The Generalized Criterion of Relevance for Argument Evaluation

Viktoriia Babiuk

Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (Kyiv, Ukraine)
E-mail: vuminita@gmail.com
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9415-2264

The paper is devoted to the relevance criterion of argument evaluation within argumentation theory. Argument evaluation is a tool to avoid misunderstanding and misleading in argumentation — one of the most basic forms of human communications. The purpose of the paper is to outline the generalized relevance criterion, which involves the key relevance types proposed in different approaches to argumentation. Achieving this goal helps to give a clear answer to the question, "What is to be relevant within the argumentative communication?" The author proves that the key features of logical relevance, dialectical relevance, and audience relevance. It is compared these relevant types to answer the question, "Whether is it possible to integrate them into one generalized criterion of relevance?"

Keywords: real argument, logical relevance, dialectical relevance, audience-relevance, informal consequence

Introduction

Argumentation is one of the most commonly used forms among the many different ones human communication can take. In addition, only argumentative communication can result in the interlocutor's point of view change and, accordingly, different implications of such a change. Starting with personal and ending with the achievement of the most global goals, according to whether it is the argument of everyday communication or political one.

All these justify the argument evaluation significance. It is very hard to mislead and confuse the person who understands what is relevant within argumentation and what is irrelevant. That is why it is very important to deal with the variety of relevance interpretations as one of the argument evaluation criteria.

In this paper, I deal with informal logic as one of the argumentation theory directions.

First of all, I must admit the term "real argument" often used in the text means the real-life argumentation which people use in their conversations.

The practice of real communication calls for consideration of the context and pragmatic aspects of the argumentative process. That is why the real argument evaluation as valid or invalid — as within formal logic — is incorrect.

This paper is devoted to the ARTS model of argument evaluation, which includes the criteria of acceptability, relevance, truth, and sufficiency. Such a model has no unified interpretation that is why each of the criteria needs to be clarified. I focus on the relevance criterion. I compare and generalize many contemporary informal interpretations of the relevance notion and formulate the generalized criterion of the relevance.

Significantly, the range of the interpretations of relevance causes the ambiguity of its essence and role in the argument evaluation understanding. Furthermore, the relevant research lets to clarify the relation between argument, argumentation, context, proponent, and audience (hearer).

I want to stress the distinction made by Fabrizio Paglieri and Christiano Castefranchi in (Paglieri & Castefranchi, 2014: 217) on internal and external relevance. This distinction relates to the elements included in the relevance relation. In the case of internal relevance, the elements are the argument's premise and conclusion. In the case of external relevance, the elements include other parts of argumentation as a process.

Besides this, I need to pay attention to the three main types of relevance defined within informal logic. Logical relevance, dialectical relevance, and rhetorical relevance are among them. In the paper, I compare all these types of relevance and justify the necessity to evaluate argument relevance by all of them together. If to integrate these relevance types to internal/ external relevance distinction, logical relevance would relate to the internal relevance, and dialectical and rhetorical would be included in the external relevance.

The notion of logical relevance

It is necessary to admit, each interpretation of the relevance — logical, dialectical, or rhetorical — focuses on only one of the argument aspects. That is why the diversity of the relevance — as internal and external — makes this criterion fragmented.

To show this, I need to describe and analyze each of the defined relevance types. Furthermore, my purpose here is to establish if all these relevance types can be integrated correctly into one conception of relevance.

It is noteworthy in this context to admit Maurice Finocchiaro's thesis about the dominance of the dialectical approach to argumentation, which leads to ignorance of other approaches (Finocchiaro, 2003). I think such a thesis can be extrapolated to every approach to the argumentation. Furthermore, I know no integrated relevance concept, which considers all aspects that can arise with respect to argument relevance.

