barriers admitted by almost all teachers:

a) A large volume of necessary educational materials defined in a curriculum and time shortage prevent from advanced strategies using;
b) Lack of motivation in students and teachers regarding innovations of a learning process;
c) Not enough time for professional pedagogical development due to overload by professional courses requirements;
d) Not enough evidence of suggested TSL strategies efficiency, lack of developed and approved methodology for teaching technical majors;
e) Not sufficient students’ theoretical background necessary for effective strategies implementation.

However, as we could notice from the research results, the main barrier is lack of teachers’ pedagogical knowledge and skills how to organize the educational process in the most efficient way. Unfortunately, most teachers from technology departments were not trained for teaching.

Having discussed these barriers with teachers, we understand that not all of them can be eliminated only by teachers themselves. However, if teachers demonstrate respect to students’ background and intentions; provide open communication; display positive feedback; facilitate students’ personal and professional growth, the implementation of advanced educational strategies will be effective for students and society as well. With this in mind, we would like to suggest some recommendations for improving the situation:
a) To include the requirements of advanced methods using into teachers’ assessment rubrics and rating system;
b) To ensure that teachers efforts and intentions are in line with university educational objectives and policy;
c) To raise students’ motivation by encouraging their attempts in searching of personal learning style and methods, respecting their ideas and results and building partnership;
d) To organize systemic and holistic interdisciplinary approach to curricular design;
e) To provide timely and systematic lessons planning and guiding;
f) To provide students with relevant, authentic and profession-related information.

Following some of these recommendations, we hope that teachers will see changes in their teaching practice. Because we consider that the key factor in teaching is meaningful interaction and collaboration between students and teachers rather than facts acquisition. Authentic methods, context and assessment of learning, which TSL belongs to, make the learning process more explicit and reflective.

Conclusions

In summary, it is necessary to admit that there are still many more problems in education to be solved in order to meet the requirements of the changing world. However, we would like to assume that engineering education is moving toward learning beyond the university. With time, the distinction between the postgraduate studying and life-long learning will disappear.

In our survey, we tried to demonstrate the TSL strategy as an effective and promising educational strategy. Moreover, we consider TSL as not an only educational tool but a useful sustainability-oriented method with transformative potential, which facilitates sustainability exploration and perception. TSL possesses a great potential and is based on constant social shifts, which enable students to develop their professional skills and strategies, become conscious of prior assumptions, achieve critical reflection upon these assumptions, create an effective working process and become real leaders for creating sustainable future. Within this framework, we assume that transformative sustainable learning establishes the opportunities that will help engineers to achieve their professional goals and generate new knowledge.

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Master Narratives of Ukrainian Political Culture

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As fighting between Russian backed rebels and government forces is taking place in eastern Ukraine, it is all the more apparent the existing political divide that exists in the country. The complex history of being subjugated by surrounding countries and major resettlements of Ukrainians is testing the country in a major way. Historically, emphasis on understanding the Soviet Union was focused on the Soviet perspective — the Soviet narratives, and most recently on reemerging Russia. As a result, little attention is placed on Ukraine's history.

In order to understand the Ukrainian identity, it’s necessary to know the narratives that encompass Ukraine’s history. As freedom and liberty exemplifies American identity and ideology, the history of Ukraine also contains a system of stories that support Ukrainian culture. This paper, the first chapter of my dissertation, details the sources I’ve used to develop my methodology for understanding and analyzing narratives. As I began my research I soon realized the complexity of narratives leading me to explore the elements contained in narratives such as story, plot, character, archetypes, and the Hero’s Journey or Monomyth. I will explain how I understand the meaning of narrative and master narrative, supported by relevant sources, and conclude with the methodology I will use for analysis of the master narratives that envelope the major historical events of Ukraine.

Keywords: Ukraine, Political Science, History, Narrative, Master Narrative, Russia, National Identity

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Introduction

Ukraine holds a high significance at this time, especially for the United States, given the recent tension between NATO and Russia. Ukraine stands at the center of recent events in the heart of Europe, such as Euromaidan, the ouster of its president, the annexation of Crimea, the fighting in Eastern Ukraine, and a passenger airliner being shot down. It is crucial to have more Americans with expertise on Ukraine. With this in mind, I have applied to, and been accepted into, the PhD program in Political Science at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv.

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My project is to investigate the master narratives that are drivers of Ukraine’s identity. I will examine the events that make up the master narratives and existing counter narratives. For instance, a Ukrainian master narrative as told in Russian history may run counter to Ukraine’s perspective. In researching Ukraine’s master narratives, I will also analyze the heroes, symbols, stories, and traditions that represent those narratives. For example, a song honoring martyrs of Euromaidan, a poem about the Great Famine of Ukraine 1932-1933, the life of Taras Shevchenko, and so on.

Knowledge of the master narratives that affect the collective identity or identities of the Ukrainian people will give US foreign policy makers insight into Ukraine’s attitudes, behavior, interpretive paradigms, and potentially future decisions and courses of action. Narrative has in recent years become an increasingly important focus of research in the areas of international relations, security, conflict, and warfare. It is widely accepted that narratives are a formative element of collective identities and a critical factor in shaping attitudes and motivating behavior. Every culture or group also has master narratives that underlie members’ interpretations of events, shape perceptions of the behaviors and motivations of other actors, and influence decision-making. Studies such as Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism by Jeffrey Halverson et al, contributed significantly to our understanding of the dynamics of conflict in the Middle East and to understanding the behavior and motivations of actors. This research paper takes its cue broadly from that work. I will examine relevant literature on Ukrainian history, narratives, speeches and symbols that have shaped Ukrainian collective memory and identity that appear to influence interpretations of current events and perceptions of the motivations of the various actors involved (that in effect underlie the “stories” people tell about what they see happening).

Ukrainian political history encompasses the leaders and rebels that made a lasting impact on Ukraine’s identity. For instance, Vladimir the Great is remembered for accepting Orthodox Christianity and introduced it as the official religion of medieval Ukraine. Or, Ivan Mazepa, who lead Ukrainian’s fight for independence against the Russian Empire during the Battle of Poltava. Or, controversial figure Stepan Bandera, a leader of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, who initially sided with Germany during the second world war as the country fought for its independence. The aforementioned events are part of the master narratives that support Ukrainian identity.

**Definition of Narratives**

In order to understand narrative’s and master narratives it is necessary to analyze the various definitions of them, beginning with narrative. According to Merriam-Webster, narrative is “something that is narrated: story, account.” For example, “He is writing a detailed narrative of his life on the island.” Furthermore, to narrate something is “to tell (a story) in detail (Merriam-Webster, 2017). The Oxford dictionary defines narrative with slightly greater detail. Such as, a spoken or written account of connected events; a story. For example, a gripping narrative. Or, the narrated part of a literary work, as distinct from dialogue; the practice or art of telling stories; a representation of a particular situation or process in such a way as to reflect or conform to an overarching set of aims or values. (English Oxford Living Dictionaries, 2017)
Thus, we understand that to narrate is to tell a story. Story and plot is sometimes used interchangeably. Yet, there is a distinct difference. According to Aristotle, of the six elements of tragedy (plot, character, diction, thought, spectacle and song), plot is most important. It must have a beginning, middle and end, and the events of the plot should have causality, meaning something happens, which naturally causes something else happening — cause and effect.

Aristotle placed plot above character — though character is a close second in importance. “Now character determines men’s qualities, but it is by their actions that they are happy or the reverse” (Aristotle, VI. 9-14, 1922). However, 19th century English critic Leslie Stephen placed character above plot in importance, “The great object of narrative action was the revelation of character.” (Abbott, 2002: 124). Henry James offered a third variant, as he considered plot and character to be a blend of both — which is the perspective I will write from. “Henry James, argued that no one could learn the art of novel writing by learning first to make characters and second to devise the action.” (Abbott, 2002: 124) The purpose of a story is to teach and though it must have interesting, complex and developed characters, it is their actions, or reaction to actions that define character. Moreover, in analyzing the master narratives of Ukraine, the events and actions that were taken by historic figures, and how those events are retold will take precedence.

Returning to the distinction between plot and story, Edward Forster, who’s definition is used in A Dictionary of Narratology by Gerald Prince, explained the difference between the two. He said,

We have defined story as a narrative of events arranged in their time sequence. A plot is also a narrative of events, the emphasis falling on causality. “The king died and then the queen died,” is a story. “The king died, and then the queen died of grief” is a plot. The time sequence is preserved, but the sense of causality overshadows it. (Forster, 1927: 130)

In other words, a story is about the main events that take place. Whereas, the plot is how the story is told. Consider the difference between how the following story and plot are told:

This is a ‘story’ about a man who has been living his life avoiding serious commitment with women. Instead of lasting and meaningful relationships, he has short flings and always ends the relationship before they can get serious. He eventually meets a woman, and their flings become more and more passionate until he realizes that he’s fallen in love. He decides to express his love to her only to find out she’s married and she never had any intention of settling down with him. Heartbroken, he decides to become a better man and not run away from love in the future.

This story could be told in a number of different ways depending on the ‘plot’. One possibility could be told as follows:

Jason, a business consultant in his thirties, meets Stephanie, a beautiful girl in her late twenties who works as an executive assistant. He takes her out to dinner using his usual charm, intent on seducing her but wanting nothing more. He finds her to be sarcastic, opinionated and annoying, but is still intrigued with her. They meet again at a museum and while looking at a Monet painting she explains to him why she loves impressionism which he finds boring. Yet, he’s impressed with how smart she is, and captivated with her feistiness and strong personality. One night they sleep together at her apartment and shortly after their rendezvous become more and more passionate. Jason tells himself that he will end their relationship eventually but continues seeing her. After a few months, she tells him that she’s moving to another city for
work. He acts nonchalant and wishes her the best. After a few weeks, he realizes that he misses her deeply and cannot stop thinking of her. He thinks about her when he’s at work, when he’s out with his friends and especially when he’s alone. Sitting in a coffee shop, Jason reminisces about their first dinner together. How she annoyed him with her sarcastic remarks and the way she laughed as they argued. He thinks about their date at the museum and how elegant she looked. And about the way she looked at him, listening so attentively with such empathy as he told her how his father died, and how peaceful she looked when she was sleeping next to him. At that moment, he realizes he’s in love and rushes home to call her and express his love for her. On the phone, she confesses that she’s married and never thought their relationship would get so serious. Irrationally, he pleads with her to leave her husband so that they can have a life together, but she refuses. Heartbroken he realizes what love is and that he was wrong to avoid it for so long. He decides he will be a better man for the next woman he meets. As you can see the plot describes how the events take place rather than merely what the story is about.

As there are repeated story forms that we are all familiar with such as the love story or the story of a hero overcoming evil and saving his people, there are also repeated characters that we call archetypes. Archetype’s are “the original pattern or model of which all things of the same type are representations or copies.” (Merriam-Webster, 2017) Archetypes according to Carl Yung are standard characters that all people seem to recognize and are loaded with emotion. As if the archetypes are part of a ‘collective unconscious’ that we are born with (Yung, 1988: 78). “Archetypes create myths, religions, and philosophies that influence and characterize whole nations and epochs of history” (Yung, 1988: 79). In addition, Joseph Campbell who was heavily influenced by Yung’s work, wrote a great deal about ancient mythology and the common archetypes contained in those myths and fairy tales. In the Hero with a Thousand Faces, he wrote about the prevailing Hero’s Journey or Monomyth, which has been taught through a great number of myths throughout history — the myths teaching the different stages of a hero’s journey. These stories contain the major archetypes and can be seen in such movies such as Star Wars, the Gladiator, Braveheart, and so forth. In Star Wars, Luke Skywalker is the Hero archetype, Darth Vader the Shadow or Villain archetype, Yoda the Wise Old Man, Obi-Wan Kenobi the father figure, and so on. Moreover, portions of the hero’s journey can be found in master narratives such as the ‘freedom and liberty’ master narrative of America, as told through the life, i.e. ‘Hero’s Journey’, of such people as Davey Crockett, George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. Consider the difference between labeling someone a terrorist or calling him a freedom fighter — utilizing a different frame. Thus, the narrator has reframed the archetype from that being of a villain to a hero. In an interview during the First Gulf War in 1990 — 1991, Usama Bin Laden repeatedly referred to the West as an alliance of ‘crusaders’ and ‘Jewish-Zionist’s’, “The international crusaders and the Jewish Zionist alliance headed by America, Britain and Israel.” (Laden, 2001) Hence, he evokes the intended audience, those with sympathetic views, to identify the West with two well-known archetypes. More recently the protestors in Ukraine’s 2014 Maidan Revolution (Revolution of Dignity), have been labeled as Fascist’s, neo-Nazis and nationalists by Russian and even some western media. Therefore, using an archetype to label someone or some group for political purposes can immediately induce a narrative or even master narrative.

Next, I will define narrative and then master narrative. H. Porter Abbott gives the following explanation, “narrative is the representation of events, consisting of story and narrative discourse, story is an event or sequence of events (the action), and narrative discourse is those events as represented.” (Abbott 2002: 16) That is to say, events happen which make a story
and how those events are retold is a narrative. For example, Stepan Bandera, a fascist and Nazi collaborator was killed by KGB agents. The previous sentence uses the fascist and Nazi archetypes to label Bandera. Compare the following sentence: Stepan Bandera, a political activist, who cooperated with Germany was assassinated by Stalin’s assassins. Thus, the story (event) has been narrated with a new frame utilizing the despot or tyrant archetype (Stalin), and the audience may identify Stephan Bandera with the victim, hero, or martyr archetypes. Keep in mind that characters in a story may have more than one archetype and “all archetypes are tied to story forms, but not all characters in stories are necessarily archetypes.” (Halverson, et al., 2011: 21)

I once asked an eleven-year-old English student what are stories for? And he quickly answered, “They teach us how to live.” I cannot think of a better and more succinct answer. I might add that narratives help us make moral decisions. Abbott explains they help us make up our minds about things. Especially when we are faced with difficult moral problems. “In almost every one of these narratives, the central figure is torn by a moral dilemma and, as the narrative proceeds, is pulled back and forth between competing moral claims” (Abbott, 2002: 175). There seems to be a predisposition for us to believe there is a higher power, an all knowing narrator teaching us. Abbott alludes to it as a power who helps us create order out of chaos (Abbott, 2002: 95), while Halverson reaches a similar conclusion that “Narratives not only hang together and make sense of the world … they also create expectations for what is likely to happen and what the audience is expected to do about it” (Halverson, et al., 2011: 25).

In addition to helping us make sense of the world, entertaining us, teaching us how to deal with difficult moral dilemmas, or a combination of all three — narratives serve another important function. Which is, to solve some kind of conflict. For example, a set of stories told about unarmed black men in the U.S. who have been shot by police might make up an ‘anti-law enforcement narrative’, which has the objective of changing police practices. As Halverson stated, the audience understands the conflict and knows what they’re expected to do about it. While the previous example was of a current narrative frequently shown on US news sites, other common narratives may tell of stories that originated decades or centuries ago. As Aristotle said, a plot must have a beginning, middle, and end. Likewise, a narrative has an end, or more specifically a desired ending that the audience is anticipating — a man wins the love of a woman, Bruce Willis kills the bad guys, American Patriots establish a new nation, and so forth. Thus, the audience understands and anticipates the desired outcome — which creates suspense. As every good story has mystery in order to create suspense the same holds true for narratives. As the audience understands the desired outcome and the fact that it hasn’t yet been achieved, it creates an emotion that motivates the audience to continue following the narrative and/or taking action. Abbott explains it as the difference between an ending and closure. “... closure does not have to come at the end of a narrative; in fact, it does not have to come at all” (Abbott, 2002: 52). Explaining how the desired outcome not being achieved causes tension and anticipation he says, “If the object is to satisfy this desire which is often the case — it can’t be satisfied too quickly, because we seem also to enjoy being in the state of imbalance or tension that precedes closure. In fact, narrative is marked almost everywhere by its lack of closure. Commonly called suspense, this lack is one of the two things that above everything else give narrative its life (Abbott, 2002: 53).

Which brings us to master narratives (also called masterplots). The main difference between a narrative and master narrative is that the master narrative is transhistorical. Halverson
explains that master narratives contain story forms with the desire to achieve a political or ideological end to a conflict.

Story forms are standard patterns on which stories may be based, defining the typical characters, their actions, and sequences of events in a story. For example, a “rags to riches” story involves a protagonist who goes from poverty to prosperity, only to suffer a setback at the hands of an antagonist, which must be overcome in order to restore his or her success (Halverson, et al., 2011: 20).

Halverson goes on to explain that master narratives are narratives which are deeply fixed in a particular culture which can take decades or longer to develop.

“A narrative is a coherent system of stories that share a common rhetorical desire to resolve a conflict by establishing audience expectations according to the known trajectories of its literary and rhetorical form. A master narrative is a transhistorical narrative that is deeply embedded in a particular culture” (Halverson, et al., 2011: 23-24).

Abbott argues that master narratives, which he calls masterplots, are constantly repeated as they use the conflicts that seem to be “a permanent part of our circumstances as human beings” (Abbott, 2002: 158).

In order to gain a deeper understanding of how narratives are created and affect people, I’ve found Abbott and Halverson to be the most helpful and applicable for my analysis of the master narratives of Ukraine. Halverson’s book analyzes narratives from a political perspective, whereas, Abbott analyzes how narratives work in general storytelling, such as through novels and film. As a result, my understanding of narrative most closely resembles Halverson’s. Therefore, I define narrative and master narrative using Halverson’s construct: a story is a particular sequence of related events that are situated in the past and recounted for rhetorical/ideological purposes. A narrative is an organized system of stories with a common rhetorical desire to resolve a conflict by establishing audience expectations. For example, the anti-pollution narrative, which is a system of stories that show effects and disasters caused by climate change through news reports, documentaries, and film. A Master Narrative is a transhistorical narrative that is deeply embedded in a particular culture, provides a pattern for social structure, and creates a framework for communication about what people are expected to do in certain situations. For instance, a willingness to fight for and achieve ‘Freedom & Liberty.’ The “Freedom & Liberty” master narrative is supported by stories from the Revolutionary War, such as The Boston Massacre or The Battle of Bunker Hill; stories from the Mexican American War, such as The Battle of the Alamo; and stories from the Second World War, such as Pearl Harbor, Battle of Midway, and so on.

Methodology

Historiography is concerned with the methods historians use to research and write about history. However, the aim of this paper is not to prove whether the master narratives actually happened as they are represented, but rather to analyze what the primary Ukrainian master narratives are, and to compare the similarities and differences among Russian and Ukrainian historians.
Thus, the following will serve as my criteria for how I will analyze the source materials. The authors will be identified as to what point of view they wrote from, e.g., Intentionalist, Functionalist, Marxist, and so forth. However, the main focus will be on what are the master narratives, how are they told, what is the call to action, what is the aim, and how the narrative may or may not differ in Ukrainian and Russian discourse. My system will consist of the following stages when reading sources:

1) What was the authors point of view at the time. For example, was he writing from a Marxist, political history, or other methodology?
2) What are the similarities or differences in how the stories are narrated? For example, narratives on the Ukrainian Famine (1932-1933) differ among Ukrainian and Russian historians.
3) Is there a reason why the narratives are similar or differ?

The way I have defined story, plot, narrative and master narrative form the basis of my methodology in analyzing the master narratives of Ukraine. As described earlier, Halverson’s definition and methodology most closely fits how I understand, and will investigate the master narratives of Ukraine, (and how they may differ in Russia), I will use his criteria for my analysis. They are as follows:

• What are the stories and how are they systematically related?
• What stories make up the narrative?
• How do they relate to one another to create coherence?
• What are the archetypes, and how do they relate to one another?
• What is the trajectory of the story form?
• To what desire(s) of the audience does the narrative appeal?
• What is the end state conveyed by the narrative for satisfaction of the desire?
• What is the narrative path that leads from desire to satisfaction?
• How are the narratives used by speakers to create ideological preferences for courses of action and expectations for what is to be done?
• What evidence is there that the narrative is deeply embedded within a culture? (Halverson, 2001: 26)

Conclusion

Thus, the aforementioned comprise my methodology and will be used to study the master narratives of Ukraine from its establishment as Kievan Rus in the 9th century, to its various struggles for more autonomy or independence, and finally achieving lasting independence in 1991. It is the hope that by having established a solid methodology and approach that the reader will be able to easily understand the master narratives which will be explained in future chapters and publications, why the master narratives are meaningful to understanding the Ukrainian identity, and that it will stand up to future criticism.