In the basic sense, some information's relevance is its usefulness (Freeman, 2011: 91). I think this thesis can be implemented to the integrative relevance conception. As I have noted above, I distinct logical, dialectical, and rhetorical relevance as three key relevance types. Thus, firstly, logical relevance means the premise's usefulness for the conclusion, in the sense of justification of the last by the first. Secondly, dialectical relevance means the usefulness of an argument for the dialogue as a whole. Thirdly, rhetorical relevance means the usefulness of an argument for an audience/proponent reaction on it.

It is necessary to admit the RAS-model of argument evaluation proposed by Ralph Johnson and Anthony Blair in "Logical self-defense" (Johnson & Blair, 1994) includes criteria for logical evaluation of an argument. It does not deal with dialectical or pragmatic aspects of argumentation. In other words, logical evaluation by RAS-model evaluates the goodness of an argument, but not its effectiveness. The question is, is it enough to evaluate an argument in practice? Does it make sense to know an argument is logically good without understanding it is correctly used, and does it really persuade the interlocutor? My answer is it does not make sense.

We should take into account that the holistic purpose of an argument is multifaceted, and one purpose — lending support by premises to the conclusion (Blair, 2012) — achieves on the logical tier, when the other purposes — rationality and conviction — achieves on the dialectical and rhetorical tiers. It is the reason we should take into account all three types of relevance to evaluate an argument.

Thus, on the logical tier logical goodness of an argument is evaluated (Khomenko, 2018). An argument's dialectical correctness of its use in the argumentation is evaluated on the dialectical tier. Argument effectiveness, or conviction, is evaluated on the rhetorical level. The relevance evaluation has to be based on these tiers of an argument considering.

First of all, let me describe logical relevance. I have to note, and I call "logical," the same relevance kind as an internal one. It should be taken into account that there are different names for this relevance type within informal logic. For example, Anthony Blair calls it "promissory relevance" (Blair, 2012: 61), Douglas Walton — "probative relevance" (Walton, 2004), George Bowles — "propositional relevance" (Bowles, 1990: 65). However, the term "logical relevance" lets us make the integrative system of relevance criterion clearer.

This relevance type is used to evaluate if there is a premise-conclusion relation in the argument. Namely, this sense of the relevance we meet in "Logical self-defense" — a classic book for informal logicians. The authors define relevance criterion as evaluating if premises are relevant to the conclusion (Johnson & Blair, 1994: 55). To my mind, such a definition includes circles. However, the authors give more clear definitions in their later papers.

David Hitchcock defines relevance as the relation between the subject, purpose, and situation. In other words, it is a relation between two questions, one of which is relevant to another in the particular situation (Hitchcock, 2017: 349). I think David Hitchcock's notion of situation is closely related to context, but the first one lets us consider argument relevance unlimited by textual discourse.

He describes the situation as a set of factual conditions in which a proposition can be relevant or irrelevant (Hitchcock, 2017: 350). Thus, the notion of situation can describe relevance relations in significantly more aspects than the notion of context, for example, decisions, accidents, or actions.

It is necessary to admit and the relevance notion acquires two other shades of meaning. On the one hand, it is an interpretation of relevance as premises property to be relevant to the conclusion. We can see such an interpretation in "Logical self-defense." On the other hand, it is an interpretation of relevance as a relation between premise and conclusion. This interpretation we can meet in Anthony Blair and David Hitchcock's conceptions of informal consequence. In my opinion, there is no conflict between these interpretations. Let us explain why. Undoubtedly, relevance should be considered as a relation between premise and conclusion. Something is relevant or irrelevant only in relation to something else. Nevertheless, we can attribute the property to enter into a relevant relationship with the conclusion.

This property, however, depends not only on the premise itself but on conclusion characteristics too. For this reason, the same proposition can be relevant or irrelevant in different arguments and in different situations.

The next point it is necessary to focus, is the relevance of the close relation to the non-trivial (non-logical, informal) following. This relation can be described better in comparison with the opposite notion to relevance — irrelevance.

In "Logical self-defense," an irrelevant conclusion is defined as a fallacy in an argument, which presupposes that the premise that is put as a basis for the conclusion fails the requirement of relevance (Johnson & Blair, 1994: 67). Non- sequitur, the Latin name of this fallacy, namely, means "does not follow" (Johnson & Blair, 1994: 65). Thus, the premise is irrelevant if the conclusion does not follow it. Thus, an informal analogy of entailment presupposes the relevant relation between premise and conclusion of an argument.

I want to note here the key features that different logicians perceive in the relevance criterion. Firstly, as we see in (Blair, 2012: 68), evaluation of relevance provides in respect to one separate premise which, however, is considered as a part of a premises set. Thus, relevance is a relation between one premise and conclusion. Nevertheless, it is not correct to consider relevant relations in a vacuum without including analysis of other premises data.

Secondly, I have to focus on the function of the relevance criterion in argument evaluation. In his book "Relevance in argumentation," Douglas Walton formulates the so-called exclusionary function (Walton, 2004: 2). The logician considers this function as the elimination of all irrelevant reasons from an argument as a whole. The same opinion we can find in Anthony Blair's papers. He concludes relevance is not a criterion of good argument but a criterion of an argument (Blair, 2004: 146-147). All these relate to the logical (internal) relevance because only this relevance type is used for the logical evaluation of an argument.

Thirdly, it would be helpful to describe the aspect of objectivity of the relevance evaluation. As Anthony Blair admits, a judgment about relevance can be made both by the proponent and interpreter, when they decide what is included in an argument, and evaluator, who decides if both of them right (Blair, 2004: 146). If to appeal to the distinction on attributed and actual relevance provided by George Bowles (Bowles, 1990), we can conclude that namely actual relevance is useful for argument evaluation. Actual relevance captures the relation which really exists between premise and conclusion, not the relation which participants attribute to an argument they are involved in. In fact, participants are biased and often cannot make an impartial judgment about relevance.

Thus, an argument can be irrelevant even if all its participants believe in its relevance. It correlates with Anthony Blair's thesis that somebody's conviction on the proposition's relevance does not make it really relevant (Blair, 2012: 63).

Next, let us describe shortly the specifics of the non-trivial consequence formulated by David Hitchcock to make the logical relevance understanding clearer. As a whole, informal consequence, as I call it to generalize Hitchcock and Blair's approaches, means that premises give grounds to accept the conclusion, or, in other words, premises justify the conclusion, which is not obvious, or is in doubt. Such a justification is based on the content relation between each of the premises and the conclusion, which presupposes lending support to the last one.

What is the place of relevance in this relation? Relevance is the necessary property of it, which is, however, not enough one. The other necessary condition of informal consequence is inference warrant or inference claim.

Both of these terms refer us to the notion of the warrant by Stephen Toulmin. The meanings of the inference claim and inference warrant are similar.

Thus, David Hitchcock formulates the notion of inference claim, which means some general meaningful basic conditional (Hitchcock, 2011: 513). He defines a warrant as a license to an inference characterized by relevance and expresses an argumentative scheme.

On the other hand, Anthony Blair defines an inference warrant as an utterance with some factual content somebody accepts to infer the conclusion from a set of premises. It is different for each conclusion (Johnson & Blair, 1994: 66). It is necessary to admit that a generalized inference warrant is considered as a principle of inference. Therefore, some generalized meaningful formula can be common for a set of arguments.

Anthony Blair describes informal consequence as lending support to the conclusion, which differs from the interlocutor's conviction. He relates this with the fact that promissory relevance is not necessary for changing the interlocutor's point of view (Blair, 2012: 65). Thus, Blair's thesis confirms that such a type of relevance is used to evaluate an argument's logical goodness.

Inference warrant, or inference claim, is a basis for our beliefs that our premises are relevant because it expresses the way we link premise and conclusion. Thus, relevance is one of the conditions of conclusion inference justification (Blair, 2012: 73).