References


The Social Potential Of the Polish Art in the Transformation Period

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The transformation of the political system, which took place in Poland at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, was accompanied with profound changes not only in economic and political rules, but also in social life.

The author assumes that the transformational potential of the artistic practice — in particular that of the Polish socially engaged art of the time, i.e. artists of the critical art movement — could be used to profile social and economic changes, especially in light of the fact that art provided a reflection of the then dominating feeling of atomisation of the political space.

The present analysis refers to a specific parallel between the mechanisms of power and artistic strategies. What is also emphasised is the political power assumed by artistic practices — manipulative skills, operational efficiency and techniques used by artists to influence the audience.

The question is why the transformational potential of the Polish art has not been fully exploited in the last decades.

Keywords: transformation, imaginary, critical art, socially engaged art, reconfiguration.

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Introduction

At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, Poland underwent a transformation of the political system, which aimed towards establishing new economic rules enabling the transition to a system based on the principles of free market, creation of civil society and democratisation. However, irrespective of the attempts to analyse and evaluate this process together with the then political context and social consequences, the common impression of the transformation is often reduced to “getting rid of the dysfunctional communist system (sometimes called socialism) and
normalisation — in other words introducing a set of natural and universally beneficial market solutions typical of a capitalist system” [Sowa, 2016: 5]. Regrettably, our historical knowledge on these processes, even though they do not belong to a distant past, is still a conglomerate of popular notions surrounded by nothing more than assumptions and interpretations of facts. As Jan Sowa suggests, referring to observations made by a French historian Daniel Beauvois, who has studied the winding paths of the Polish history, Polish historical discourse avoids an adequate explanation of both the prerequisites for transformation and its effects, oscillating between the real and the imagined. In his works, Daniel Beauvois deconstructs Polish historical myths from the perspective of an external, critical observer, discussing topics that had not been addressed before, such as violence and cruelty of the Polish farm and feudal service, the illusoriness of the national solidarity myth, the illusion of tolerance and coexistence of different cultures and denominations within the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the reality of the Polish colonialism in the past. Consequently, there emerges an imaginary, which comprises not only ideas and theoretically-framed historical reconstructions of events, but also imagined dimensions — individually profiled practices of daily life, images, legends, myths, and superstitions. Building such illusionary historical context does not only have a consolidating and persuasive function but might also be an answer to the social need for myths observed by Mircea Eliade or the deficit of magical thinking ascertained by Giorgio Agamben.

This should not be surprising as politics and history are closely related, and the politicisation of history, like all manipulations related to the collective memory, has been evident in the states once dominated by totalitarian regimes. This stems from the fact that history was an extremely effective tool of ideological expansion. Generated visions of history served to build collective imaginaries, instruments to consolidate and create the core of national identity. In consequence, distribution of specific content increased the effectiveness of controlling the dynamics of collective memory and disciplining social groups.

Perhaps this lack of consistency in regulating collective memory resources — caused above all by letting the Catholic Church participate in the process — together with an unsuccessful fight against the opposition resulted in a gradual separation of two mutually exclusive visions of history: its official and contested versions, built on controversies and alternative interpretations that disallow any assimilation. Following Michel Foucault, it can also be assumed that the classic historical discourse (Roman-type history), which legitimises the power, is usually accompanied with an unmasking discourse, the counterhistory (contre-histoire), which is critical towards the power and exposes secrets that the regime deliberately conceals in the shadows of oblivion [Foucault, 1998]. The history of sovereign power, a narration which attempts to recreate “the great uninterrupted jurisprudence of power”, would thus be constantly confronted with the history of servitude and exile, a story whose aim is to “decipher secrets” and “demystify the power”. [Foucault, 1998: 83]. Although both would be cognitively efficient, it is the counterhistory that would have a revolutionary potential by unmasking internal conflicts and antagonisms concealed by those in power.

Therefore, when the time of transformation weakened the dominating official discourse supported by the Polish authorities and revealed a number of manipulations and misrepresentations, the alternative version of history could triumph. This version, however, was also schematised and simplified in order to construct a new founding myth. This is why an adequate reinterpretation
of the Polish history requires abandoning the glorification of the “golden age” and distancing oneself critically from one’s own traditions and national myths, which for the time being is a task for subsequent generations of historians.

The time of transformation released a range of discourses and practices, which had been previously restrained by an ideological muzzle. However, it would be difficult to identify specific fields of art that would be strongly correlated with this period. It should be remembered that the notion of transformation involves a process, transition from one state to another, which is gradual rather than revolutionary. The same is true of transformations related to artistic projects. What became real in the field of economy and politics through the transformation of the socialist model into a social market economy had to wait for its artistic representation. This extremely interesting time of dynamic political, social and economic changes saw the emergence of the rules of the art market, which had previously existed only in a hypothetical form. Works of art were gradually included in the general circulation of goods. However, as in the case of new regulations in social life, many artistic solutions were temporary and did not receive institutional support. Moreover, one should remember that the reality that replaced the so-called real socialism did not create favourable conditions for creating an art market that would function in the same way as in the Western European states. This is why the 1990s are, above all, a time of redefining, experimenting with and modifying the Polish art.

The open and ambivalent character of this period made Jakub Banasiak describe it as non-time, a transitional moment, formless, dominated by potentiality, in which reality could take any shape: “The non-time of the nineties could be (...) described as a natural state or a kind of resetting. All these concepts designate basically one thing: a state of void which was to be filled with great narrations of the transformation period” [Banasiak, 2011].

One of such narrations was proposed by critical art. This movement in Polish socially engaged art of the 1990s was the first to react to the dilemmas and problems related to transformation, postulating a distanced, critical reflection and cultural commentary, exploration and demystification of the changing social and political reality, exposition of ambiguity and ambivalence and exposure of the disciplining strategies of the authorities. The movement was created by artists who debuted in the eighties, such as Zbigniew Libera and Grzegorz Klaman, as well as younger artists associated with Grzegorz Kowalski’s atelier, who began their careers in the mid-nineties, such as Artur Żmijewski, Katarzyna Kozyra, Jacek Markiewicz and Paweł Althamer, but also Alicja Żebrowska, Dorota Nieznalska and Robert Rumas. Constructed on the basis of counterhistory discourse and exposing the shortcomings and misrepresentation of the dominating narration, the project reflected a search for a new order — the future, transformed horizon of social life. However, in the fluctuating world of deep and dynamic changes dominated by uncertainty, the lack of permanence or stability, the feeling of being lost, and the need to arrange a permanent order had to assume a different shape. This is why Polish artists resorted to techniques developed in the Western counterculture: subversion and recontextualisation (detournement), body art or even abject art.

In this way, critical art was able to weaken the myths that had been generated to validate the existing order, argue with the proposed interpretations of national history, condemn power discourses and point to social engagement methods. By acting in an unconventional and often controversial way, critical art could galvanise, stimulate reflection, arouse emotions, but also provoke indignation.

A good example of this function can be found in most works by Zbigniew Libera, a scandalising and controversial artist, who deconstructs the area of stereotypical social roles and
canonical discourses. Among his works are the video *Jak tresuje się dziewczynki / How to Train the Girls* (1984), a body-building set for little boys (*Body Master*, 1995), an installation imitating the sign on the gate of the Auschwitz concentration camp (*Christus ist mein leben, 1990*), a device for penis enlargement (*Universal Penis Expander, 1995*), and his most recognisable work, a Lego set for building a death camp (*Lego. Obóz koncentracyjny/Lego. Concentration Camp, 1996*). All of these works caused many “allergic” reactions. Other artists whose works have a critical, demystifying and iconoclastic character and emancipatory power include Dorota Kozyra (for example her diploma work *Piramida zwierząt/Pyramid of Animals, 1993*, or the subsequent well-known *Łaźnie/Bathhouses 1997 and 1999*) and Artur Żmijewski (videos *Oko za oko/ Eye for an Eye, 1998, KRWP, 2000, Berek/Tag, 1999, and 80064, 2002*). A spectacular example of a scandal generated by the public media are actions and repercussions (social protests and institutional sanctions) against the works of Nieznalska (*Pasja/Passion, 2001*) and Markiewicz (*Adoracja Chrystusa/Adoration of Christ, 1993*).

Unfortunately, viewers at that time were unprepared for this kind of art due to lack of cultural education. In most cases the works were perceived as an incomprehensible attack on reception habits and traditional forms of art. The same is true of the so-called elites who behaved in the same way as the rest of the society. Their reaction to the manifestations of critical art was uniformly negative due to the fact that their knowledge of art was limited to the most canonical examples. Indeed, this is still characteristic of the majority of Poles. Due to lack of knowledge and little competence, contemporary art is marginalised as incomprehensible. As a result, its social role is not recognised. This fact has been confirmed by studies [Krajewski & Szmidt, 2016: 8-12], which also demonstrate Poles’ preferences: they expect art to fulfil aesthetic (source of satisfaction and positive emotions), cognitive (source of information or reflection), pragmatic (object that can be used in practice) and social functions [Krajewski & Szmidt, 2016: 20-21].

Therefore, when assessing the time of transformation in terms of how important the voice of artists engaged in the process was, one could risk a claim that this period was somewhat squandered. It is true that, having critically evaluated the transformation, art was not afraid to take up the challenge of deconstructing the image of history sanctioned by social imaginaries, to contest the leading narrations of the past, to problematise the scale and to demythologise official discourses. However, these actions where never institutionally supported. What is more, the critical discourse did not generate mechanisms of self-regulation and the new reality brought not only enthusiasm, but also new problems and frustrations. At the same time, *critical art* turned out to be an ephemeron, whose social potential quickly expired due to its form and cultural context, which passed without continuation (its history comes to an end quite rapidly in spite of the fact that the artists originating in this movement are still active).

Nevertheless, the emblematic character of the transition years is related to *critical art* and even if its social capital was not effectively used, it was an exceptional time of artistic radicalism. It paved new ways in the Polish approach to thinking about art. There is also some hope in the actions and statements of the critical artist themselves, who, looking back, acknowledge this untapped potential. Artur Żmijewski, the current artistic supervisor of “*Krytyka Polityczna*” magazine and the curator of the 7th Berlin Biennale, to which he invited representatives of social and city movements together with political activists, says in an interview with the co-curator Joanna Warsza: “I have always been more interested in the social and political usefulness and
effectiveness of artistic activity. I have been wondering how you can use the language of art to put people into a state of ideological tremor and to become as skilled in manipulation as politicians are” [Żmijewski, 2012]. Żmijewski is aware of the political power of art and its emancipatory potential, yet sceptical about its effectiveness. It should be remembered, however, that this period started a series of unprecedented attacks on works of art and the galleries where they were displayed, and that binary oppositions that divided the artistic community in parallel to political divisions, were also present in the field of art perception.

On 17 November 2000, the actor Daniel Olbrychski came to Zachęta National Gallery of Art in Warsaw with a film crew of the public broadcaster (TVP). The actor entered the gallery with a saber and used it to destroy part of Piotr Uklański’s installation Nazis, which consisted of 164 colourful film photographs depicting attractive actors who had played the roles of German soldiers from the time of the Second World War. Later Olbrychski explained that he did it as an act of defending his own dignity and the dignity of his colleagues whom Uklański identified with the characters they played. Olbrychski was unable to understand Uklański’s deceptive game of playing with popular culture clichés, but at the same time he reached for a rather spectacular tool himself — he staged a performance with the use of a prop (Kmicic’s saber) and had it recorded. Due to an (unfounded) suspicion of Nazism propagation, the then Minister of Culture and Art, Kazimierz Michał Ujzadowski, decided to close the exhibition.

However, as noticed by Stach Szablowski, this event gained a symbolic status as the first case when “an aversion to an artistic proposal left the sphere of debate and took the shape of physical violence — a radical act of iconoclasm targeted at contemporary art and its strategies” [Szablowski, 2009]. What is more, Olbrychski removed the image of one of his film characters (Karl Kremer from Les uns et les autres by Claude Lelouch, 1981) using an artefact belonging to another character he played (Kmicic from Potop (The Deluge) by Jerzy Hoffman, 1974) in a symbolic fight against representations of new culture with an archaic weapon of the Polish nobility [Szablowski, 2009].

Another spectacular example of a conflict which escalated around a work of art was the behaviour of a Polish MP Witold Tomczak. On 21 December 2000, the politician visited Zachęta Gallery together with his colleague from the same political club, Halina Nowina-Konopczyna. Driven by patriotic and religious motives, he felt the need to “correct” Maurizio Cattelano’s sculpture La Nona Ora, which presented Pope John Paul II squashed by a meteorite, by relieving the Head of the Church of his burden. Despite security’s intervention, the MP succeeded in removing the heavy object from the Pope’s body — sadly, together with one of the Holy Father’s lower limbs.

These events not only exemplify a situation when conservatism and ignorance are confronted with new, radical or critical artistic strategies, but also confirm the fact that authorities may intercept artistic practices — the performative power of works of art is taken over by politicians’ activities and various forms of social protests. Thus, political actions (debates, manifestations, demonstrations) could be described as spectacles organised according to the rules (of art). This seems to confirm an observation that performativity and spectacularity are those aestheticising strategies that were annexed by the popular culture most efficiently.

The entire situation raises the issue of why such a complementary and relevant (functioning within the context of social dynamics) artistic project, which additionally had an enormous political potential, was unsuccessful. The observed political involvement of art calls for a detailed and adequate explanation — not only with regard to rather obvious usefulness of artistic practice and its instruments (strategies) for legitimising the order of power and affirmation of
the projected reality, but also in the aforementioned context of social engagement and reshaping
the experienced world. It should be emphasised that aesthetic criteria and artistic preferences are
more than just a form of nostalgia for an orderly world. The political power of art has always
been based on a confrontation between that which represents rationalised and relatively stable
past, and the volatile present which evades discourse. It has predominantly been based on the
dynamics of opposing forms and complementary contents. That is why art has aroused interest
of theoreticians and creators alike, who, after all, attempted to explore the principles underlying
the interaction of power structures, artistic forms and aesthetic criteria.

Artistic power over form could exist as a parallel to political power. However, in the processes
described, the awareness of such power did not lead artists to revolutionary changes, but merely
attempts to redefine their social function. The alliance between power and art explored by
modernity was nevertheless based on a conscious, successive and aesthetic profiling of politics
and found its expression in propaganda mechanisms used for its glorification. This way artistic
means were used in an instrumental way to popularise political and social ideas, which was
realised in specific forms and iconographic motives. Propaganda annexed intermediate forms
represented by symbols and signs and took on a sensual shape which related directly to the
emotive sphere, while the reflection on the establishment of power merged with artistic order.

III

In the complicated history of Poland, filled with political disasters and patriotic uprisings,
a functional merge of the aesthetic and the political appeared to be a natural process, which in
addition instrumentalised all artistic activities in order to effectively submit them to the goals
set by the high authority or interests of the emancipating nation. Therefore, disputes on the
usefulness of artistic practices in shaping the national identity and awareness occurred within the
field of modernist manifestos. Already at that time, artists were shown a perspective of designing
the future world, being capable of regulating its formal complexity and establishing the field
of power. It was recognised that art had a transformational potential and as such could become
a useful reshaping and constructing tool for the animators of the new reality, who wished to
modify the established hierarchies. Art was seen as an instrument of political transformation in
the world.

Based on these observations, what emerged as the most popular term to describe the nature
of relations between power and art was “politicisation” understood as ideological involvement
that made art a hostage of the political regime in power at a given time. However, the meaning
of the term “political” cannot be reduced to institutionally grounded processes of exercising
and distributing power. It can refer to more extensive phenomena pertaining to the entire sphere
of social life and every kind of organisation or configuration of experience. We can therefore
assume that politics is not only about holding power or struggling for it — it is also about
managing a specific space and dividing a particular sphere of experience.

One can have doubts, however, about the role of contemporary art within modern societies,
especially about how its mechanisms, techniques and strategies have been used to secure new
forms of power. This doubt can be inscribed in the wider context of discussions on the position
of modern art, the status of works of art and social roles of artists, but also the institution of art
itself, which changes in the time of transformation. In the context of political transformation
in Poland, this is related to the role of artistic practice in shaping a new model of life. Analysis
of the domain of aesthetics may prove helpful to describe these interrelations. A cognitive
The Social Potential of the Polish Art in the Transformation Period by Artur Pstuszek

perspective found in the works of Jacques Rancière might also prove useful. The author of *The Politics of Aesthetics* argues that apolitical art does not exist due to the fact that all forms of artistic activity lead to modification and aesthetic reshaping of the world; therefore, in their essence, they reconfigure the field of our experience, providing it with a new spatial order. In consequence, one could hardly imagine an artistic act — or any recreation — that would not involve some transformational power. Art understood in this way is “not politics because of messages or feelings related to that the world order it communicates. Neither is it politics for the way in which it shows the social structure, conflicts or identities of social groups. Art is politics through the very distance taken towards its functions, through the type of time and space introduced, through the way it divides that time and peoples that space” [Rancière, 2007: 24]. This specific configuration of time and space as forms of sensuality demarcating the sphere of experience creates the basis for designing a future society.

For this reason, when discussing the postulates of socially engaged art one should emphasise various attitudes towards the political involvement of art and active reshaping of social life. In 2007, Artur Żmijewski published his artistic declaration titled *Applied social arts*. Its publication in “Krytyka Polityczna” coincided with the first Polish edition of Jacques Rancière’s writings *The Politics of Aesthetics*. In his declaration, Żmijewski tried to draw our attention to social consequences of creative activity, their transformational potential and cognitive usefulness — an important element broadening the field of artistic works and enabling artists to truly contribute to reshaping the world [Żmijewski, 2007]. According to Żmijewski, recognition of the political power of an artistic gesture was not enough to substantially influence the shape of social life. Hence the postulated effectiveness, which should be generated by abolishing the established restrictions, among which, as the author believes, are: placement of art in the position of an outsider, isolation of art from other discourses, the related alienation and ignorance of artists and critics and finally the impossibility of verifying achievements. In order to restore art’s direct influence on social and political life, one should stop treating artistic realisations as mere symptoms — they have a real “power to name, define and interfere in cultural structures, power to put pressure on elements of social structure by including them in artefacts” [Żmijewski, 2007: 17]. Artists themselves should stop being afraid of the effects of their actions by finding a Solomonic solution between serving the power and an open rebellion.

Artists, therefore, should not refrain from engaging in social debate and stating their political preferences regardless of past, perhaps difficult experiences, such as alliances with totalitarian regimes. The area of creativity should complement other culture-forming discourses and break the oppressive isolationism, stressing the cognitive deficit of artistic activities. In consequence, such actions should strengthen the interactive potential of art. This way art would be able to intensify social engagement, while artists could profile their activities in a way that would lead to reconfiguring the network of relations shaping the sphere of common experience. This is especially true when the artistic project anticipates far-reaching social effects, including bond strengthening or community resuscitation, which seemed particularly relevant during the transformation period. Moreover, the artistic appropriation of public space connected with this activity influences the assimilation of creative strategies and the transfer of artistic forms into popular culture.

One should also abandon the tradition of instrumentalising artistic practice and rather than treat *politicism* in terms of alliance with power, see it as a real change, *reconfiguration* of life. Only real involvement, described as *participation*, eliminates the state of being closed within the autonomous field of art sanctioned by modernity, eradicates isolation, autotelicity and distance.
from problems that go beyond the artistic practice. Therefore, it succours all the postulates that would like to see art as the tool for reconstructing reality. Any artistic or aesthetic idea, by means of which social reality is organised, gains political power to reconfigure the experience and modify the established hierarchies. Thus, it can be concluded that the twentieth-century transformations of social space have confirmed the belief held by Rancière and others that all spheres of life are “politicised.”