Dialectical relevance as a kind of external relevance

The next relevance type involved in the integrated relevance conception is dialectical relevance. It must be noted that dialectical level is an integral aspect of every argument that can be recognized from the practice of argumentation (Hitchcock, 2017; Freeman, 2011). Therefore, the dialectical tier is the bridgehead of making argumentative exchanges or, in other words, the practical tier on which an argument is used.

The notion of dialectical relevance appears in Douglas Walton's pragmatic conception. It is significant that dialectical relevance emerges in the pragmatic aspects of an argument, such as its relation to the purposes of interlocutors, their common ground, and other contextual aspects (Walton, 1999: 103). That is why evaluating an argument, and dialectical relevance is possible via understanding dialogue participants' purposes. Thus, to evaluate the dialectical relevance of an argument, it is necessary, firstly, to find out dialogue purpose and, secondly, to clear up if an argument contributes to this purpose achieving (Walton, 2004: 169).

Douglas Walton defines the notion of dialogical relevance as the specific relation between speech act (step in dialogical communication) and the type of dialogue in which it occurs (Walton, 1999: 120). Due to the fact that dialectical relevance depends on the interlocutor's purposes, the definition of dialogical relevance is closely related to it since dialogue type depends on participants' purposes.

Shortly speaking, dialectical relevance is the type of relevance that can be used to evaluate the correctness of argument using in the dialogue as a communicative frame for it.

If an argument meets the dialogical rules' requirements formulated in Walton's dialogical conception, it is dialectically (and dialogically) relevant. In this aspect, Douglas Walton admits that dialogical rules constitute the normative base for logical adequacy of dialogue type changing (Walton, 2004: 108). Actually, each argumentation is built in the heterogeneous text or speech, and shifts of dialogue-types can be licit or illicit. In the context of relevance, it is necessary to admit only licit shifts let to be an argument relevant to the dialogue purpose.

The basic interpretation of dialectical relevance by Douglas Walton concerns if premises lead to the conclusion or thesis, which is defended (Walton, 1999: 126). This relevance type evaluates if an argument set directs to the endpoint — the issue discussed in the dialogue (Walton, 2004: 28).

Audience-relevance as the rhetorical kind of relevance

Therefore, we are closing in on the last relevance type of our generalized relevance concept. It is the type of relevance I call rhetorical, and its author calls it audience-relevance.

Primarily, I describe here the definition of relevance-audience. As Christopher Tindale admits, an argument is relevant to an audience if it has a contextual effect (Tindale, 2015: 183). The synonymous definition appears as an argument that is relevant to an audience if it takes into account the audience's cognitive environment (Tindale, 2015: 183).

As a cognitive environment, I should note, Christopher Tindaledefines a set of audience beliefs, knowledge, purposes. Thus, the cognitive environment is that which forms audience cognitive expectations and opportunities and manifests in relation to particular arguments.

In this regard, Christopher Tindale argues that the speaker and the audience are co-creators of the discourse (Tindale, 2015: 4). This thesis lets us understand the ground of audience-relevance notion.

Therefore, to be rhetorically relevant means to be relevant to an audience. Such an interpretation of relevance indicates the specific rhetorical approach to an argument as a whole. This approach is the reaction to an excessive focus on an argument as static premise-conclusion construction. That is the reason why the emphasis here is on the conviction tools and characteristics of the audience argumentation as a process is directed to.

Obviously, other informal logicians focus on the argument effectiveness too. For example, Anthony Blair notes a proponent has to be sure an argument is acceptable for an audience (Blair, 2012: 63). David Hitchcock admits that an argument establishes the conclusion for the audience only when the audience has good reasons to accept its premises and conclusion, which is followed from them (Hitchcock, 2017: 361).

Nevertheless, the role of an audience is maximized, namely in the rhetorical approach. Each argument is considered here in the aspect of its orientation to an audience. Argumentation does not exist in other ways than for its audience. It cannot be in itself because it always has the interlocutor's conviction (audience) as a purpose.

I argue that rhetorical relevance has some specific features which make it different from other relevance types.

Firstly, audience relevance can have degrees. Both logical relevance and dialectical relevance do not have it.

Secondly, an important role to play in the evaluation of rhetorical relevance has participants of argumentation, such as arguer and audience. In respect to other relevance types, I can note the key role in evaluation has neutral argument evaluator. It lets us argue that rhetorical relevance is a descriptive notion rather than normative since the judgment of relevance can make the subject involved to argumentation.

Thirdly, rhetorical relevance is even more dependent on context than other relevance types. Actually, even if an argument is logically good and dialectically correct, it can be rhetorically irrelevant only because an audience that forms an argument context does not understand this argument or only does not accept it.

On the other hand, rhetorical relevance has many common features with dialectical ones. First of all, both of them are included in the external relevance. Consequently, both of them are used to evaluate the way of argument using argumentation as a process. As opposed to this, logical, internal, or promissory relevance evaluates an argument premise-conclusion relation itself.

The integrative view on the relevance criterion

All described above let us argue that these three relevance types are not contradictory. Moreover, they are complementary. None of them can be the general and unique criterion for relevance evaluation. Only together can they constitute such a general criterion of relevance.

Such a descriptive notion captures the relation between the arguer and the audience. Therefore, this aspect of the relevance criterion moves away from logic in a narrow meaning. Essentially, the only first described kind of relevance is a logical one.

With respect to the dialectical relevance, I believe this notion is not logical too. Although its author — Douglas Walton — calls it a logical notion (Walton, 1999), there are two aspects I cannot accept in his thesis. Firstly, dialectical relevance manifests only in argumentative communication. It relates to an argument with correct or incorrect use, as I have noted above. Thus, it concerns dialectical situations to which some argument has to be relevant, meaning its use must be rational in some part of the dialogue.

The distinction between argument and its use has one more reason to be justified. Secondly, on Douglas Walton describing fallacies of irrelevance, the dialectical nature of such fallacies is evident. For example, the irrelevant dialectical argument is considered irrational, while relevant is interpreted as rational (Walton, 1979). Actually, failure of relevance occurs in the case of incorrect use of some argument in some dialectical — which is the same as the communicative — situation (Babiuk, 2020).

Although external relevance is not the criterion of argument evaluation logically, it fills the gaps in argument analysis. It lets us understand the specificity of real argument functioning in communication.

Therefore, I argue that the general view on the relevance criterion should involve internal as external relevance. When internal relevance is used on an argument's illative tier, external relevance aims to evaluate dialectical and rhetorical tiers.

I want to stress once again that we evaluate external relevance, firstly, in regard to rational argument using in the argumentative process; secondly, in regard to the way it is used to convince the audience. Thus, the main difference between internal and external relevance is the different subject of the relation. Moreover, this difference relates not only "argument premise — argument conclusion," "argument — dialogue," and "argument — audience" opposition's second element. First of all, it concerns the first element — argument, because actually, "argument" itself is the subject of evaluation only in the first opposition. Two others aim to evaluate not an argument itself but the way of its use.

In this regard, I should note Anthony Blair and Christopher Tindale's points of view on this issue. Blair argues it is necessary to distinguish argument and argumentation as its way of using, and only the first one is the subject of logical evaluation (Blair, 2012: 62). In contrast to this, Christopher Tindale considers argument as the result of arguer thinking and raw material for audience thinking (Tindale, 2015: 187). It looks like Christopher Tindale thinks premises relevance cannot be considered without their audience-relevance since it is impossible to separate product and process of argumentation in practice.

Thus, dialectical and rhetorical evaluation is based on the knowledge about the context (situation) of argument using because to know context means to understand what way of using it is correct.