IV

What is characteristic of the Polish setting, however, is a conviction that attitudes towards art are always polarised and translate into mutually exclusive, antagonised “front lines” in a battle for the “quality” of artistic expression. However, when modelling dissensuality of political narratives is added to the picture, it becomes more complicated. Hence the continuous creation of new partitions, parcelling and demarcation strategies, separating not only the fields of artistic exploration, but also the audience. This also leads to far-reaching simplifications in the critical layer and highlights not so much the heterogeneity of artistic practices, but rather the reduction of the balance of forces within the field of art to a dichotomous alignment. However, the idea of polarisation can be a convenient and simplifying interpretation key. This is exemplified by the attempts to critically reflect on Polish contemporary art. Agata Pyzik, for instance, writes that in Poland „there are two attitudes towards modern art: one involves ignorance and right-wing censorship of institutions succumbing to the pressure of the church or authorities, and the most primitive accusations of offence to feelings, moral debasement or pointless “daubs”; the other is based on full acceptance of the primacy of monetary value, where art is only for the sophisticated and affluent, and as such should primarily be part of the “market”, where the status of an artist / his art is indicated by his market position” [Pyzik, 2017]. A similar attempt to present the recent political involvement of the Polish art was made by Jakub Banasiak. While evaluating this year’s exhibitions (Późna polskość/Late Polishness at the Centre of Modern Art, curated by Ewa Gorządek and Stach Szabłowski and Historiofilia/Historyphilia at Drukarnia Naukowo-Techniczna, curated by Piotr Bernatowicz), he focuses only on the continuing fundamental dispute between two conflicted parties of the Polish political scene [Banasiak, 2017].

Naturally, both these opinions are founded on the belief that the very nature of art is political. If so, its political potential can (or rather: should) be used. However, when an artistic work becomes a “manifesto”, some questions arise: to what extent can artists be politically engaged? To what extent can they associate their creative work with active support for political movements? What limits their creative activity? Do such boundaries, determined by the so-called political correctness, make sense? After all, distancing oneself from experience, from what is spectacular, implies exclusion from social circulation and means marginalising and suppressing one’s own views and political demands, and consequently leads to loneliness and powerlessness. Political emancipation is the only type of emancipation that involves a transfer of a given form of subjectivity into the sphere of political “visibility”, the ability to manifest one’s ability to manage the field of experience, to attract attention, and to communicate one’s presence and strength (social importance). At the opposite extreme, there are those who are always excluded, deprived of their “voice”, i.e. the politically powerless.

However, is such disengaged “visibility” possible? Part of the artistic community declares a kind of “neutrality”. While commenting on the creation of one of the most controversial installations located in the centre of Warsaw (Tęcza/Rainbow, 2012), Julita Wójcik claimed that
she was not involved either socially or politically, because she tried to purge this project from any dedicated meanings to generate pure pleasure. Another form of distance and non-alignment was postulated by the artists associated with the Noo-avant-garde Manifesto (Agnieszka Kurant, Oskar Dawicki, Łukasz Ronduda, Janek Simon and Edwin Bendyk), who made lack of commitment one of their postulates, arguing that any form of engagement could deprive the work of art of its artistic value (Niezwykle Rzadkie Zdarzenia. Dystrybucja Nooawangardy/Extremely Rare Events. Distribution of Noo-avant-garde, Centre of Modern Art 2009).

The problem, however, is not whether artists consciously enclose their works with socio-political content, or whether they try to defend themselves against such an association, distancing themselves and choosing various strategies of escapism. Rancière’s perspective demonstrates the impossibility of separating these two areas, with art making certain objects “visible” and thus taking control over the techniques of their representation. As a result, there are no enclaves in which artists could be isolated from power. After all, they themselves authenticate this power. Therefore, their decision can only relate to real engagement.

Thus, only a broad understanding of creative activities allows for overcoming the barriers that isolate art from other areas of social life and select groups of its recipients. However, what is most often observed is the politicisation of artistic practices, rather than liberation of their critical power, intervention or correction postulated by the creators engaged. Hence the actions that usually instrumentalise art acquire performative, spectacular and transparent traits. Żmijewski noticed that the “the oldest and most important tradition of art” is conformism, not rebellion. The latter is a marginal phenomenon since “art is rather a tool that makes people conform, makes them stay loyal to their own rules” [Żmijewski & Warsza, 2012]. For those in power, the phantasmal figure of the artist — alienated, irrational and anti-social, and therefore powerless — is the most useful one. A gesture of visibility on its own (lending visibility) seems to be insufficient — in order to be effective, the artist should become the animator.

This might explain why the transformational potential of art was used to such a small extent in the time of political transformation in Poland. The artistic and social orders were not correlated despite creators’ commitment. The power of art, or the possibility of real influence on the shape of social life, was limited by the expedient inertia, institutional immaturity, isolation of art from other discourses, and the need to construct a myth conditioned by political alliances, i.e. a unified, coherent narrative that would precisely dislocate objects of experience and enrich the imaginaries. In fact, all regimes have used and distorted the artistic and intellectual heritage of their time, controlling the sphere of creativity and turning the effects of artistic practices against artists or persuading them to obligingly deform the experienced world. Therefore, what could be expected from art born on the ruins of a totalitarian system is distanced and critical authenticity, free from collaboration with the ruling regime. However, art is already fulfilling its new task, i.e. it is reconfiguring the world, establishing its new hierarchies and setting new boundaries of experience; artists either critically deconstruct the mechanisms of power and oppression or exploit them to achieve their own goals. Perhaps, following this trail, one should assume the possibility of a specific “feedback”, a subversion mechanism that would go beyond simple manipulation of the results of artistic practices. This feedback would neutralise the oppressiveness of political power over not only creative actions, but also strategies for their interpretation, and thus enable autonomous re-interpretation, a free play with conventions appropriated by the authorities. Only then could art become a power-threatening field of critical activity.
References


Classic University as Institutional Form of Human Action

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The article is devoted to the analysis of historical dynamics of university and its way of organization of human action. The main part of attention is concerned over the classic model of university and its transformations. The university carries out a social institution. It has absence of its own autonomous field of culture, which is a form of spiritual rather than social production. Education is a set of social institutions that produce social structure directly, that is, social technology with the purpose of human and social production of the new model. The society of the late Modern becomes a collection of social institutions (not only educational, but also legal, political, economical, and even in a certain sense cultural) and industries (specialized fields of material production). Education in this sense is a form of human production in general, while economics, politics and law are generally aimed at the indirect production of people through the logic of much complicated institutes movement: economics, politics, law (goods, power structures and laws). Depending on the national model of education, universities determine the priority of certain educational strategies. The university as a social technology, based on the new sample of anthropological model, forms disciplinary practices that function for production of habitus and cultural capital, and also provides identification “under the auspices of the concept of culture” in the Modern era. This cultural-historical period is characterized by the fact that social control is carried out not through personal coercion, but through the passage through institutions. A higher educational institution in the era of Modernity is the most consistent embodiment of the idea of a social institution as an intermediary between spiritual and material production. Culture in this context acts as a form of “high culture,” that is, as a way of human existence just like this, with value orientations on the foundations of universal cult of reason. The “Cultural Mission” of the University is a mediation between the regulatory ideas of the Modern and a certain type of state that is, to be a social technology of nation-building. The technology of cultivating reason is provided by studying at the Philosophical Faculty and is an obligatory philosophical component for other faculties in the German model, created by Wilhelm von Humboldt. The formation of the cult of universal reason and self-sufficient subject is the basic task of the classical university and its leading socio-cultural function and cultural mission.

Keywords: human action, university, classic university, Modern, social institute, cultural field, disciplinary practice, discourse.

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Introduction

Contemporary cultural transformations make significant corrections to all present socio-cultural configurations. A university as the basic phenomenon of Modern is not standing outside of these changes. Pessimistic scenarios declare “death” and “destruction” as the most obvious prospects of its future. In the meantime, the most optimistic, on the contrary, anticipate increasing of its cultural potential in the context of knowledge economy development. The fact that socio-cultural functions of a university are changing in the “post-national constellation”[Habermas, 2001] is supposed as to be generally accepted. The above mentioned fundamental shifts require clarification and explanation of the historical dynamics of higher education institutions, in particular the cultural mission of its classical model. Since the experience of a corporation that successfully survived several civilizational transformations causes respect and as well as both theoretical and practical interest. The task of our research is to determine the cultural mission of the University classical model.

Social and cultural context

The classical European philosophy of consciousness was based on the universality of the identity principle on the condition of immanent unity of being and thinking. The autonomy of the transcendental subject correlated with the isolation of a man from social conditions of his life and the opposition of the forms of high culture. The unity of the subject itself was carried out in the epistemological dimension on the basis of the intellect universalism as the necessary moment of the realization of its autonomy. All this was a symptom of a shift in the sphere of social self-production.

In the Modern era, the production of the subject was carried out not through the personal compulsion, as in previous eras, but through opposition to the swap of things logics as goods and gradually shifted to the sphere of “passing through the institutes” [Readings, 1997: 44]. The establishment of a market economy and a national state was not independent, but appeared to be the only one socio-cultural process. The modern technology of social production was not just a derivative from the syncretism of material and spiritual culture, but mediated the relationship between industrial production and forms of high culture, the social division of labor, and an organic type of solidarity. Forms of high culture required the body of social structures, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the industrial and economic spheres were the result of the subjects interaction as atomic individuals, which were caused by their relations with things. Industry demanded the economy specialization, legal and political systems for its successful functioning, which led to the formation of institutions derived from the sectoral division of the industry. At the same time, another type of social activity separated — social technology itself (that was out of the specialization of the material and spiritual spheres of production).

On the first place, it was the sphere of education. The last one serves as a technology for the formation of a person in a complex differentiated society, where the reproduction of social opportunities of every one is carried out significantly outside of his belonging to the occupations in his family and genus in general. Education is a social lift, social magic, exit beyond the three classical stratums of the Indo-Europeans (oratores, bellatores, laboratories).

University as a form of higher education becomes the basic institute of the Modern, it is the crossing of its two main dimensions: the academic corporation and the state institution. It should
be noted that the first appointment was initially self-sufficient. Moreover, all corporations were carried out as universitas, that is, as a community of equal people who had vowed each other. This was the union of any craft guild and even the city community as a whole, the prototype of any institute in the modern sense of the word, and even a legal person, as being proved by the studies of the medievalists. Only gradually such a name was fixed only for a certain type of educational institutions.

We should not also forget about the religious-ritual dominant of any premodern civilization. In the statutes of the first universities, in particular Parisian one in the 13th century, it was recorded that they were “a community of the alive and the dead” [Oexle, 2007: 27]. This meant, first of all, the responsibility for the funeral ceremonies of community members and funeral prayers for them. Since being detached from blood relatives, students and even lecturers usually stayed in a foreign country without support, in such an important for religious people thing as funeral and memorial. The rituality of the last ones was even obligatory for Christianity, despite the high degree of theology rationalization. Consequently, in pre-modern Europe, the university was born as a transnational corporation based on the principles of the civilization of Christian Europe unity and the organizational — Papal Curia. However, the first change of the Reformation, and then secularization, allowed it to be nationalized quickly.

**Classic university: between disciplinary practice and discourse**

The construction of a national state required an increase in the bureaucracy and, accordingly, an educated class of people. Time has shifted accents. University autonomy, which took its origins in the codes of guilds, gradually began to serve as a necessary social distance from the utilitarian cares of life in order to create an appropriate anthropological model.

The social function of the university was explained by Immanuel Kant in the well-known work “the Conflict of the Faculties.” He said that the state as a source of financing uses the product of university education — educated people. The last ones are needed “to influence the people by certain teachings” [Kant, 2002]. Influence becomes possible due to the fact that people are lost in the contradiction between their sensual impulses, private goods and social requirements. They do not want to be responsible for every decision and want to be led in the most enjoyable and safe ways. What the state did through the community of not professional scientists, but educated people who represented “motivation reasons” to coordinate the interactions between individuals and, more importantly, with the state. Immanuel Kant emphasizes that “according to reason (that is, objectively) the following order exists among the incentives that the government can use to achieve its ends (of influence the people): first comes the eternal well-being of each, then his civil well-being as a member of each society and, finally, physical well-being (a long life and health)” [Kant, 2002]. Each of these “incentives” had a projection of the socio-cultural system of the Modern and a psychological coloration that represents private space of the atomized individual. After all, person of Modern is connected with the social whole by private interest. “Eternal well-being” is a private dimension of spiritual culture; “physical well-being” was a condition of material, even physical reproduction of an individual. “Civil well-being” — this is a form of the evolving of private interest in the general legal system of self-production of society. Each of these areas is a combination of disciplinary practices in Foucauldian description (first and foremost, medicine and law). The last ones were devoted to create the conscience as the “body of the prison,” that was, “by teachings regarding the second (civil well-being) it (government) helps to keep their external conduct under their
reins of public law” [Kant, 2002]. Modern disciplinary practices, their norms and rules, differ both from the types of institutionalization of the human actions in Premodern, and from the value orientations of cultural fields.

In the dimension of high culture there was a certain number of fields producing a priori values and “the system of things”, which are intended to legitimize the self-sufficiency of each of them (in case of art and science). In the body of society such cultural fields incorporate through social institutions. The last ones have the middle function: to preserve the a priori status of values and to form the productions and consumers of them, that was to deal directly with the actors as their agents. For the incorporation of subjects into social structure of cultural field disciplinary technologies are being produced, which, in the process of learning and obsessing, turn into habitus (body techniques) and cultural capital (an interiorized set of knowledge and values), in the bourdieusian concept. Modern body typification techniques and their legitimation in public perception as generally recognized lead to the formation of disciplinary practices. Fundamental difference was in Eliasian perspective.

The Formation of social structures that provide the implementation of these disciplinary practices is the process of institutionalization. The emergence of a certain set of knowledge, the content which determines the form of its implementation, also causes a certain style, a certain way of thinking. The functioning of such knowledge as a cultural capital was a form of implementation of discursive practices. They supplement disciplinary practices and even gradually begin to provide reflation over them, organize them, asking for models and norms for the last ones. The autonomy of the theoretical sphere sets authority and level of recognition of discursive practices and becomes the basis of their ideology. Thus, the role of discourse and ideology in the process of institutionalization of Modern is much higher than in previous historical types of culture. On the autonomy of the theoretical consciousness itself and the spiritual forms of culture is generally based on the specificity of the social institutes of the Modern age.

The process of person incorporating into the body of a social institution is the most successful when it is not just a bad imitator (that is the difference between a simple which is produced by a cultural field and its unsuccessful bearer becomes obvious), but when a person becomes the creator of socio-cultural norms and even the institution, that is, it promotes the autonomy of the cultural field and / or its financial success. In fact, the producing of disciplinary practices is a condition of obsessing them as a separate subject, that is, the moment of self-production of the cultural field itself in a social dimension. The dualism of habitus and cultural field capital and of the institute as its basic social structure is sufficiently stable in the context of the domination of a closed type of cultural field, for example art production. The university is a more pure form of a social institute than social structures of the art field. In order to clarify this problem, one should turn to the incomplete problem of the institute.

British researcher Raymond Williams in his work “Keywords vocabulary of culture and society” concluded, that “Institution is one of several examples of a noun of action or process which became, at a certain stage, a general and abstract noun describing something apparently objective and systematic; in fact, in the modern sense, an institution” [Williams, 1983: 168] in the dimension of human interaction.

Human activity always makes sense and obeys a certain established rule or order. This sense of installation is very important. After all, the use of the term “institute” in English language in the 14th century had a connotation of
“establish, found, appoint. In its earliest uses it had the strong sense of an act of origin — something instituted at a particular point in time — but by 16th century there was a general developing sense of practices established in certain ways, and this can be read in a virtually modern sense: ‘in one tongue, in like manners, institutions and laws (Robinson’s translation of More’s Utopia, 1551); ‘many good institutions, Lawes, manners, the art of government’ (Ashley, 1594). But there was still, in context, a strong sense of custom, as in the surviving sense of one of the institutions of the place’ [Williams, 1983: 168].

British law still has retained the peculiarities of the case-law of its application, in contrast to universal and rational shifts in its French interpretation of it, up to the requirement of the Declaration of Human Rights. In this, the emergence of a conflict between the aristocratic respecting of tradition and the democratic nature of the enlightenment critique of tradition was considered as a superstition.

Raymond Williams notes the complexity:

“to date the emergence of a fully abstract sense; it appears linked, throughout, with the related abstraction of society. By 18th century an abstract sense is quite evident, and examples multiply in 19th century and 20th century. At the same time, from 18th century, institution and, later, institute (which had carried the same general sense as institution from 16th century) began to be used in the titles of specific organizations or types of organization: ‘Charitable Institutions’ (1764) and several titles from 18th century; Mechanics’ Institutes, Royal Institute of British Architects, and comparable organizations from 18th century here probably imitated from the Institute National, created in France in 1795 in consciously modern terminology. Institute has since been widely used for professional, educational and research organizations; institution for charitable and benevolent organizations. Meanwhile the general sense of a form of social organization, specific or abstract, was confirmed in 19th century development of institutional and institutionalize. In 20th century institution has become the normal term for any organized element of a society’ [Williams, 1983: 168].

It is worth mentioning, that data of Raymond William’s definition are rather descriptive, but they enlighten the historical dimension of the question.

**Human action and Modern organization of social institute and cultural field**

The logic of making ordinary, “typicality” of human action, which comprises the functions of its objectification and legitimation, is put into the basis of the consideration of the institutionalization of human life in the sociological works. Significantly higher degrees of unification and rationalization of the institutes of Modernity is supposed. A new form of myth of Modern society (D. Meyer, B. Rowen) [Meyer & Rowen, 1977: 340] and its ceremonies in the form of self-compel and self-control is also noted by researchers as a modern feature. The specificity of the institutes of Modern consist of using disciplinary practices that, by help of the internalization of certain behavior codes, creates the new technology of social production of man. After all, the Modern institute is controlled not only by its own mechanism of implementation, and not even by additional sanctions (such as completion or punishment), but created the most productive reflexive model of self-control. The universal cult of mind and, accordingly, the
Faculty of Philosophy, not only produces the new type of discourse or cultural capital, but also a way of new social formation. Thus, the new anthropological model is produced and also a new social order, where consciousness is formed as an instance which separated from the living conditions and controls it from the outside. Such a sociocultural practice would not have been possible without the experience of Christianity and its confessional procedures. Their influence could already be evident in such early Modern characters as Don Juan and Faust. However, the self-control of Christianity was sent to the authority of God, and therefore autonomy of consciousness could not be implemented consistently. Modern anthropocentrism did not foresee external instances, but itself was rooted in human sensual-rational dualism. The autonomy of theoretical consciousness was provided by disciplinary practices of university education.

The university, for example, as opposed to art, is a social institution itself, in other words it has absence of its own an autonomous field of culture, which is a form of spiritual rather than social production. Education is a set of social institutions that produce social structure directly, that is, social technology with the purpose of human and social production of the new model. The society of the late Modern becomes a collection of social institutions (not only educational, but also legal, political, economical, and even in a certain sense cultural) and industries (specialized fields of material production). Education in this sense is a form of human production in general, while economics, politics and law are generally aimed at the indirect production of people through the logic of much complicated institutes movement: economics, politics, law (goods, power structures and laws).

Depending on the national model of education, universities determine the priority of certain educational strategies. This is generally accepted business orientation of American higher education institutions. In French universities after the Napoleonic reform, a correlation of the interests of the state with social division of labor was implemented. The priority of university autonomy, research programs and the broad humanitarian basis of studying is characterized by the Humboldt model. The more problematic was the collision of the formation of a national state, the more claims model of the university to a greater degree of social disposition. The Humboldt version became a classical form of the university and has spread to many countries around the world, in particular, Ukrainian universities were formed by its model.

Exactly this German model of university has become the object of Immanuel Kant’s reflection. The specialization of the faculties, through which the production of this type of educated people is carried out, correlates with the modern form of socio-cultural differentiation. The discursive practices of individual disciplines and faculties become the basis for the identification of professional communities. The University, accordingly, was an institute, an intermediary in the form of a social system between a state machine and atomic individuals. Division, which was formed empirically, on Immanuel Kant’s opinion, nevertheless, corresponds to a certain a priori principle. This approach becomes the main one for the cultural sociology represented by Scott Lash [Serani & Lash, 2016: 3].

All these spheres of privatization of the public good for which the medical, legal and theological facilities are practical, are service and non-self-sufficient, despite their ability to formulate guidelines and dictate orders. They are not able to clarify their own principles, and therefore the basic one for Immanuel Kant was the lower faculty — philosophical — the task of which was “public presentation of truth as its function” [Kant, 2002]. Exactly his impracticality, the inability to formulate orders and to provide bread studying, enables freedom of judgment and truthfulness of knowledge of representatives of other faculties.
His task is to produce educated people whose “increased insight gained from this freedom, a better means for achieving its ends than its own absolute authority” [Kant, 2002] This means that the universality of reason is a Modern ground for coordinating action, in contrast to Premodern compulsion. Therefore, the resolution of the conflict of the faculties can be either “legitimate” — the recognition of the universal status of reason for the functioning of the national state, or “illegal”, which provides a short “heroic way” to the disappearance of the lower faculty.

The explanation for the “Conflict of Faculties”, in this regard is the concept of Canadian researcher Bill Readings [Readings: 1997], which proved the connection of this university model being based on the idea of culture, with the structures of the functioning of the national state. Its political discourse is based on the principles of sending to a collective entity, which represents itself as a «species-being». Therefore, the basic task of the national state is the task of implementing the “rational self-determining subject of modernity”, that is, a self-sufficient subject. Army, literature and education are socio-cultural technologies of this complicated process. The last can represent school and university. If a school (and even the obligatory elementary education as a whole) has its task to form disciplinary practices that proved to be extremely important for the Modern Dominant of Consciousness the “Techniques of the Body,” as well as the level of literacy required for the reserve army of labor and just an army (that is, first of all, caused by the charity of the “social state”, a welfare state), the task of creating and reproducing a model of national identity, the bearer of which is a self-sufficient subject becomes exactly the formation of Humboldt`s model of the university.

Subjected to an autocratic monarchy was, in the first place, limited (or, conversely, privileged) by rights. There is no wonder that one of the first historical acts of the bourgeois revolution in France was the acceptance of the Declaration of Human Rights. The necessity of the equality of all of people under the law is ensured by the division of power. The subjugation of the Modern subject to the national state was carried out differently from the non-Modern way. In previous times, personal coercion was a dominant form of relations between people and social systems, but gradually the rich form of dependence became the most important. In such a specific situation, the relationship between a man and the state is carried out through the passage of a number of social institutions, the crown of which is the university. “I£ can become transcendental, only “passing through the institutes” [Readings, 1997: 44], or much precisely the nation. The Humboldt University model proposed, in contrast to the Napoleonic version and the Hopkins one, has not accidentally deliberately denied the orientation of bread studying or the state’s needs, that is, the provision of a profession to be fed after the end of study, but set goal for creating a self-sufficient subject.

Conclusions

Thus, the university as a social technology, based on the new sample of the anthropological model, forms disciplinary practices that function for production of habitus and cultural capital, and also provides identification “integration and standardization” [Readings, 1997: 29] in the Modern era. This cultural-historical period is characterized by the fact that social control is carried out not through personal coercion, but through the passage through institutions. A higher educational institution in the era of Modernity is the most consistent embodiment of the idea of a social institution as an intermediary between spiritual and material production. Culture in this context acts as a form of “high culture,” that is, as a way of human existence just
like this, with value orientations on the foundations of universal cult of reason. The “Cultural Mission” of the University is a mediation between the regulatory ideas of the Modern and a certain type of state that is, to be a social technology of nation-building. The technology of cultivating reason is provided by studying at the Philosophy Faculty and is an obligatory philosophical component for other faculties in the German model, created by V. Humboldt. The formation of the cult of universal reason and self-sufficient subject is the basic task of the classical university and its leading socio-cultural function and cultural mission.

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Soviet and Ukrainian Studies of American Philosophy: Translation of Philosophical Texts

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Studies of the history of American philosophy by Soviet and Ukrainian philosophers are described in this article. The specifics of the history of philosophy in the Soviet Union under the conditions of official ideology are emphasized; the tradition of translating Western philosophical texts and the appearance of the Russian philosophical lexicon (the language of the Soviet Union) is described. Studies of translation activities and critical literature of Soviet philosophers on American philosophy allow us to study the ideological components that Ukrainian philosophers seek to avoid. The article briefly describes the history of translation activity and some aspects of translations of English texts. The features of the Soviet selection of texts that would be consistent with official ideology are revealed. Also, in the article the most popular and well-known texts of the Soviet period and independent Ukrainians, philosophers and translators (such as, Alexey Bogomolov, Anyur Karinsky, Yuri Melville, Nikita Pokrovsky and others) who worked on American studies are described. The article also mentions two volumes of “American Enlighteners: Selected Works” compiled by Goldberg N. with an introductory article by Bernard Bykhovsky in the multivolume edition of the “Philosophical Heritage”. Their contribution to the development of American studies was demonstrated on the basis of an analysis of scientific works: critical literature and translations of primary sources. The article is focused on the need for the absence of a “correct” philosophy, which is a recurrence of the totalitarian practices of Soviet philosophy and ideology.

Keywords: American philosophy, Soviet philosophy, Ukrainian philosophy, philosophical translation, ideology.

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During the period of the Soviet Union, philosophy was based on the principles developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. These principles, in turn, were developed in the writings of Vladimir Lenin. Vasilii Zenkovskiy (1881–1962), a professor at Kiev University, a religious philosopher, witnessed revolutionary actions and described the state of philosophy in the 20s of the 20th century: “…the system of “Soviet philosophy,” for the development of which there is a special Philosophical Institute at the Academy of Sciences (along with the Marx-Engels-Lenin

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Institute under the central government), is actually built under the constant guidance and vigilant gaze of the government” [Zenkovskiy, 2001: 690]. The purpose of authority was to destroy all dissent in the Soviet Union, to force all who did not accept the new ideological doctrine, to give up their views. Philosophical thought has lost the most important condition — intellectual freedom. This situation resembles the definition of totalitarianism, this concept appeared in the first half of the 20th century and was understood as a society in which the main state ideology has a strong influence on citizens.

Professor Elena Yurkevich in 2009 wrote an article dedicated to the history of the translation of philosophical literature “Translation of philosophical texts in Ukraine: history and contemporaneity” in which she described the situation of translation in the Soviet era:

“Only ideologically trustworthy texts of classical philosophy and Marxist literature were translated into the Soviet period. The translation of philosophical texts was also tested for ideological reliability and, in case of special popularity of any ideologically incompatible text, it was still translated, but with detailed introductory articles and comments. The significance of these comments was formed by the authority of the CPSU, the publishing house and the personality of the translator, who had to voluntarily agree with the official attitude to the text, or stick to his point of view, which was different from the official one. Then the interpreter got into a situation of double evaluation, a “double standard” in understanding and interpreting the translation” [Yurkevich, 2009: 244-245].

Professor defines the main problems of translating philosophical texts by Soviet philosophers. First, it is the problem of freedom of translation due to the influence of ideology. Translations of Nikolay Lossky (1870–1965) and Aleksei Losev (1893–1988), Professor Yelena Yurkevich, consider as the exception, in other words — “not on orders.” Secondly, there was a problem of understanding the translations of the philosophical text, due to the gap with Western culture. Thirdly, the problem of the accessibility to already translated philosophical texts. Soviet publishing houses were centralized; there was a monopoly and planning [Yurkevich, 2009: 245]. There is a tradition to define the years after World War II as the “era of translations”; new relations between states around the world have influenced the exchange of legacy literature, including philosophical texts. One way or another, in the Soviet philosophical culture, translations of foreign texts were subject to increased demand. It is clear that the translation should not just accurately convey the meaning of the text, but also involve the reader in the overall context of the foreign language. In philosophy, this rule is doubly effective, where it is not just a text, but an idea in it that can be caught and interpreted. And this applies not only to idioms and metaphors; it can be about using the most common words and terms. This is the danger on the one hand of imperceptible distortion, on the other hand, of purposeful change.

As the well-known Ukrainian philosopher of the Soviet period and the times of Ukraine’s independence Vylen Gorsky (1931–2007) said: “Translation requires the development of our own living language, we work in accordance with the ideas that the thinker lives on, whose work is translated” [Gorsky, 2001: 54]. Each time translating a philosophical text, Soviet philosophers, like Ukrainian today, searched for the appropriate words to translate this or that term. The language of philosophy of the times of the Soviet period was naturally Russian. The tradition of translating Western philosophy into Russian began in the 18th century. For example, Grigori Teplov (1717/1716–1779) in the 18th century in his book “Znanija, Kasajushhiesja Voobshhe do Filosofii” (Knowledge Relating in General to Philosophy, 1751) for the first time translated into
Russian such concepts as Being (Latin: Ens), (Russian: Бытие), Substance (Latin: Substantia), (Russian: Вещество), the Essence of thing (Latin: Essentia), (Russian: Существо) and so forth. As for the concept of “Being”, his translation is still relevant, but the translation of “Substance” in the philosophical language has changed. In Russian, the concept of “substance” originally was translated as “material”, emphasizing only the material nature of the substance.

Gradually by the 20th century the Russian philosophical language was formed, dictionaries appeared in which the rules of translation were legalized. During the Soviet period, the so-called “pre-revolutionary” translations of philosophical texts were actively used as a basis. The main issue in Soviet philosophy was the question of the relationship between matter and consciousness, and the main method was dialectics. Everything that did not conform to the official doctrine should be reprinted with censorship.

“The Newest Philosophical Dictionary” compiled by Alexander Gritsanov defines Soviet philosophy as a non-uniform, ambiguous and internally contradictory intellectual tradition in the USSR 1930-1980’s:

“As a self-aware system of ideas, theories, hypotheses, and ideologically-protective myths formed as a result of: (a) Forcible rejection of Russian social science and human studies of non-Marxist thinkers; b) entering the dominant positions in the system of philosophical academic structures and theoretical bodies in the USSR; c) making attempts of a certain systematization and giving respectability to this tradition...” [Gritsanov, 1998].

In 2008, the editor-in-chief (1988-2009) of this journal, Academician Vladislav Lectorsky, wrote the book “Filosofija. Nauka. Kul’tura: “Voproso Filosofii” 60 let” (Philosophy. Science. Culture: “Questions of Philosophy” is 60 years old, 2008), he summed up the trends in Soviet philosophy. He mentioned everything in our philosophy before 1991 (including the philosophical journal Voprosu Filosofii) was none other than the absolute absence of any kind of thought. Indeed, the situation in which there was a philosophy in the Soviet years was very difficult: “There was a rigid ideological dictate, it was impossible to discuss the serious problems of social philosophy, many publications were forbidden, for quite some time the teaching of philosophy was conducted according to such textbooks, which could only disgust any philosophy” [Lectorsky, 2008]. In his article, the academician says, that the isolation of Soviet philosophy was relative, since many Western texts were translated into Russian, and this is not surprising. After the Second World War, a new “probable adversary” appeared before the Soviet Union. It was necessary for the Soviet leadership to know the philosophy of America, how people think there, what they dream about, what they want. The study of American philosophy made it possible to better know the Americans themselves. But to acquaint the Soviet man with the ideas of the capitalist west was required cautiously. It was impossible to admit the idea of the superiority of America over the Soviet Union. For ideological reasons, philosophers in the Soviet Union were forced to receive dosed information about what was being done abroad. There were well-known directions for collecting information and there was a methodology for its interpretation. The term “history of foreign philosophy”, “criticism of anti-communism”, “bourgeois ideology” and others entered into use. It is important to note that this does not mean that Soviet philosophers have studied American philosophy exclusively by criticizing it. America also had its own critics of Soviet ideology, critics of communism.

In the Soviet Union and later in Russia, a group of researchers of American philosophy was formally formed. They were such researchers as Alexey Bogomolov (1927–1983), author...

It is worth mentioning two volumes of “Amerikanske prosvetiteli. Izbrannye proizvedenija v dvuh tomah” (American Enlighteners: Selected Works, 1968-69) compiled by Nikolay Goldberg with an introductory article by Bernard Bykhovsky in the multivolume edition of the “Filosofskoe nasledie” (Philosophical Heritage). The book series published since 1963 by the Russian publishing house “Mysl’”, under the auspices of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, later — Russia. Prof. Bernard Bykhovsky emphasizes that the philosophers of the American Enlightenment were outstanding thinkers and public figures who “the American people are proud”. The idea of an anti-colonial revolution impressed the official ideology of the revolutionary consciousness of the Soviet Union. Soviet philosophers were allowed to talk about this period in the history of American philosophy, as a “right” period. By “right” is meant a period that has similarities with Soviet history: in particular, the struggle for independence from the monarch, revolutionary ideas, concern for the common people and criticism of religion. Prof. Bernard Bykhovsky writes: “One of the most important tasks of Marxist philosophical historiography is to extract from the Summers materialist thinkers who are forgotten by the idealistic history of philosophy, to restore their authentic, not vulgarized and not distorted by opponents views and to understand their actual role in the struggle of the two camps in philosophy and meaning their ideas in the progress of social thought. In education philosophy in this regard is of particular interest due to its inseparable connection with advanced, revolutionary for their time, socio-political aspirations” [American Enlighteners: Selected Works, 1968: 8-9]. This fact confirms that for the Soviet philosopher there was a “correct” and “wrong” philosophy, that there was an ideology that was the yardstick of truth. The struggle between the two “lines of philosophy” in the face of materialism and idealism was declared, everything that concerned idealism was blamed, everything that concerned materialism was praised (therefore, European materialism was well studied by Soviet philosophers).

In 1962, the book of the well-known literary critic Vernon Luis Parrington “Main Currents in American Thought: An Interpretation of American Literature from the Beginning to 1920, 1927–1930” was translated into Russian. This three-volume book is devoted to the history of American literature, but at the same time acquaints the reader with the philosophical works of American thinkers. Moreover, three volumes allow us to fully consider the development of American thought from the Puritanism of the first colonists until the 20th century.

as the basis the book of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry Thoreau and others. The author of the introductory article Alexander Nikolyukin wrote that “The revolutionary activity of the broad masses of people, who sought to achieve not only the liberation from the yoke of the English metropolis, but also to make social transformations, gave rise to new ideals in the minds of yesterday’s residents of the colony in North America. Political and State Unity country was the beginning of the formation of national culture, literature, art [and philosophy — Sobolievskyi Y.A.]” [Aesthetics of American Romanticism, 1977: 9].

Remembering that “Language is the house of the truth of Being”, we must pay attention to certain issues related to the translation of English-language philosophical texts. First of all, English has a different semantic structure than Russian or Ukrainian. English is more structured; it has the order of words. The researcher Sergey Nikonenko in his article “The Problem of Translating English-Language Philosophical Texts” suggests several examples of difficulties that interpreters face: “…the complexity is connected with the many-valuedness of the majority of English philosophical terms ... the majority of philosophical concepts are also the words of everyday language; therefore, can be included in various ways, while changing the way of use. For example, the word “sense” is translated as “feeling”, “sensation”, “meaning.”, and so forth.” [Nikonenko, 2004: 158].

In fairness, many translators and philosophers were able to circumvent censorship and acquaint us with qualitative translations of Western wisdom. So, for example, the translation of the book by the classic American philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson “Nature” performed Alexey Zverev introduced to the idealist philosophical ideas of the thinker. Such lines as “Spirit is the Creator. Spirit hath life in itself. And man in all ages and countries, embodies it in his language, as the FATHER” [Emerson, 1836: 35]. The lines radically contradicted the materialistic philosophy of the Soviet period. Ralph Waldo Emerson called the Spirit as the Creator, while Soviet philosophers taught about the dialectic of materialism that matter self-developed into the world.

The topic of this article correlates with the scientific program of the Faculty of Philosophy of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. As it was written by the article of Professor Sergii Rudenko, associate professor Vadim Tytarenko: “In the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, according to the mentioned earlier scientific program of the Philosophical Faculty “Modernization of Philosophical Education and Science of Ukraine on the basis of International Educational and Scientific Standards”, was resumed the tradition of teaching a special courses” [Rudenko et. al., 2018: 136]. For two years, the course “American Philosophy: Originality or Heritage?” has been taught at the Kiev University. The purpose of the educational course is to acquaint students with the history of American philosophy, with the primary sources, the texts of American philosophers. Thanks to new translations and publications, students can understand American philosophy without political censorship.

As Professor Taras Kononenko writes, the changes in public consciousness and the absence of Soviet ideology have a beneficial effect both on the political situation in Ukraine and on education: “Thanks to the events in Ukraine, freedom, democracy and the values created at the territory of Europe became global and have created the new world paradigm. Freedom and democracy become the meaning of existence of the new global system, of the new world order. I am sure that struggle for these values will lead to the peace and prosperity of the people of free will” [Kononenko, 2017: 34].
Conclusions

Translations of European and American philosophical texts have become popular in recent years in Ukraine; however, most often their quality is average, because of what the translated text is not always suitable for use, both in education and in research work. There was a need to create a standard for the translation of humanitarian texts, and modern Ukrainian philosophers work on it. The 20th World Philosophical Congress, held in 1998 in the United States, was essentially the first congress in history, where the English language was undivided.

Gradually, English became not only the language of science but also of philosophy, as a result, interest in Anglo-American literature increased significantly, and the history of the development of English philosophical terms on both sides of the ocean became topical. The history of English philosophy is very well studied in contrast to the history of American philosophy. Studying the history of American philosophy will complement the crater of English-speaking philosophical vocabulary.

The tradition of translating philosophical texts in the Soviet Union was confronted with ideology, as a result, translated exclusively into Russian texts, such as books by American enlighteners, American romanticists. Their ideas of the unity of theory and practice, materialism, deism, criticism of the bourgeoisie and revolutionary ideas impressed Soviet philosophers. On the other hand, the books of American puritans and idealists were not known to Soviet philosophers and were not translated into Russian.

If philosophers do national philosophy, then translators work the world philosophy. The quality of translations of philosophical texts in Ukraine is much better than in the Soviet Union, since there is no Soviet ideology. In order to improve the quality of translations of philosophical texts, the “Philosophical Fund” was organized in 2001. The activities of the Foundation and scientific and educational institutions in modern Ukraine are jointly aimed at finding new objective ways of developing the humanities. A new view of philosophy as a science devoid of such qualities as “correct” or “wrong” allows us to leave in the past a Marxist ideology. It’s possible, that the elements of this ideology have survived in the scientific worldview of modern Ukraine, but this requires some new research.

References


Kant’s Studies in Ukrainian Philosophy of Soviet Period

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This writing is devoted to the brief review of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy studies and receptions of his philosophical concepts within the Ukrainian philosophy of Soviet period. Such attempt is actually pertinent because nowadays we definitely need to reconsider the soviet philosophical heritage for better understanding the real value of any philosophical conclusions and worldview-concerning statements which were made in the times of soviet ideology hegemony. Additionally, mentioned reconsidering is presently urgent because Ukrainian intellectual culture is now looking for its identity and is trying to identify the still-remaining ideological totalitarian elements which spoil the originality and objectiveness of its products.

The present review attempts to identify which totalitarian intentions and prejudices were used to interpret and evaluate the Immanuel Kant’s heritage in the texts written by several selected Ukrainian philosophers of the Soviet period. Nevertheless, it’s obvious that absolutely impossible to avoid talking about Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s philosophical position interpretation by the same authors. Kant’s and Hegel’s soviet-Ukrainian interpretations were often connected, because there was a general trend of soviet Marxist history of philosophy to interpret Kant as the “worse” version of Hegel.

To fulfill the general image of Kant’s philosophy interpretation in Ukrainian philosophy and its future perspectives, this paper also delivers some common information about the whole historical path of Kant’s interpretations and receptions.

Keywords: history of philosophy, Ukrainian philosophy, Soviet philosophy, German classical idealism, Immanuel Kant, totalitarianism, culture.

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**Introduction**

The philosophical heritage of Immanuel Kant is a significant element of the intellectual history of mankind. Nowadays, of course, it’s impossible to do philosophy in the same way as Kant did it. Nevertheless, it’s in the same time, impossible to do philosophy without taking into the consideration his contribution.

Modern Ukrainian philosophy needs a fundamental reconsideration of the Kant’s philosophical heritage because of the numerous totalitarian prejudices which are still exist within the cultural practices of the contemporary society. The aim of this writing is to make a brief review of the history of Kant’s studies in Ukraine, focusing on the peculiarities of the soviet totalitarian interpretations of the historical role and meaning of Kant’s philosophy.

This review is the starting point of the future more fundamental research on the totalitarian prejudices which are still present in Ukrainian philosophical culture.

The “System of Critical Idealism” created by Immanuel Kant influenced a great variety of different philosophical inquiries all over the world. Kant’s philosophy studies in Ukraine starts in 19th century and can be divided into three main periods: 1) early receptions and interpretations (19th century); 2) soviet interpretation; 3) present interpretations (since 1991). In authors opinion it is necessary to outline the peculiarities of each period.

Immanuel Kant’s philosophy was not so popular in Ukraine in 19th century as, for example, the philosophical heritage of Friedrich Josef Shelling. Nevertheless its appearance in Ukrainian scientific and philosophical discourse was a significant step of development of philosophical and scientific culture.

Ukrainian philosophers and scientists of 19th century who were interested in Kant’s philosophy, mostly became a transmitters of a specific rational, transcendental type of worldview that influenced their scientific research. Most of them were professors in different Ukrainian universities (Lviv, Kharkiv, Kyiv and so forth.) The main Ukrainian Kant’s philosophy influenced thinkers of that time were:

Petro Lodij (1764-1829) was a Ukrainian philosopher, pedagogue, jurist. His academic career started at Lviv university (at present time it is Ivan Franko National University of Lviv). Since 1787 to 1802 he was on the position of professor of theoretical and practical philosophy. After the Ukrainian language subject teaching was prohibited by Austrian government, he moved to Kakow, where worked as the professor of mathematics and philosophy (1802-1803) in Krakow university (at present time The Jagiellonian University). Since 1803-1821 Petro Lodij worked as the professor of philosophy in St. Petersburg University (Russia). His main philosophical works were based and on Kant’s critical methodology.

Jacob Ruban (1760-1806) was acclaimed for his achievements in mathematics, history and translations. Being a professor of Black sea navigation school in Mykolaiv, he published the first Russian translation (1803) of Kant’s “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals”.

Ludwig Jacob (1759-1827) was a German philosopher and economist. He had changed several teaching and administrative positions in The University of Halle (presently Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg) by the time he arrived to Kharkiv to take a professor position in local University. During teaching in Kharkiv University (1807-1809), professor Jacob widely contributed in general and special acquaintance of Ukrainian students to the crucial critical ideas which were propounded by Emanuel Kant. But for his interpretative and enlightening activity local students became more confident in philosophical trends of that time.
Georgii Chelpanov (1862-1936) was doing psychology and philosophy, working on the professor position in Kyiv University. Teaching Philosophy, Psychology and Logic, professor Chelpanov was sure that the theory of cognition by Emanuel Kant is a perfect basis of psychology. His lectures widely touched upon the crucial points of Kant’s epistemology and the possible ways of its practical implementation. As a logician, he proclaimed that the ground basis of logic lies within an a priori forms of reasoning. Nevertheless, he never followed the theories of total dependence of the Universe existence on human being’s rational and cognitional abilities. The intellectual and philosophical environment of Ukraine in 19th century and German classical philosophy reception within its limits are well described and researched in the monograph by the modern Ukrainian historian of philosophy Sergii Rudenko [Rudenko, 2008].

**Soviet transformations in the History of Philosophy**

The soviet ideology expansion over Ukrainian intellectual culture caused fundamental changes in the topics and the way of providing of philosophical inquires and research within all subfields of philosophy. The variety of topics and methods of philosophical research was reduced to Marxist-linked topics and Marxist-Leninist dialectics. Aim and scope of any philosophical research were strictly determined by a general communist party strategy of social development. Moreover, one of the fundamental intentions of the soviet totalitarian science and philosophy was to destroy a national authenticity and cultural distinction of a USSR members and its research in Humanities. Consequently, History of philosophy was not an exception. Recently mentioned soviet ideological pressure was based on the idea of an absolute scientific value of Marxist-Leninist methodology and worldview. Only Marxist-Leninist-based history of philosophy hailed as a true scientific. All other, non-Marxist versions of historical inquires in the field of philosophy were denied and sometimes forbidden because of an “ideological hazard”, they were able to deliver. All non-communistic philosophical “misinterpretations” were carefully controlled by special comities related to USSR KGB (Committee for State Security of USSR).

The general approach of soviet history of philosophy (propounded by Vladimir Lenin and which all scientists were persuaded to accept) consisted in division of all philosophical heritages into two main groups:

- a) Sources and elements of Marxism;
- b) “Opposite force”, which had to be criticized on Marxism-Leninism positions.

There are several branches of philosophy which were considered as the sources and elements of Marxism. First of all, it is necessary to mention “Democritus line” (in terms of Vladimir Lenin) — systems of philosophy in history of philosophy which were based on materialistic worldview. Other important sources are British political economy (Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and so forth) and French Utopian Socialism (Henri de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier and so forth). Otherwise, the main methodological and theoretical basis of Marxism, on Vladimir Lenin’s opinion [Lenin, 1977], is German classical idealism in addition with philosophical works of Ludwig Feuerbach (in terms of Friedrich Engels — “German classical philosophy” That’s why it was one of the main subjects of research and interpretation of soviet history of philosophy.

The “opposite force” consisted of “Plato line” — idealistic philosophical systems of all the historical epochs, and also of alternative to dialectical materialism methodologies, theories of
science and epistemologies (Neokantianism, Positivism, Neopositivism, Existentialism and so forth). Both elements of mentioned above distinction were widely and substantially criticized because of its numerous “mistakes”, misinterpretations and general false and non-truly-science approach.

There are some significant peculiarities of soviet interpretation of German classical idealism — the philosophical tradition which was methodologically and theoretically conceived by Immanuel Kant.

Due to the mentioned above, one of the main goals of Marxism-Leninism intentions in field of history of German classical philosophy were: a) to discover it deeper; b) find out and highlight its “weak” elements, which were later rejected or corrected by Karl Marx in his philosophical system. Firstly and mostly, research attention of soviet historians of philosophy was focused on Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s philosophy, but later on, they also began systematic research of Kant’s philosophical heritage to compare it with Hegel’s and Marx’s and to criticize it.

Totalitarian strategies in Kant’s philosophy interpretation

Tradition of research and interpretation of Kant’s heritage in Ukrainian philosophy of soviet period took off in 1960’s after the main Kant’s philosophical texts were translated into Russian. The first published soviet collection of Kant’s texts wasn’t comprehensive. Some important texts, devoted to the religious problems were not mentioned despite inevitable significance of this topic within Kant’s philosophical system. One of the main Kant’s questions about the human being “What may I hope” [Kant, 1998] may find its answer in philosophy of religion. Human image cannot be comprehensive without being reflected in mentioned subfield of philosophy. The importance of objective evaluation of social and cultural role of religion phenomenon for contemporary human image is well shown by in recent article by Gennadi Aliaiev [Aliaiev, 2016] which main conclusions author agrees with.

New Ukrainian translations were not provided in this period, likewise the existing translations were ignored, denied and forbidden to use in scientific discourse. One significant peculiarity of soviet history of philosophy is that scientist often used the translations of the main philosophical texts. Original texts written in English, German, French and so forth, were mostly never quoted. In authors personal opinion such peculiarity was the practical implementation of a general intention of soviet totalitarianism to control all possible opinions by putting all the conclusions into the “wright tracks”. Some “ideologically correct” interpretations were already hidden present in the translation specially to form the correct opinion in readers mind.

The most known Ukrainian scientists in the field of history of philosophy, who provided their researches on Kant’s philosophy in frames of Marxist tradition, were: Pavlo Kopnin, Volodymyr Shynkaruk, Myhailo Bulatov, Anatolii Trubenko, Jurij Kushakov and so forth. This paper touches upon the most significant personalities.

Pavlo Kopnin (1922-1971) was a soviet and Ukrainian philosopher, founder of several philosophical research communities (Tomsk philosophical community, Kyiv philosophical community and so forth), which represented his general and special scientific interests — philosophy of science, epistemology, logic, dialectics, history of philosophy. Despite of the fact that he was born and died in Russia, he is acclaimed as one of the most honored personalities of Ukrainian philosophy and history of philosophy. He graduated from Lomonosov State
University of Moscow (1944). In 1958, after gaining the Doctoral degree (Doctor of philosophical sciences) he moved to Kyiv, where he spent ten years working on different teaching and administrative positions (Head of the philosophy chair in Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, Head of the historical and dialectic materialism chair in Taras Shevchenko state university of Kyiv, Director of the Institute of Philosophy (scientific research institution) of Ukrainian Soviet Socialistic Republic) and publishing his main scientific works: “Dialectics as Logic” (1961), “Hypothesis and reality cognition” (1962), “Idea as the form of reasoning” (1963), “Logical basis of the science” (1968), and so forth. In his books he developed several scientific theories concerning to methodology of science, logic of science and leading role of dialectics in all fields of research. He took part in the discussion of the concept of unity of Logic, Dialectics and Epistemology which was evaluated as crucial and significant.

Pavlo Kopnin researched Immanuel Kant’s philosophy mostly from epistemological perspective. He never published a special book devoted to any aspect of Kant’s philosophy. Its representation in his books appears as an implementation of discovery of the historical grounds and development of Marxist epistemology. Kant’s epistemological approach represented in his “Critic of Pure Reason” and other related texts was valued as an important condition of later appearance of George Hegel’s epistemological positions and formation of his dialectical logic based on the additional method. [Kopnin, 1957] There are several inevitable demerits of such approach: a) due to the described strategy philosophical heritage of Immanuel Kant was discovered inconsistently and partly; b) the conclusions about its weak points were based only on several subjective rational reconstructions made by author; c) Kant’s philosophy loses its self-sufficiency and valued only as contribution to future more relevant theories. In author’s opinion, described approach, which refers to Lenin’s critical position [Kopnin, 1960], cannot be evaluated as objective and representative in history of philosophy.

Voldymyr Shynkaruk (1928-2001) was a Ukrainian philosopher and historian of philosophy. He graduated from Philosophy department of Taras Shevchenko state university of Kyiv (1950). Since 1951 to 1968 has been working on different positions in University (associated professor, full professor, dean). In 1968 he was admitted on the position of Director of the Institute of Philosophy. Voldymyr Shynkaruk was proficient historian of philosophy, nevertheless he wasn’t able (for the political reasons) to do history of philosophy itself. His historical inquiries in the field of philosophy were connected with the Marxist-Leninist dialectical researches he was persuaded to do. However, he published several books which specially touched upon some crucial points of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy and some other German classic philosophers. (Epistemology, Logic and Dialectics of I. Kant (1974); Logic, Dialectics and Epistemology of Hegel (1964); Essays on Ludwig Feuerbach’s philosophy (1982) and so forth). Some propounded ideas highlighted the necessity of independent evaluation of Kant’s ideas, but mostly such intentions were never realized.

The book which gives a good presentation of the general Kant’s interpretations tradition is “The Unity of Dialectics, Logic and Epistemology” published in 1977. As was mentioned in the introduction, the book appeared as a result of the synthesis of some previous books concerning to Kant and Hegel. Aim and scope of the book, as also mentioned, were not given by the author himself, but by the Communist party. The aim of the book concerns to the general party task — to research the deep connections between Dialectics and Logic, mentioned in Vladimir Lenin’s dairy scribbles. The book contains a detailed historical analysis of a wide range of philosophical traditions and texts, concerned to the dialectics and its unity with logic and epistemology. On the other hand all this work was done for one final reason to criticize and
valuate all mentioned theories from Marx’s positions.

Myhailo Bulatov (born in 1936) is a Ukrainian philosopher and historian of philosophy, disciple of Volodymyr Shinkaruk. He worked on the research positions in the Institute of Philosophy of Ukraine and taught “German classical philosophy” course on philosophical department of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. His research heritage consists of books and articles published both in soviet and independent times. His past and recent works perfectly describe the distinction between soviet and contemporary approaches in history of philosophy. His book “Lenin’s analysis of German classical philosophy: problems of Logic, Dialectics and History of Philosophy” published in 1974 was a good example of the soviet image of Kant’s philosophy problems and the frames of its possible analysis.

Jurij Kushakov (1946-2016) was a Ukrainian philosopher and historian of philosophy disciple of Volodymyr Shinkaruk and Valerij Bosenko. After graduation from Philosophy department of Taras Shevchenko state university of Kyiv he worked on teaching positions. Dialectics, Marx’s philosophy and German classical philosophy were his research fields. His main researches on Kant’s philosophy were done in the same tradition as was described above.

Kant’s philosophy in modern Ukraine

After Ukraine got political independence from the USSR in 1991 the ideological pressure disappeared. Ukrainian philosophers became able to research German idealism without any limitations. During the years of independence a lot of different philosophical research communities appeared. Among them also present communities of Kant’s philosophy researchers. Such communities are functioning in different Ukrainian educational and scientific institutions. In Kyiv there are three scientific centers that provide Kant’s philosophy researches:

a) Taras Shevchenko national university of Kyiv. (Department History of Philisophy, Department of Theoretical and Practical philosophy);

b) National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy” (Department of philosophy)

c) Hryhorii Skovoroda National Institute of Philosophy National Academy of Science of Ukraine.

Local Kant’s philosophy research communities also can be found at all philosophy faculties of the country.

All interested and inspired by Kant’s philosophy researchers are now united in “Kant’s community of Ukraine” — public organization that was founded in 1998. The mission of this organization consists in increasing of quality of philosophical researches and native intellectual culture development. “Kant’s community of Ukraine” is now headed by Professor Mikhail Minakov. “Community’ organizes and takes part in numerous specialized conferences all over Ukraine and abroad, provides publication activity.

One of the most important vectors of development for this community is a Ukrainian translation of the most significant texts written originally by Immanuel Kant, and his famous followers. Now day’s main theoretical works by Immanuel Kant are translated into Ukrainian. Nevertheless, this translation work is now just started, and there a lot of texts still waiting to be translated. Ukrainian philosophical terminology is also developing now. A lot of terms are now being discussed to reduce an influence of the totalitarian past on non-totalitarian future of Ukrainian Kant’s philosophy researches.

Nowadays, methodological approach to the scientific research of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy was fundamentally modernized in accordance with the new strategies of the
history of Ukrainian Philosophy development. Mentioned strategies are widely described in monograph “Modern methodological conceptions of inquiry of History of Ukrainian philosophy” by Sergii Rudenko [Rudenko, 2012]. The mentioned new strategies are focused on overcoming of still remaining impact of soviet scientific and ideological prejudices, which definitely appear as obstacles for objectivity. Some useful practical experience notes about facing such prejudices and possible ways of overcoming in contemporary international research projects were suggested in our recent paper “Management features of international educational projects between the universities of Poland and Ukraine” [Rudenko, Bazaluk, Sapenko, Tytarenko, 2018] The modern needs and purposes of higher philosophical education in Ukraine mentioned in the recent scholarly article “Cosmology in the Philosophical Education of Ukraine: History and Modern Condition” [Rudenko, Sobolievs’kyi, Tytarenko, 2018].

Conclusions

Most of Kant’s philosophy studies made by soviet Ukrainian historians of philosophy were provided in the general ideological frames, formed by communistic government in Moscow. That was the reason of a huge amount of ideological prejudices that can be found in all mentioned researches: a) for instance it was ideologically incorrect to be a follower of Kant’s theories and valuate his philosophical system as self-sufficient; b) it was a strong obligation to criticize him for “idealism”, “apriorism”, “agnosticism”, absence of “proper” and “veritable” dialectic method, “system of categories” and so forth; c) only some, “ideologically correct” and “authorized” Kant’s texts were researched and critically analyzed. Some other text’s (“Opus postumum” and so forth) were not, sometimes, even mentioned; d) soviet historians of philosophy mostly used translations instead of original texts of the works they analyzed.

Consequently, Ukrainian soviet researches of Kant’s philosophy were not actually representative, authentic and independent. This tradition can be evaluated as an attempt of foundation of the general ideology in field of philosophy and education.

References


Environmental Education for Sustainable Development

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The authors believes that by continuing the further roll-out of education for sustainable development (ESD), however, need to start implementing a new strategy for global educational process to accelerate and expand the movement towards “global sustainability”. It is shown that the environmental component (and corresponding model) of education currently prevalent in the form of education, which is now called ESD, but this is only the beginning of a formation of a new systemic model of education for sustainable development. For the ecological component of ESD has already added the vision of ESD as a leading education and interpretation education based on the concept of “security through sustainable development.”

Keywords: anticipated education, education for sustainable development, environmental education, security, sustainable development, futurization

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Introduction

In modern education, there are too many different contradictions, which are known to almost everyone who somehow dealt or deals with education (and that has all socialized individuals). In addition, we can hardly find a person who could not be able to offer his “recipe”
for a way out of that deplorable state in which the world educational system is “preserved”. Nowadays people write a lot about the need of a fundamental change in strategy of the world education, but constructive suggestions are often reduced to “patching up the holes” in the guise of modernization. Meanwhile, education must become a truly innovative process and one of the main factors in the creation of that new society that will help mankind to survive the approaching global cataclysms and especially — the threatening anthropoecological catastrophe. Rapidly changing socio-natural dynamics dictates new requirements to the educational process in order to provide innovative advanced nature of training of students both in terms of the satisfaction of the needs of society (including strategic ones) and needs of the educational process resulting from them. It is clear that from the modernization of education that transforms education in accordance with the requirements of modernity, it is necessary to transit to its futurization, to the satisfaction of the leading needs of present and all the more — of future generations.

Already now it is necessary to anticipate new opportunities and the leading needs of social development, and not just those which occur at this moment in time. Meanwhile, the traditionally established situation in the world education (including, of course, Russian education) indicates a clear commitment of official structures of education to a stable orientation to the past, to the transmission and mastering during training pretty outdated information. And although in the official documents of the modernization of education it is still possible to see the tendency of their creators to some innovations, in the adopted state educational standards the already outdated knowledge and values are yet stressed.

For all scientists and educators it is well known that textbooks and manuals are published on the basis of scientific material which is well proven by practice and substantiated by theories. In addition, this is closely related to the traditionally-translational understanding of education as the transfer of knowledge, skills, values, culture to current generations from previous ones. Actually here we speak about (whether we want to admit it or not) the motion of obsolete knowledge and values in the educational process that are only slightly can be used in future human activity. Hypothesis and assumptions rarely get into teaching materials and therefore actually inform about the past of the scientific search, about the things that have already been established in science, but are still far from its front edge of exploratory activity. It is no coincidence that scientific knowledge about sustainable development is outside of the area of education in school and universities, because the current Russian “managers of education” have not received this knowledge in the process of their learning and by virtue of a narrow worldview, which does not extend beyond market horizons, do not think about the future generations and their needs in the strategic perspective.

Meanwhile, the upcoming transition to sustainable development provides the opportunity for all humanity to move to a wider implementation of the approach to education, which is considered in the Platonic sense, as the shaping in accordance with the ideal (which is described in the article by Oleg Bazaluk (Bazaluk, 2017; 2018).

The Futurization of Human Needs

In the book “Our Common Future”, well-known as a report of G.H. Brundtland, the definition of SD was given: “Sustainable development is the development that meets the needs of the present, but does not threatens the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” [Our Common Future,1989: 59]. This definition became most widely-spread after its actual
acceptance at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro (UNCED). This definition expresses the deep essence of the new model (form) of human development, which, according to the opinion of authors, should not be interrupted by any global catastrophe of human origin.

In such a definition of SD the priority place is taken by the concept of necessity, which expresses the relation of the subject, i.e. a living rational being and the environment, both natural and social. However, as in the case of SD we actually speak about the whole mankind, we have in mind the need for natural conditions and resources of the Earth and the space surrounding the civilization. Emphasis is also placed on future generations, which is directly related to the change of generations and youth policy [Ilyinsky, 2006].

Because in the UDM (i.e. in modern model, so called at UNCED), it is impossible to satisfy equally both current and future generations, this model of development implies a rather fast dramatic finale of wasteful market-economocentric development of mankind. This tragic end of the “market mankind” (if modern economocentric orientation can be called so) is associated with anthropoecological catastrophe, first of all with the deterioration of the environment and depletion of natural resources. That is exactly why the satisfaction of needs of future generations expresses not yet existing at the moment, but future — a kind of leading humane need of the entire human race to continue its temporal prolongation (the “linear thinking” effect).

The majority of people living on the planet do not feel this “here and now” need if to consider the development of mankind in the coordinates of modern market economocentric element. However, such need for the continuation of the human race emerges if the need and the importance of ensuring the survival and the temporal prolongation of existence for indefinitely long future are realized. Thus there emerges a potential need for the formation of a new “youth strategy”, in the appearance and existence of future generations, which in principle should exist for indefinitely long period of time. This need for the implementation of life support for future generations is beyond the momentary “market horizon” of thinking, it is directed towards the very distant humanistic future, and has a fundamentally virtual-strategic nature.

The discussed leading need for survival and the continuation of the human race will affect the modern needs, transforming them more efficiently in the direction of its future implementation. There is a contradiction between apparently superfluous needs of present generations and opportunities of satisfaction of the needs by future generations. The growth of needs of current generations, particularly unreasonable and pathological, leads to a significant reduction of opportunities and ways to meet the vital needs for natural resources and environmental conditions of future generations up to extinction of mankind as a result of, for example, anthropoecological catastrophe already at the beginning of the current millennium. It is a kind of a globally-temporal law of “conservation of energy”: the more irrationally the present generations waste environmental resources, the less is left for future generations. In addition, not only resources but also environmental conditions that can be considered as resources in the broad synergetic understanding.

Such a perspective requires a change in the modern model of development of civilization for the purpose of the progressive realization of perceived leading need for the “continuation of humanism” for an indefinite future. As this need is already recognized (though it is not put on the priority place), then it is a human interest, of long-term strategic nature that more and more should be considered with the transition to a sustainable future. That emerged contradiction
between the current and future needs can be solved only by the increasing of opportunities
to satisfy the needs by future generations through reasonable restriction (without affecting
the vital needs) to meet the needs of present generations. In conditions of the limitedness of
planetary resources modern generations live, and do not realize it, borrowing at the expense
of future generations, actually thoughtlessly wasting natural resources, and creating for them
worse living conditions in the biosphere, which is obviously inhumane, bearing in mind the
strategic perspective.

It is appropriate to call the process of increasing satisfaction of perceivable leading needs,
which go beyond the short-term “market horizon”, the process of futurization of satisfaction
of needs (and interests). And the transition to SD suggests a long-term holistic system of
activities that implement the process of rationalization and futurization and thus “strategic
humanization” and “temporal optimization” of needs. This implies a gradual abandonment
of the modern society of consumption and the transition to a more rational satisfaction of
needs, or, as they also say, coevolutionary reasonable needs, which involves transition to SD,
extending the temporary existence of mankind on the planet and in the Universe. In this case,
there will occur the temporal optimization of the needs of present and future generations,
which is manifested in futurization and rationalization of needs of mankind, which should
be seen not just as a whole in the spatial sense, but as a whole in a temporal dimension. It is
doubtful whether the purpose of the process of globalization is the achievement of only spatial
integrity in UDM, which sooner or later will be destroyed by anthropoecological catastrophe.
It is clear that such a goal in the strategic perspective looks anti-humane, which indicates the
need to see the prospects of globalization at the perspective of transition to SD.

Transition to SD involves the formation of not only globally-spatial integrity, but also the
deployment of a more systematic process — achievement of system-temporal integrity of
mankind. This means the acquisition by mankind of its rational human future that threatens
to lose the continuation of a modern model of socio-economic development. The acquisition
of temporal integrity of civilization by mankind can occur only in the process of optimization
and futurization of the needs of present and future generations. In this sense, we can agree with
Nikolay Marfenin that “modern ideologies should be based on the choice between short-term
and long-term benefit in nature management” [Marfenin, 2007: 599]. And although it is stated
in relation to nature management, however it is his rationalization that underlies future SD as
essentially a synonym for SD, to which Victor Danilov-Danil’yan draws attention [Danilov-
Danil’yan, 2003: 123-124] and about which it was already written many years ago [Ursul,
1993]. Of course, we are talking mainly about conceptual, from the positions common sense.
interpretation of the future model of civilization exactly as a model of the survival of mankind,
as a kind of “earthly invariant” of social level of evolution that occurred on our planet. The above
means that you need to consider in shaping long-term strategy of development of civilization
the most important insights of the general theory of evolution [Bazaluk, 2014; Bazaluk, 2015].

The first work (at least in Russia), which examines the relationship between environmental
education and prospects for sustainable development (SD), published in Russia more than
20 years ago [Environmental education, 1993], to a large extent anticipated the basic ideas
of “Strategy of the European Economic UN Commission for Education for Sustainable
Development” adopted in 2005 in Vilnius by high-level meeting of representatives of the
Ministries of Environment and Education.

Moreover, it becomes clear that the Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) is not
only an assumption to achieve sustainable development, but a priority means of it, i.e. we
can say that transition to a new course of the development of the civilization begins with the formation of education for the benefit of sustainable development, achieving the global dimensions. It should also be agreed with the opinion that ESD is the order of forward-looking politicians who have a good sense of direction in megatrends of the world community [Marfenin, 2008: 298].

For most ESD researchers it is quite obvious that a new type of education is based on the environmental education [Ursul & Demidov, 2004; Stepanov, 2009; Towards Education 2006]. During the research it has become clear that the environmental education in the unsustainable development model (i.e., that it represents currently) and something it should become in the sustainable development model — these are different types of education in terms of content and quality.

Despite the fact that the environmental education is, in a sense, an invariant of the modern education and its future system (model), which is adequate to the SD, within the latter it acquires some features caused by this new type of the civilization development.

**Features of Education for Sustainable Development**

Some meaningful features of this new type of the global education, which are the most significant, can be formulated now on the basis of the purposes and principles of the SD (sustainable development).

Firstly, if the environmental education for the benefit of the SD is guided by the purposes and principles of the SD, i.e. the salvation of mankind and the planet (biosphere), then it should contain the educational information building the future culture of the SD, i.e. not everything existing nowadays. It is not necessary anymore to argue that culture is evolving and will continue to evolve, although last century Leslie White had to defend the evolutionary approach to culture. However, it is important not so much the past of culture genesis as its future directed at transition to the SD. It seems that this transition will be coupled with the formation of a new type of the world culture, which is appropriate to refer as the sustainable development culture, which is gradually evolving in a noospheric culture during noospherogenesis [Ursul, 2003].

It is quite clear that a recovery from the global crises, and especially from socio-environmental, is possible only on the basis of building of a fundamentally new “sustainable culture” associated with the new way of the relationship between man and nature, which exclude the possibility of widespread environmental damage. This future type of culture should also be connected with security culture, and not only of environmental security.

Secondly, the environmental education in the unsustainable development model seems alien to this model, it looks kind of a virtual “implant from the future”. When the whole modern model of the functioning and development of a society has economic and centric character, showing in all areas the consumer orientated marketing, it does not accept the broad introduction of the environmental imperatives, rejecting everything that is associated with the restriction of receiving of profit and benefit. All other components of the education system of the unsustainable development model, according to the principles of the model, react and begin to “put pressure” on their own and at the same time “alien” component in the form of the environmental education. This contradiction between the interests of present and future needs cannot without difficulties and problems resolved in favor of the latter (the contradiction between the modern “economic” generations and future generations in a hypothetical society with the SD).
A way out of this contradictory situation is seen in the fact that all other components of education: i.e. its economic, social, humanitarian, technical and technological and other components should also “work” for the transition to sustainable future. Development of the environmental education only, even applying more and more efforts and finances, will not be able to bring the educational system to a new level corresponding to the purposes and principles of the SD, especially in its noospheric direction. The SD is a system of economic, environmental, sociocultural, political, demographic and other aspects of human activity targeted at the survival of the civilization, and that should be reflected in innovative and advance “sustainable education”.

The environmental imperatives are indeed critical within the understanding of the SD concept (especially if it comes from environmentalists). However, during the theoretical and methodological research it has become clear that the SD is not just adding the ecology to the traditional development, but is fundamentally new transformations in all areas of mankind development, i.e. it is different in essence “innovation revolution” on a global scale.

Unfortunately, the ESD is still based on a very simplified and one-sided concept of the SD, which is not adequate enough, as the environmental aspect and its relationship with economy and social sphere are mainly emphasized. Certainly, it is necessary to do, but this is not enough, it is important to expand the subject field of the study of the stability issue, and to make the SD concept more integral.

The environmental emphasis of this concept was the right step, focused on a long-term, strategic perspective. It is important to proceed from the assumption that the biosphere, as noted by Vladimir Vernadsky, is that earth shell, “where life can only exist. A human being, according to its nature, is inseparable from it. And this non-separability begins only now to reveal truly in front of us” [Vernadsky, 1965: 324]. Therefore, addressing the issue of the human environment meets the requirement of a scientist to consider the socioeconomic development in conjunction with this environment.

Taking into account this requirement, the sustainable development implies survival of the civilization and even improvement of the life quality of the world population without increasing in usage of natural resources and without degradation of the environment to such an extent that it would not result in exceeding of the carrying capacity of the Earth as an environmental system. Despite the fact that the transition to the sustainable development may require taking different actions in each state, the current efforts to build a sustainable future require an integrated approach to activities in three key areas: economic, social and environmental. Formulation of a new development strategy means gradual integration into a single self-organizing system of economic, environmental and social fields. In this regard, the SD should be characterized by (at least) economic efficiency, biosphere compatibility and social justice under general decline in anthropogenic impact on the biosphere.

Thus, as mentioned above, the new model of the civilization development has turned out, on the one hand, to be more promising, as with its help the civilization will be able to survive. However, on the other hand, created only in theory, this model is less systematic and does not take into account many components in terms of the interrelation of development and security, which characterize the modern development model.

Thirdly, the environmental education in the unsustainable development model (as well as all other types and forms of education) is far behind from the real life and from the research frontier. Of course, not all environmental education can be characterized as “lagging behind”; it also has anticipated features. However, being in the integral system of the “unstable”
global education, currently the environmental education cannot in the proper degree be such anticipated education, which would be adequately consistent with the importance of resolving of the environmental issues and transition to the SD.

Meanwhile, the forward-looking features of the environmental and other types of education, as has often been emphasized, follow from the fact that the environmental (especially global) issues and their negative and disastrous consequences can be only prevented, i.e. their solution is fundamentally proactive. There will be no one to eliminate the consequences of a planetary socio-environmental or any other planetary disaster, so the only way to secure from it is to take anticipated decisions and actions to prevent it globally. Within the unsustainable development model the most common way to respond to emergencies, crises and disasters is the elimination of their consequences (when they are local), but within the new civilization model the priority and dominant way should prevent them (which, by the way, is much cheaper in economic terms). And it requires the formation, to a certain extent, of a “anticipated culture”, and it is possible not in all cultural fields (because some of them are basically focused on the past).

Fourthly, the environmental education, as, indeed, and all environmental activities throughout the world, after the Stockholm Conference on the Environment under the auspices of the United Nations, focused its attention mainly on local environmental issues. Improvement of the environmental situation in a particular ecosystem, for example in a particular pool or city, is important, but this approach is typical for the solution of environmental issues in the unsustainable development model. Inspired by the solution of local environmental issues, the international community after two and even more so after three decades after the Stockholm Conference revealed that the global environmental situation had not improved, but deteriorated significantly. And this despite the fact that only during these three decades the enormous sums, perhaps exceeding several trillion USD, were spent on the local environmental actions all over the world. This amount is still increasing, and the global environmental situation and its prospects are declining because the emphasis is still on local environmental activities, and all this is typical exactly for the unsustainable development model [GEO -5, 2012].

In addition, even though the Club of Rome in due time encouraged to think globally and act locally, this appeal was understood primarily in terms of performance of local activities. Nobody even thought, holding local activities, about simultaneous improvement of the global environmental situation. Now, referring to the prospects for a sustainable future and following Vladimir Vernadsky, it is necessary both think and act globally and locally, without breaking their interrelation into the mental and practical components. The environmental degradation on the planetary scale due to the majority of the local environmental events has occurred, resulting from the fact that due to their holding the human pressure on the biosphere has been not decreased, but has been increased (because for their implementation the resources are used and environmental degradation occurs in other parts of the planet). Let us say, to clean a pool or river it is necessary to use energy and other resources taken from other places from other ecosystems, which leads to their disruption and pollution. All of them are summed up at the biospheric global level, and as a result the local events appear as “sweeping trash under the bed” and approach a planetary ecocatastrophe. Moreover, due to synergetic reasons there are more degrading areas on the planet, and this is reflected on a planetary level more and more anticipating and intensifying a socio-ecological crisis and approaching a global ecocatastrophe.

That is why it is important during any environmental activities to ensure that the global environmental situation would not be worsened and even better if the human pressure on
the biosphere would be decreased due to the whole complex of environmental measures aimed at implementing the purposes of the SD. The transition to this type of development has a fundamentally planetary character by virtue of the integrity and strong environmental interrelations of the biospheric components, and the globalization of social activities. Global security in terms of the environment or any other is of higher priority than the security of any part of the biosphere and sociosphere. And it is clear why: in case of a global environmental disaster, all local improvements of ecosystems will be negated, the national security (including environmental as well) of any state will be destroyed, and safety of an individual, society and any other communities is out of the question at all. Natural ecosystems — biogeocenoses and in the first place biota, especially in its higher level — will suffer as well.

All the above mentioned priorities should be fully taken into account in the environmental education, which will become an integral part of the ESD. It is possible to come up with other arguments, which supports the fact that the environmental education before the SD strategy and after its appearance is fundamentally different forms of education. It is important to realize this and direct the vector of further development of the environmental education towards the transition of the world community to the SD, the ultimate purpose of which is the establishment, in the global scale, of the most secure and highly intelligent society — the noosphere.

**Conclusions**

The ESD will substantially include the environmental component both in the form of ecologization of education and professional environmental education. In addition, supporters of this point of view consider the process of establishing of this type of education as a transition from the environmental education to the ESD, as it emerges in the aforementioned Strategy UN Economic Commission for Europe. A new recently adopted Global Program of Action on Education for Sustainable Development opens up even broader perspectives [Global Action, 2014].

Taking the environmental interpretation of the ESD as a basic, however it is important to note the trend to expand the understanding of this type of education at the expense of other SD system components. It has become clear that this future type of development will consist of at least several of its components: social sustainable development, economic sustainable development, demographic sustainable development and environmental sustainable development, and so forth. All these and other components of a single socio-natural sustainable development become persistent types of development if they are subject to certain limitations and all of them are all linked in a single system, which differs from the one-dimensional economic and centric unsustainable development, mainly characterized by economic efficiency.

Along with this, let us call it “system-conceptual” interpretation of this type of development, an understanding has become to form recently about more secure development than the existing one and not only in environmental terms. In fact, the identification of the connection of the SD with the issue of environmental security, as it has turned out, has come down to the definition of those restrictions and, consequently, new rules, which express the maximum allowable (carrying) capacity of the ecosystems and the biosphere altogether. The SD is such a regulatory type of development that occurs within the carrying capacity of the ecosystems, i.e. in this case the normalization is of natural kind. However, this understanding expresses mainly its environmental aspect and is positioned as an environmentally friendly development with
the following from this norms, principles and standards.

However, in case of consideration not only environmentally friendly, but also other forms and types of safe development, certain boundaries (limits) and standards of safe (in some way or another) development can be defined. It is subject to economically safe development, social, informational, political, technical and all other forms and types of development and the corresponding forms of security. The development of any system as a whole is sustainable, if it occurs within the appropriate “regulatory security corridor”, i.e. this or that “carrying capacity” of human activities.

In this sense, the environmental security is not different from other types of security, but it is important that the concept of the SD was first formulated only in connection with the environment. And before the awareness of the connections between the concepts “development and the environment”, other types of safety were studied along with the environmental, but the concept of the SD was created only through the environmental understanding of development and, as it became clear, especially through environmentally friendly development. Only later it became clear that in addition to the environmental security, it is important to include other characteristics of a real development process, i.e. its economic, political, social, demographic, information dimension, and so forth. However, with such a system synthesis, it is not very clear why we should include only those characteristics that are associated with the appropriate kind of security: economic, demographic, social, and so forth. It was an unexplainable “error” of conceptually theoretical awareness of the SD issues, and it is important to adjust it in a new, more systematic concept of this type of development in its broader “safe” interpretation.

In general, the concept of the SD could appear not in the “environmental and centric” form, if it had been realized that it was necessary to change the course of development of the world community due to other circumstances. Although historically it first came through environment, yet a new type of development cannot be associated only with the implementation of the strategic environmental imperatives and priorities. The SD is after all safe and innovative type of global development in all respects, which is implemented in a fairly narrow evolutionary corridor (within the carrying capacity of the ecosystems). Therefore, at a certain level of “normative” understanding of the essence of this type of development, it is important to state that it is characterized by globality, systematicity, continuity, security and adoption of forward-looking solutions. The ESD model, of course, will more and more include security issues [Ursul, 2009; Ilyin & Ursul, 2016].

Therefore, understanding of the ESD issues should not necessarily occur only through environment and environmental security. This type of development can be interpreted also through security issues and through directions of social activity (including security) included in the SD system, which have previously been studied as relatively autonomous forms of human activity. As the most cardinal and priority characteristics of SD are identified, they should be mastered by education in the interests of sustainable development, joining existing ESD components, and thereby a system-evolutionary synthesis of this new perspective form of the educational process will be carried out. For example, you can enable this advanced educational system becoming cosmic education, which also will go to sustainable development path [Bazaluk, 2013; Bazaluk & Blazhevich 2013].

It is clear that both the SD and education for this type of the civilization process should be systemic in nature and should be applied to all educational disciplines and courses, and, first of all, should be implemented where there are more reasons to include the SD ideas in education. It is important to develop the ESD in various directions, including environmental, “safe” and
other paths forming the system and integral concept and, in the long term, the SD theory.

The future science, on which the education is based, emerges as a totally new stage of development of single world science, which corresponds with the establishment period of the sphere of mind (noosphere) through the SD with a distinct emphasis on the study of the global development and the awareness of the future of mankind and all creation. The noospheric science, following the post-non-classical science, altogether with education will form in the long term a single scientific and educational process, forming planetary and integral noospheric consciousness both of an individual and all mankind, which advances practical global activities and contributes to its optimal development within coevolution with the nature of the Earth and Universe.

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Essence of the Discursive Competence as a Part of Professional Interaction of Future Physicians

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The article is concerned with essence of the foreign language discursive competence of future physicians. All participants of the communication process should know model of verbal and nonverbal behaviour, depending on the circumstances that unfold. When join in communication, for realization of the set communicative goal it is necessary to be able to choose a particular model of verbal behaviour among those models, which already exist, taking into account the communicative situation and the conversation strategy. However, medical students have difficulty connected to the perception and forming of speech messages in in real communicative situations. Furthermore, knowledge of rules and regulations of the foreign language is not in every instance relevant to ways of formation of opinion. Moreover, it is related with in the context of the foreign language learning insufficient level of discursive competence formation. Discursive competence is an important part of the teaching and learning activities. It reflects the nature of cognitive, informational, communicative and reflexive activities and has an impact on the success of communication. Discursive competence of the future physician is the ability of the medical specialist to form, perceive and interpret holistic monologues (messages, presentations, reports, speeches) and dialogic/polylogical (discussions, consideration, conversation, interviews, telephone conversations) oral discourses in a foreign language in accordance with communicative intention within the scope of professionally oriented communication with due consideration of specifics of their pragmatic and grammatical organization, the relationship between extra-linguistic and linguistic factors and the rules of speech etiquette.

Keywords: competency, competence, discursive competence, future physicians, formation of the foreign language discursive competence.

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Introduction

There are expansion of international cooperation in all fields of knowledge and current situation on the global job market require future alumni of a higher medical school to be not only a qualified specialists who have knowledge and skills only in professional field but they should be first of all competent professionals with knowing of foreign language as a means of international communication.

That is, competent professional should be able to communicate freely in foreign languages with colleagues from around the world, discuss issues of the medicine developing, taking into account the current trends, make speeches in international medical congresses, symposiums and conferences with reports and furthermore, choose appropriate variant of the foreign verbal behaviour according to communicative situation.

It is for this reason that is necessary to improve future physicians’ knowledge of the foreign verbal speech in accordance with the Common European Framework and it is necessary to create new approaches to teaching of foreign languages as compulsory subject in a higher medical school, implement interactive teaching technologies and techniques, which will facilitate the development of a foreign verbal discursive skills on the basis of the gaining systems of knowledge in the education process.

It is in accordance with the National Doctrine for Development of Education in Ukraine the language education system should give opportunity to use practically at least one of the foreign languages that means learning of the language linguistic component in close combination with the sociocultural component and pragmatic effectivities.

Goal of the foreign language learning in a higher medical school is acquisition of foreign languages as means of communication as well as acquisition of professionally directed foreign language competence for successful performing of the further professional activity.

Concept of communicative competence as common communicative quality of the person, that includes the developed communication skills and formed skills and abilities of the interpersonal communication and knowledge about its main regularities and rules directly or in connection with research of other issues are considered in the works of Oleksii Bodalov, Yurii Yemelianov, Oleksandr Kyrychuk, Yakiv Kolomynckyi, Nina Kuzmina, Alvina Panfilova, Larysa Petrovska, Nina Tarasevych, Tamila Yatsenko and so forth.

Most scientists consider the communicative competence as a significant component of the professional competence, which has its own specificity in each activity.

Modern discourse theory serves as a theoretical basis for the discursive competence (Olena Aleksandrova, Volodymyr Karasyk, Oleksandr Kibryk, Olena Kubriakova).

Competence and Competency

Concepts of the «competence» and «competency» are considered from different perspectives by scientists.

Andrii Khutorskii distinguishes terms of «competence» and «competency». He indicates that the competence is a set of interrelated human features (knowledge, ability, skills, and ways of activity). Competency in this field is having competence by the person including the personal feelings about object of activity [Khutoskii, 2003: p. 55].
Competence should be understood, in accordance with definition of these terms, as specified requirement, standard of future physicians’ educational level, while competency should be understood as their actually formed personal qualities and minimal experience.

Foreign communicative competence is an integral characteristic of the professional activity of a specialist, which includes the following substructures: activity (knowledge, ability, skills, and ways of the professional activity performing); communicative (knowledge, ability, skills, and ways of the professional communication performing) [Yefimova, 2013].

Future professional should be able to use the foreign languages as means of international communication, which includes the formation of the appropriate level of a foreign language communicative competence of the users. Communication is considered as the process of verbally or in writing interaction, which cognitive essence includes an exchange and evaluating of information [Feldman, 2003]. In view of this, communicative competence is considered as formed if the future professional uses a foreign language with the purpose to get and increase own knowledge and experience [Hymes, 1971: p. 28].

**Essence of the discursive competence**

Communicative competence is complex and multidimensional concept in the modern sociolinguistics. It is considered as system that performs functions of balancing of existing language forms, which are determined on the basis of the communicant’s language competence in the context of certain social functions [European Recommendations on Language Education, 2003]. Communicative competence means that each speech has rules which are regulated by the common grammar rules and learning of which provide ability to use language in the process of communication. Essence of the communicative competence are revealed through pragmatic, discourse and informative components.

**Pragmatic (strategic)** component is considered as the rules of the coming into contact with an interlocutor, ability to maintain this contact during the process of communication, and complete communication logically. Communicative pragmatic means, in other words, readiness to transfer to communicative meaning in the specific situation of communication. This readiness is related, in the foreign language classes, as a rule with possibility of the student to orientate quickly in the foreign language speech communicative strategy, in other words, ability to adapt verbal and cogitative process to the given by the communicative situation conditions.

**Discourse** component is considered as the rules of the meaning constructing of the specific speech. Discourse is the form of the communicative meaning («what should be said» and «in what manner say something»), which is always addressed to the interlocutor, listener or reader and is characterized by the following features: coherence, logic, organization. Mentioned features of the discourse are especially identified in written speech when lexico-grammatical connection, logic of meaning and the speech appropriate organization are more important in the verbal speech.

**Information** component is purposed on getting the meaningful subject of communication. In the process of the information component forming student gets a set of necessary concepts in the foreign language classes. These concepts describe any given situation, information from past experience in the form of knowledge and patterns of behaviour, knowledge of the real world, ability to describe the real world and own attitudes towards it by means of foreign language form and so forth.
Communicative competence is being gaining by students in the process of foreign language learning be means of communicative approach, basis of which includes reorient from form to function, from the linguistic competence to communicative, from the language correctness to spontaneity and authenticity, in other words, the naturalness of communication.

Communicative competence includes several sub-competencies. Discourse competence is one of the most significant and communicative relevant. It includes knowledge of different types of discourses and rules of the discourse construction as well as ability to create and understand these discourses with taking into account different communicative situations.

Conceptual diapason of the term “discourse”

Nonna Sukalenko things that this term is situated between text, context, functional style, sublanguage [Sukalenko, 2001: p. 254]. Florii-Batsevych determinates discourse as set of communicants’ verbal and cogitative actions, which are related with learning, understanding and presentation of the word by a speaker and understanding of the linguistic view of a sender world by a listener.

Discourse is determined in the modern linguistics as complex communicative phenomenon that includes text as well as extralingual factors (knowledge and concepts about the world, attitudes and purposes of the addressee), which are necessary for adequate understanding of a text. Unlike a text, discourse is, first of all, the sample of certain communicative intentions realization in the context of a specific communicative situation in relation to a specific partner, who represents other culture, with expressions of verbal and non-verbal means which are appropriate in specific situation. Adequacy of communicants’ language behaviour, however, is determined by the success of speech interaction, in other words, by the achievement of a communicative goal as well as agreement with the verbal and non-verbal behaviour rules which are characteristic of a specific linguocultural community.

New approach in the definition of discourse computation was formed mostly in the teaching of foreign languages. Discourse competence are determined by foreign scientists (Michel Canale, Merrill Swain) as knowledge of different discourse types and principles of discourse construction as well as ability to create and understand the discourse with taking into account of the communication situations [Canale, Swain, 1980]. H. Douglas Brown considered discourse as the human ability to connect sentences in discourse fragments and creates complete semantic text from the set of phrases [Brown, 1987: p. 143]. There is the discourse approach in the study of linguistic phenomena contributed to the modification of methods and techniques of teaching a foreign language because it shows procedural and effective unity of the language behaviour in combination of its verbal and non-verbal components. Hence the idea of the text which is the source of information about the discourse, is the central section in the process of communication, complex sign which created by means of semantic elements which are connected into a hierarchical structure by the author’s communicative intention [Kruchyna, 2008: p. 91] and text exactly should serve as the main unit language communication teaching, has started up in the theory and practice of the foreign language teaching.

Olha Kucherenko things that discourse is more important than text in accordance with the modern concept of language teaching. It is because «unlike a text, discourse includes also extralingual conditions of communication» what is the necessary condition for forming of the communicative competence, i.e. the ability to correlate language means with specific spheres, situations and communicative tasks» [Kucherenko, 2000: p. 89]. Researcher distinguished
several components of the discursive competence, such as textual, genre, tactical and strategic. Strategic component includes the ability to understand a communicative intention and plan a communicative event. Tactical component includes formed skills to analyse the communicative situation and choose language means which are adequate in this situation for achieving of the communicative goal. Genre component includes knowledge of genre norms and the ability to choose type of texts and create the discourse in accordance with specific genre canons. Textual component seen as the ability to make sentence in a manner that will form textual unity. At the same time, text is considered in the aspect of the research issue, in the narrow sense, as in the traditional dictionary definitions, as sequence combination of items united by a semantic connection with a fundamental characteristic such as coherence and integrity [Kucherenko, 2000: p. 84-89].

Transition to the text and the sentence does not imply the actual quantitative predominance of the textual material. It is the issue of a qualitatively new direction when using texts at classes. Discourse basis of studying give the opportunity to consider the language units in the condition of natural realization of its meaning, structure and function of which promote the most complete understanding of the language behaviour of native speakers of the language which learnt. Textual component can be indicated as the ability to accept, understand and create the text (verbal or written). Discourse competence is a wider field of activity, which includes strictly linguistic skills and abilities as well as knowing of a sociocultural register which can be determined as a set of typical and specific language formulas, communicative models or structures testing socially, and those which concentrate a language experience of communication participants.

Formation of the discursive competence in the process of foreign language learning by future physicians

Discourse competence is the ability of the linguistic persona to create and accept cohesive discourses of the different types (written and verbal) in accordance with communicative intention in borders of a specific situation with taking into account specific of their semantic and pragmatic and grammatical organization on macro and micro levels and relationship between their extra-linguistic and linguistic components. Availability of the discourse competence in the students includes their ability to create and accept different type of discourses with taking into account a communicative situation that is observance of parameters of one type of discourse or using of different types of discourse depending on changes of a communicative situation during the speech acts. It is impossible to know different types of discourses of native and especially of foreign language without special preparation. It is proved that all people have different ability to understand and duplicate different texts. Probably, it is because each person exists in his/her special spheres, such as family, public or professional and exactly there meets with special discourses. But, it is the fact that each one has the set of discourses of native language that is necessary for communication. These sets of discourses are gained because of communication and interaction with other communicants whose language is the sample in different real-life situations. Communicant gain, as a result, to his/her own experience necessary nomenclature of discourses. Classroom is still the main place during studying of the foreign language, where is used discourses that are characteristics of alien cultures. It is exactly in the classroom student who learn the foreign language have the opportunity to learn which discourse choose with taking into account the situation and form his/her own...
speech correct but with using different tools that is without using identical lexical units and grammatical forms, starting own speech in different way, when talking personally or by means of telephone, on the street or at home with representatives of different social group, even if the speech topic are always the same [Shevchenko, 2005].

Despite sufficient levels of grammatical knowledge, future physicians do not always choose grammatical constructions and speech formulas in the correct manner. A lot of difficulties arise in the process of the stylistically appropriate lexical means choosing, because students have almost no idea about lexis’ systemic organization. Consequently, when using with didactic purposes professionally directed English texts such as scientific article, article from the reference textbook, formal letter, and fragments from educational texts, attention should be drawn to the row of conventions inherent to the British legal community, for example, on the strict restrictions on the imperative mood using, strong language, complete emphatic refusal, negative particles, negative constructions and so forth. Therefore, a discourse competence as a part of future physicians’ discourse competence serves as one of ways for solving of such problems. It promotes the students’ linguistic observational skills development in different contexts, which in turn leads to conscious acceptance of appropriate stylistic and lexical means, grammatical structures and to their appropriate using when forming of texts. When using a discourse approach attention should be drawn to the relationship among the language form, its content, function, and a communicative situation.

Individual’s discourse competence realizes by means of performing of different communicative activity types, such as accepting, understanding, reproducing (verbal or written). There are three stages for gaining of skills for forming/accepting of discourse:

a) indoctrination (introductive speech of lecturer with reference on the communicative purpose of communication, presentation of discourse, control under understanding and analysis of situation);

b) training (acceptance and analysis of a few discourses of the same type); exercises for consolidation of language means, reproducing of discourses);

c) practice: controlled communication (forming/understanding of discourses), free communication (forming / understanding of communicative act with using of learnt type of discourse with taking into account a problem situation of a foreign language cultural environment).

Each of type of activity can be connected with texts in verbal or in written forms, or in both of them. It is necessary, for forming of communicative motivation, to create favourable didactic conditions, use personal individualization which includes taking into account the context of the student’s activity of his/her experience, his/her interests and desires, spiritual needs, outlook, emotional and sensual spheres, the individual’s status in the team. In accordance with the mentioned above information we can make the following conclusion: students, especially those who have a certain knowledge of foreign languages, should not learn by heart texts as samples of language realization of a certain sense/ theme, they should, in return, be studied to accept and form discourses with taking into account the communicative purpose and communicative situation. It is rather difficult language skills which are necessary for performing of these actions, so their forming demands purposeful, continuous, systematic learning, creating of modern the lecturer’s arsenal.

Experience of working with students shows that they have relatively low level of a discourse competence formation. This is manifested in the fact that students often have difficulty when choosing language means, which would appropriate in the context of discourse,
when choosing language and behaviour reactions and strategies, which are not adequate in the specific communicative situation, students are not able to achieve communicative purposes during introduction to problem and during discussing considering a problem. With purpose to help students to avoid difficulties of communication, it is used the situation analysing approach (Case method), which characterized by the wide pedagogical opportunity. Realization of these approaches take possibility to student actively interact, learn from each other, (collectively, in groups, learn in cooperation), when lecturer and student are in equal position, and none of the participants prevailed over the other. Students get know how to be democratic, communicate with other people, think critically and make decision.

Conclusions

Discourse competence is the human ability to create connected part of speech with taking into account grammatical, lexical and syntactic rules, communicative situation and extralingual factors, which are integral components of the communication process, logically forms utterances into completed texts and represent these text in accordance with style of speech and the principles of rhetorical efficiency. Formation of the foreign language competence of students includes shift of accent from language form of the text, which served as the sample of discourse models using in a verbal discourse to ways and means of expression and achieving of interlocutors’ communicative purposes.

References


Philosophy and Post-Totalitarian Practices

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This writing aims to outline the principles of researches on philosophy in Central and Eastern European countries, preferably USSR, in the latest soviet and post-soviet periods. In author’s opinion, the crucial points for such kind of research are: a) to discover a correlation between philosophy and the phenomenon of totalitarianism; b) to correlate a soviet philosophy with totalitarian experience. The article considers methodological and axiological problems in research of post-totalitarian practices in general as such as in philosophy. In author’s opinion the main problem in development of the post-soviet philosophy is interiorisation of intellectual, cultural and social practices, which were formed concerning to totalitarian experience. This became a reason of “cynicism” and “nihilism” of post-soviet philosophy. It’s impossible to cast mentioned phenomena off without consideration of totalitarian phenomenon and critical reconsideration of the own totalitarian experience.

Keywords: Central and Eastern Europe, totalitarian phenomenon, totalitarian experience, Soviet philosophy, post-totalitarian practices

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Introduction

Philosophy is doubly connected with totalitarianism. One could be added “just as with any political regime”, but there are probably two regimes with which philosophy has a special relationship. The emergence of philosophy is usually associated with the Athenian democracy, from which the modern liberal-democratic regime begins its genealogy. An incredible challenge for the philosophy of the twentieth century was a totalitarian regime. After the fall of Nazism appeared the question “how to philosophize after Auschwitz?” I do not support a thesis that...
philosophy is possible only in one of the political regimes or that one of the regimes creates ideal conditions for philosophy or, conversely, that under any of the regimes philosophy is impossible at all. Since its origin, philosophy is possible always and everywhere, but each political regime creates for its philosophers its own conditions, which are a challenge for them, because these conditions must be objectified, that is, to realize the limits of the dependence and freedom of philosophical activity for a particular political regime, and also consider this political regime as a special case of linking philosophy with politics. Therefore, the question of the relation between philosophy and totalitarianism means, first of all, the question of the conditions of philosophizing under the totalitarian regime, and therefore of how these conditions affect the philosophy that arises in connection with a totalitarian project or in view of the totalitarian experience. And last but not least is the question of how philosophy can explain the totalitarian phenomenon, without which it is impossible to understand it as a condition of philosophizing and resist it and its consequences, including those ones that in this article will be called post-totalitarian practices. Under such terms, I will refer to political, intellectual, cultural, everyday and other practices that have arisen in totalitarianism and are maintained in the process of coming out of it, and which also significantly affect those formations and configurations that change the previous ones.

Post-totalitarian practices and totalitarian phenomenon

The transformation of post-totalitarian practices to the subject of research which is equivalent to totalitarianism, is often hindered by methodological and axiological, or even psychological reasons. Today, there are many convincing studies of the totalitarian phenomenon in where totalitarianism is almost always analyzed in the context of the establishment of liberal democracy. This creates an interesting transitological perspective: societies emerging from totalitarianism must, within the framework of the universal logic of the establishment of liberal democracy, return to it or build it. This perspective is quite consistent with the German situation, the feature of which should be streamlined. The Nazis gained a power in a democratic way, and although they immediately began to construct a totalitarian society, but for 12 years in power they did not have time to eliminate, completely change, and in some cases subordinate all institutions of the previous regime. This is the thing that distinguishes German totalitarianism from the Soviet one.

Instead, the exit from totalitarianism and the transition to liberal democracy in the West Germany has a completely different character. They are caused by military defeat, capitulation, occupation, the total elimination of Nazi institutions, the removal of political life, and often criminal punishment of those who involved in the previous regime, and so forth; at the same time, the occupation administration was the guarantor of the effectiveness and inevitability of democratic transformations. Another thing is the USSR and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that were under its control. The totalitarian regimes are established here as a result of the military defeats of the previous regimes and / or Soviet occupation, the liquidation and the replacement of the institutions of the old regime show a revolutionary and often totalitarian nature. Communist authorities lasts for decades and undergoes a marked internal evolution which ultimately leads to the collapse of the Soviet system in democratic (as much as possible under the conditions of “developed socialism”) way. In the transitological perspective, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, after the collapse of communism, have to build liberal democracy (the way in which happened this collapse only exacerbates such expectations),
and therefore everything that takes place here between totalitarianism and developed liberal democracy is evaluated only from the point of view of the lack or incompleteness of the last one or of remnants of totalitarianism. Therefore, the way out of communism must objectively be a longer and larger process and it becomes non-subjective and uninteresting\(^1\) for research. Thus, in the opinion of the French sociologist — researcher of the communist and post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, Georges Mink, “the situation after communism has, for many sociologists, an indistinct or even unpleasant taste. What is the disproportion between the brilliant collapse of the “cold monster” and the awesome effects of the post-communist period? Was not this the result of so-expected collapse leading to revolutionary changes in social structures? ... However, nothing proves that there was a sharp change in societies, although according to sociologists’ beliefs after 1989, social structures and mentality had to change as radically as the political and economic regime” [Mink, 2002: 443-444]. The contrast between expectations and reality was caused by the expectations. The expectations were greatly stimulated by the fact that the communist regime throughout its existence — up to 1989 in the case of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and until 1991 — in the case of the USSR, was attributed the invariably totalitarian character. According to Krzysztof Pomian, a French philosopher and historian and former Polish communist and participant of the Polish dissident movement of the 1960s, “to assert totalitarianism of any regimes means to attribute it monolithic and exclude, as a result, the very possibility of changes caused by internal factors. Totalitarian regimes themselves are trying to create such an image for themselves, because accepting the existence of internal conflicts means for them to recognize the defeat of their project of building a united society” [Pomian, 1995: 20]. This perception not only makes the changes that took place in 1989-1991 more “brilliant” and the factors that caused them — less noticeable and, consequently, the consequences of these changes — more strange, it can lead to a reverse effect, because “equivalence of “totalitarian” and “monolithic” logically serves as an argument capable of making the very idea of totalitarianism. Each more or less in-depth study of the institutions of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany opens internal tensions and inconsistencies that contradict the image of the only unbreakable block” [Pomian, 1995: 20]. Outside the logic of the application of concepts and its effects there are axiological and psychological dimensions, in particular, not only representatives of the younger generation, but also people who grew up in the USSR, often tend to talk about the “horrors of totalitarianism” in the 1970s-80s, although this contradicts the elementary historical data and personal experience of those who lived in those years. A modern Polish scholar, Krzysztof Brzechczyn, aptly noticed that these epithets are more likely to mean the attitude to their own past and the desire to distance themselves from it: “the term “totalitarianism”, which often appears in the titles of books or articles, is rarely a declaration of the author’s theoretical beliefs (or editor of the collection), more often it serves as an axiological manifestation — a negative attitude to the social system designated by this term” [Brzechczyn, 2011: 69].

In a theoretical point of view, the definition of the Soviet regime as totalitarian is entirely correct in relation to the period preceding 1953-56, that is, the death of Stalin and the 20th Congress of the CPSU, but needs to be clarified for the period 1953-56 — 1989-1991. In my opinion, there is not a very persuasive approach, according to which after 1953-56 there is a transition from totalitarianism to authoritarianism (or some other than totalitarianism of the

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\(^1\) The real research interest to a transitional state or transition problems can only cause fears (quite justified in the case of a number of post-Soviet countries) that post-totalitarian transformations can lead to some other political regime than liberal democracy.
regime), and from 1989-91, from authoritarianism to democracy, since such the approach does not make it possible to understand the specifics of the “late Soviet regime.” Considering it as a totalitarian one is a necessary, but insufficient condition for understanding this specificity, while the cornerstone is the question of the causes of the collapse of the Soviet system. If it was due to internal causes\(^2\), then its own evolution leads to collapse, and therefore we have different phases or stages of totalitarianism, at least until and after 1953-1956. (On the other hand, this evolution did not necessarily have to crash, and other scenarios similar to those realized in China, the DPRK or Cuba were possible). About such an evolution, says Pomian: “Was the Soviet regime totalitarian to the very end? Only one answer is possible here: it was a totalitarian regime that was heading towards its collapse. It was no longer practiced mass terror and there was no leader ... Due to this, the Soviet regime was no longer an emergency regime. He retained all the institutions of the totalitarian regime and the desire to build a society without a class struggle. But from now on, the bureaucratic routine replaces the will of the leader, and disappointment is the enthusiasm of the masses, even if he was artificial. The official comes to replace the ideological wrestler, money — to change the ideology, gerontocracy — to replace the cult of youth. Former fanatics turned into cynics” [Pomian, 1995: 22]. Although he believes that “the Soviet regime was transformed into an authoritarian regime which, in the same way, retained the Stalinist institutions and which could not appeal to the threat of a civil war for its legitimacy” [Pomian, 1995: 22], such Soviet “authoritarianism” was beyond mere the formal features of the exercise of power differed significantly from those that arose as a result of the degradation of the liberal-democratic regime. First of all, the aforementioned presence (and continuation of activity) of totalitarian institutions and the absence of civil society institutions, as well as post-totalitarian practices, carriers of which were Soviet people, engendered by a totalitarian experiment that markedly distinguished them from the citizens of yesterday’s liberal democracies.

To clarify the specifics of the “late Soviet regime,” I will use the criteria offered by Raymond Aron (1905-1983) in his work “Democracy and Totalitarianism” (1965), which was based on a course of lectures, read in Sorbonne in 1957-1958. This work differs from the well-known at the time of Aron’s work “The Origins of Totalitarianism” (1951) by Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) in that Aron’s reasoning was built on the comparison of the French Fourth Republic (1946-58), which was by no means the best example of liberal democracy, and the modern Soviet regime, that is, the USSR of the Stalin and Khrushchev period. This comparison takes place in the peculiar Aristotle’s perspective of “the generation and corruption” of political regimes, reflection on the causes of their stability and instability, and also in the future of the formation of “industrial societies.” Aron distinguishes five main principles of the “totalitarian phenomenon”:

1. A totalitarian phenomenon arises out of a regime which gives a monopoly of political activity to one party;

2. The monopoly party is guided or armed with an ideology to which it gives absolute authority and which, as a result, becomes the official truth of the state;

3. In order to extend this official truth, the stataretains a dual monopoly — a monopoly of coercion and a monopoly of means of persuasion. The state and those who represent it fully manage and direct the totality of means of communication, radio, television and the press;

\(^2\) Usually, contrary to this thesis, they indicate the subversion of Western countries with regard to the USSR, but during the Cold War the latter was doing the same thing against Western countries and losing this competition with them because of their internal weakness.
4. Economic and professional activity is largely subordinated to the state and becomes, in some way, a part of the state itself. Since the state is inseparable from its ideology, economic and professional activities are largely marked by official truth;

5. Everything is state activity and any activity is subordinated to ideology; error committed in the economic or professional activity is both ideological error. Thus, the politicization and ideological coloring of all possible mistakes of individuals and, as a result, at the same time police and ideological terror. [Aron, 1965: 284-285]

All these principles remain valid until “perestroika”, but does this mean that we have the only unchanging totalitarian phenomenon by the end of the 1980s? Changes that take place in the “late Soviet regime” can be noticed, above all, in paragraphs 4 and 5, although, of course, at the official level, the principles mentioned in them are preserved. To outline the difference between the two phases of totalitarianism, it is necessary to reconsider the peculiarities of the functioning of the “late Soviet regime” of the two core elements of totalitarianism, “whose essence is terror and whose principle of action is the logicality of ideological thinking” [Arendt, 1958: 474]. “The Late Soviet Regime” is totalitarianism, which abandoned terror as a form of existence, that is, from terror for the sake of terror (which does not exclude the use of repression in order to maintain order), and proposed a kind of normalization of the lives of Soviet citizens both at the level of personal security and at the level of well-being. The normalization, of course, did not mean giving any real rights or real prosperity to the Soviet people — the day’s stagnation is a time of great inequalities, in particular between the elite and ordinary citizens, between the inhabitants of the capitals and industrial centers and the “outback” and the countryside; this is the time of great “deficits” (that is, the inaccessibility or inaccessibility of a number of material wealth of most citizens), as well as the great discrepancy between the official rules of “socialist legality” and the real rules of functioning of society and real practices of Socialdisciplinierung. The state-and-party retains a monopoly not only on political activity, but also on the determination of material and spiritual needs of citizens, as well as the definition of what is legitimate and just, that is, how to interpret and apply “socialist legality”. These inequalities, differences and restrictions look scandalous for liberal democracy people, because they mean no fundamental freedom and any guarantees, but for the Soviet people who survived the Stalinist era, war, occupation, post-war devastation, stability itself has already looked a significant improvement in life, and the conditions for a kind of agreement proposed by the state and party: “You follow the rules we have established — we do not touch you”, have been great progress in the field of personal security compared to the Stalin period when loyalty to the regime, merit to the regime or involvement in it in no way guaranteed personal security. After the Stalinist terror and instability, the terms of this agreement were quite understandable and acceptable, therefore, the Soviet people of the “era of stagnation” were relatively happy, although this did not interfere with the fact that they were somewhat dissatisfied in their lives. However, the subject of such dissatisfaction was rarely the actual political regime, at least even the dissidents rarely questioned the official principles of the “socialist system”, criticizing mainly those Soviet practices that violated these principles. On the other hand, terror and instability ensured the dynamics, without which the totalitarian regime is falling, so the symptomatic name “the era of stagnation” in the context of totalitarian logic indicates the degradation and timing of the regime.

Just as it would be wrong to call terror any unjustified, unjust or voluntaristic use of force, and the existence of an ideology by itself is not yet a sign of totalitarianism. We can agree with Arendt that “...all ideologies contain totalitarian elements, but these are fully developed
only by totalitarian movements, and this creates the deceptive impression that only racism and communism are totalitarian in character. The truth is, rather, that the real nature of all ideologies was revealed only in the role that the ideology plays in the apparatus of totalitarian domination” [Arendt, 1958: 470]. Communist ideology remains the official truth of the Soviet state until its collapse, but the totalitarian nature of the Soviet regime is conditioned not so much by the content of the communist doctrine, but by the way in which it determined the policy of the USSR and the behavior of its citizens. The state-and-party guided in their activities by the communist doctrine, but identifying it only with the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin is the same mistake as to deduce the policy and repression of the Soviet regime from the Constitution of the USSR and the official rules of “socialist legality”. The real “guide to action” during the Stalinist era was based on the interpretation of the classics’ disciples, but the monopoly on him, as well as all other interpretations, had only the “great leader and teacher”, who was a living embodiment of the communist doctrine. So, Stalin was the supreme authority in all these domains, from agriculture and military affairs to art, philosophy and linguistics. However, after Stalin’s death, his heirs (primarily for reasons of their own security) did everything to prevent the “cult of personality” revived in the USSR, which affected the role of ideology for the “late Soviet regime”. The state-and-party leadership was led by people who managed not only to survive, but also to make a career in the environment of Stalin, as they understood and, perhaps, even introjected the principle that brilliantly expressed Arendt: “The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction (i.e., the reality of experience) and the distinction between true and false (i.e., the standards of thought) no longer exist” [Arendt, 1958: 474]. Because of this, for the leaders of the “late Soviet regime,” the communist doctrine becomes “dogma” rather than “guide to action”, but in this capacity, “dogma” continues to perform its organizing role: the study of works of “classics of Marxism-Leninism” was an obligatory element of education, but the state-and-party and the party retained a monopoly on the understanding of what is a communist doctrine, and therefore any — which attempts to interpret the works of classics independently were perceived as an attack on this monopoly and, thus, on the state itself. Instead, the show of recognition of the official ideology and the adoption of any, even absurd, but official ideological statement, was a sign of loyalty to the regime.

Both the policy of the USSR and any professional activity in it until its very end remained subject to official ideology, but since the Soviet leadership had to deal with real economic, technological, ultimately social problems, he had to resort to decisions that were effective in his reign, but either did not rely on communist doctrine, or even contradicted it. It is clear that in the situation of choosing between an ideologically correct and efficient decision the simplest was to declare an effective solution ideologically correct, and therefore either to correct the ideological dogma, or to resort to its complex sophistic explanations, which became even more complicated when it comes to the abolition or change of previously declared ideologically correct solutions. The space for such adjustments and explanations was not so great, which reduced the possibility of truly effective decisions and often led to decisions absurd, but within this space, the possibility of partial denationalization of professional activity in a number of realms, the creation of original ideologically neutral areas, where one could be guided by its own professional logic, provided, of course, maintaining the loyalty of the regime, that is, the recognition of the supremacy of the communist doctrine over these professional logic.

3 If you use the popular expression in the Soviet times by Friedrich Engels.
Philosophy and totalitaritarian experience

Within the limits of such space, in my opinion, there is the formation of post-totalitarian Soviet philosophy, but this thesis needs a lot of refinements, especially the term “Soviet philosophy”. The use of this term resembles the above-described methods of using the term “totalitarianism”, in particular, its understanding also depends on the attitude to what it denotes. Often, under Soviet philosophy, only “Marxism-Leninism” means consciously or unknowingly reproducing of the official Soviet position and bringing the Soviet philosophy closer to ideology or its ideological function as much as possible. The opposite approach under Soviet philosophy means only that which is not limited to ideology or ideological function, and therefore what can be called philosophy from the present viewpoint. Thus, in the first approach, ultimately, the existence in the USSR of a philosophy independent of ideology, or of any value defined in this way by Soviet philosophy, is denied, and thus the gap between Soviet and post-Soviet philosophy is emphasized. In the second approach — on the contrary, the decisive is the desire to emphasize continuity between them, and often this continuity is understood as an absolutely positive factor. Thus, the leading Soviet and today’s Russian philosophers, Abdusalam Guseinov and Vladislav Lektorsky, state: “The examination of what has been produced by today’s philosophy, both from the points of view of the contributing authors, the range of themes investigated, and the conceptual solutions proposed, bears strong witness to a firm desire to be part of a continuity in relation to the history of philosophy. The debates and the principal outcomes achieved by Russian philosophy over the last twenty years fundamentally serve simply to extend, develop, enrich and bring to fruition the best of the intellectual endeavour of the years 1960 to 1980” [Guseinov, 2009: 20]. In my opinion, if it is true to analyze the philosophical literature of the post-Soviet period, then it is difficult to deny the continuity mentioned, but this approach causes a caveat. The remarkable selectivity of this approach is due to the traditional Marxo-Hegelian conception of history, as a linear process, aimed at fostering freedom and good, as a result of which the post-Soviet philosophy automatically turned out to be the heir of “the best of the intellectual endeavour of the years 1960 to 1980”, and therefore, it automatically left in the USSR the worst thing that was done in these (and previous) years. This idea is well combined with the aforementioned transitological perspective, but this time at the end of the transition (which, according to the conviction of the authors, has already taken place), we have an ideal state for philosophizing: “At the beginning of the 1990s, and more particularly after August 1991, a situation became established that was new and generally favourable to the development of philosophy in Russia. The decisive contributing factor to this was the end of the monopoly of the Marxist vision of the world, or in other words the end of the centralised State control over ideology. Philosophy was able to become what it should always be, an unfettered intellectual endeavour, which contains within itself the determinants of its own truth and which constructs itself within the context of the academic community” [Guseinov, 2009: 18]. From such an opinion of the authors, one more problem arises from their approach — the totalitarian phenomenon and philosophy are taken in it as immutable, monolithic and always identical to the essence of itself, which is why the connection between them is conceived as purely external — one that can simply disappear if not for several days in August 1991, then, at least, in a few years of “perestroika”. Moreover, without any special efforts on the part of the philosophers: “In Russia (contrary to other former Communist countries), the end of Marxism’s monopoly has not led to the adoption of virulently anti-Marxist positions and has not been accompanied by professional interdictions.
Remarkably, the evolution of theoretical stances within the philosophical community had not led to a wholesale change of personnel, apart from course from the natural processes of renewal and the surge of new recruits” [Guseinov, 2009: 18]. The author’s description of the mechanism of transformation of Soviet philosophy in post-Soviet Russia is quite accurate, taking into account the peculiarities of the Russian case, but their optimistic assessment of this transformation has a reverse side: if this “evolution of theoretical stances” did not require any revision of the legacy of Soviet philosophy and had an exclusively cumulative character, then its connection with the totalitarian phenomenon was so insignificant that in all the reflections on “the best of the intellectual endeavour of the years 1960 to 1980” can simply be made for brackets.

In order to identify such a connection and to find out its nature, in the study of Soviet philosophy one must bear in mind all the activities and products that were considered philosophical in the USSR, withing the conditions of philosophizing under the Soviet regime. It is clear that a significant part of these products had a purely ideological character, but ignoring the official philosophy or ideological component of Soviet philosophizing would mean ignoring not only its conditions, but also the very nature of post-totalitarian philosophy, that is, the philosophy that arises within the aforementioned denationalization or deideologization of educational, scientific, the cultural sphere for the “late Soviet regime” and continues its evolution after its collapse. The emergence in the USSR of post-totalitarian philosophy looks rather unusual phenomenon. With the advent of Soviet power, previous educational institutions were eliminated or fundamentally changed, old personnel — exiled, released, destroyed, new ones were trained from the class-based principles of people in the system of party education. The repressions of the 1930s destroyed most of the convicted Marxists and intellectuals who had some kind of training and / or pre-revolutionary education. As a result, the philosophical faculties restored during the Second World War were mainly full of people whose of philosophical knowledge did not go beyond the section “Dialectical and Historical Materialism” of the “History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks): Short Course.” At the same time, at the time of the collapse of the USSR in 1991, when the first graduates of these philosophical faculties barely reached retirement age, we see a developed system of philosophical knowledge with numerous research areas, topics and concepts. The possibility of philosophy, which was not limited to ideological function, was created with the normalization of social life, but its appearance did not occur automatically with the termination of terror. The most important factor behind the emergence of post-totalitarian philosophy was that it was called “de-Stalinization”: after 1956, Soviet philosophers began to oppose the odious ideological guideline on the philosophy of the thesis drawn from the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, sometimes even frankly criticizing the deviation of Stalinism from the spirit and the letter of discipleship the classics of “Marxism-Leninism”. On the other hand, in the field of philosophy, new research directions, problems, and branches are discovered, the need for which is justified by the logic of the development of philosophy as a science (Marxist-Leninist philosophy was considered to be the most scholar of all philosophies), which is not limited to ideology, but also various institutional, educational , ideological and cultural demands of Soviet society on these directions, problems and industry. After a period of confusion and flirting with the humanities and the “creative intelligentsia” party leadership has since mid-1960 puts an end to this amateur philosophers and proceeds to “crackdown” but a full return back did not happen and most new trends, issues and sectors preserved. The experience of “de-Stalinization” and its completion with “organizational findings”, and in some cases — even
repressions against individuals, showed the philosophers the limits of their capabilities for the “late Soviet regime”: philosophers can engage in scientific research, but only on condition of political loyalty. Scientific research, including in new directions, issues and industries, should not contradict the official ideological truths, and the philosophical activity must not attack the monopoly of the state-and-party to establish such truths. These conditions were fully in line with the logic of the normalization of the life of Soviet citizens described above, and gave the Soviet philosophers, besides the ability to engage in research, a rather high social status of ideological ministers of the state-and-party. The internalization of these conditions by the Soviet philosophers creates an illusion of the normal development of philosophy for the “late Soviet regime,” the only (external and, eventually, temporary) obstacles which were the “monopoly of the Marxist vision of the world” and “the centralised State control over ideology.”

Conclusions

To counter of this illusion and its consequences is the consideration of the Soviet philosophizing of the 1960s-1980s as a post-totalitarian practice, that is, the inclusion of such a consideration of totalitarian experience as a condition for philosophizing. Such an approach can make it clear not only external but also internal constraints of Soviet philosophy as a pragmatic and cognitive plan that they inherited from it and post-Soviet philosophy. According to Vasyl Lisovyi, Soviet philosophers of this period, “avoiding conflict with the official ideology, began to compromise, adapting to ideological prohibitions and trying to do something positive within the limits of possible” [Lisovyi, 2008: 511]. These “limits of the possible” are outlined not only forbidden, but also how to do it is allowed. Party and academic authorities looked after keeping this rules and Soviet philosophers usually knew them well, as well as the price paid for their violation. This situation contributed to the spread of the “cynical reason”, which, according to Anatoliy Yermolenko’s definition, “fully understands the distance between ideology and social reality, but does not renounce ideology ... it can be argued that in the seventies philosophers, few believed in the authentic truth of the Marxist theory. However, the cynicism of the seventies — the beginning of the eighties was fruitful. It made possible to distance to the Marxist theory, which should have become the basis for a critical reflection. However, the critical reflection of Marxism in the Soviet times did not take place, which was the reason for the smooth transition of such cynicism into the post-communist era” [Yermolenko, 2003: 138]. In my opinion, the dominance of cynical reason led to a profound deformation of the profession de foi of Soviet philosophers, which signals the above-mentioned illusion of the normal development of philosophy, the only obstacle which is supposedly established by the power of the border. Transposing all responsibility for limiting the development of philosophy to power, the Soviet philosophers withdrew from themselves any responsibility for their own philosophizing; By making their dissatisfaction with external restrictions, they adopted numerous of internal constraints, more precisely self-restraint and, even, “self-censorship — deformations of thinking and speech that were not a direct consequence of the requirements of external censorship ... self-censorship often surpassed the requirements of external censorship” [Lisovyi, 2008: 512]. The main self-restraints concerned understanding of the subject of philosophy and its tasks. It should be recalled that Marxist philosophy, in accordance with the famous 11th “Theses On Feuerbach”, was intended to change the world, and such an understanding of the purpose of philosophy remains an official
truth throughout the existence of the Soviet regime. Under totalitarianism, the state-and-party has a monopoly on how the world should be valued and what changes it is subject to: it is the competence of ideology or official philosophy. The competence of those branches of philosophy, which was not limited to ideology or attempted to get rid of its dictate, remains purely scientific, far from the immediate reality of the question (in the 1970s and 80s also, the problems of culture) or sophistic explanations of the peculiarities of ideological decisions.

Such a division of competencies was even suited to those Soviet philosophers who tried to develop alternative for Marxist or official philosophy projects. Having adopted this division, the Soviet philosophers refused to make political or social reality a subject of professional interest (although the Marxist arsenal offered enough tools for this). As a result, it proved incapable to object the totalitarian phenomenon as a condition for their own philosophizing, to make it the subject of their critical reflection and to confront such a way for it and its consequences even when no one has forbidden it. This implies the consequences for the post-Soviet philosophical theory: the lack of critical reflection of its Soviet past contributes to the preservation of the narrowed and deformed nomenclature of philosophical knowledge and relevant research practices developed in the 1960-1980s, which often leads to “restoration” (if we use Yermolenko’s expression [Yermolenko, 2003: 139]), “the best of the intellectual endeavour of the years 1960 to 1980” and impedes the emergence or full development of new trends, issues and industries. The discovery in the post-Soviet period of Western philosophy (in the case of philosophical Ukrainian studies — of Humanities of Ukrainian Diaspora) could not completely compensate for the limitations, because such a discovery took place in accordance with the rather selective and deformed image of Western thought that developed during Soviet times within the framework of the “critique of bourgeois philosophy” (in the case of philosophical Ukrainian studies, “critique of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism”).

Similar problems caused by the post-totalitarian origins of modern Ukrainian philosophy and they require a critical reflection, which necessarily includes both analysis and the assessment of our own immediate past. The theses formulated in this article, of course, need to be developed and refined and aimed not only at outlining the most obvious directions and the general explanatory scheme for such a reflection, the most fruitful form of which, in my opinion, will be the study of post-totalitarian practices in the field of philosophy on the example of individual figures, communities, institutions, research areas, and so forth. In particular, the analyzes and evaluations I have proposed are largely based on my own research on philosophical Ukrainian studies of the Soviet period and its post-Soviet transformations, as well as through the study of the figure and intellectual heritage of Vasyl Lisovy (1937-2012), one of the few Soviet philosophers in Ukraine, who dared openly resist the above-mentioned compromises of the Soviet period and in independent Ukraine to fight against consequences of Soviet nihilism in Ukrainian philosophy and humanitarianism. I would like to dedicate this article to his bright memory.

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