All these let us argue that a holistic argument evaluation on relevance has to include logical evaluation and evaluation of the way of using some argument. Although the last one does not deal with logic, at least on the first look, it becomes necessary because an argument never exists alone, without being a part of argumentation as a process.

Argumentation theory is an interdisciplinary area of research, and general evaluation of the relevance cannot be carried out only within logic. It also needs pragmatic and rhetorical aspects of the argument.

It raises the question, how to evaluate these relevance types together? The first step is to evaluate an illative structure of an argument that is to find out whether the premise supports the conclusion. The next step would be to analyze how the logically good argument falls into the communicative frame, for example, into the dialogue. And the last step in such evaluation is to decide if the correctly used argument achieves some audience acceptance.

It is necessary to analyze the specific relation between logical and rhetorical relevance. The logically relevant argument can be rhetorically irrelevant and vice versa. In regard to the first part of this thesis, I have to note that logical relevance has the same relation to a dialogical one. However, with respect to the last part of the thesis, we find out some specific links. Actually, logical relevance is the core of dialectical one. The logically irrelevant argument most probably cannot be dialectically relevant due to its inconsistency, which does not allow for such an argument to fit rationally in the dialogue.

Nevertheless, regarding rhetorical relevance, an argument can be relevant to the audience and be logically irrelevant. The possibility of this situation is caused by participants involved in the evaluation process. Within informal logic, itself and pragmatic conception relevance is evaluated by some independent evaluator, while relevance is evaluated by participants of the argumentation in the rhetorical conception.

This issue is important in regard to the question of the subjectivity of the rhetorical relevance evaluation and objectivity of dialectical and logical one to integrate into one system. I argue that it is possible because the descriptive side of the relevance lets us be closer to the real argument. I think we can never evaluate argument relevance without knowledge about the audience's perspective on relevance.

Besides the aspect of evaluation subjectivity, it is important to focus on the other distinction. In contrast, logical relevance captures the relation between the elements of static premise-conclusion structure, dialectical and rhetorical relevance capture the relation between the elements of a dynamic process.

In my view, such distinctions are determined by the purposes of a particular relevance type evaluation. All these justify it is correct, firstly, to distinguish relevance types according to the purpose of its evaluation; secondly, to integrate these different types to make multifaceted relevance criterion of argument evaluation. I must admit that this integrated criterion evaluates both argument and argumentation, and I think to evaluate argument relevance in general needs to take into account all three defined relevance types.

Thus, the integrative relevance criterion includes three aspects. Firstly, the evaluation of logical relevance, which is a logical goodness condition, lets us decide if the premise really lends support to the conclusion. The evaluation of dialectical relevance lets a decision is an argument correctly or rationally used in the argumentation. Evaluating rhetorical or audience

relevance lets us judge if the argumentation is effective or persuasive for a particular audience. Therefore, the generalized relevance criterion let us evaluate is an argument that meets the requirement of relevance to be good in general and not only to be logically good.

Since the internal (logical) relevance criterion cannot provide the evaluation of an argument using correctness and its effectiveness, external relevance fills this gap.

Conclusions

Underlying all the above, I would like to note that the generalized relevance criterion concept involves three key kinds of relevance: logical, dialectical, and rhetorical. Each of these types relates to different tiers of argument appraisal. Furthermore, each of these types achieves its own purpose: logical goodness, rational use, and effectiveness. Each of the defined purposes can be achieved via having a particular kind of relevance.

Namely, one of the reasons for the logical goodness of an argument is local positive actual logical/internal/promissory relevance. Dialectical relevance provides dialectical correctness or rationality of using an argument in some part of a dialogue. Rhetorical/audience-relevance provides an argument convincing or effective.

Therefore, a logically good argument does not fulfill the general purpose of good argumentation. At the same time, argumentation effectiveness would be very problematic without a good argument at its core. So does it would be doubtful in the case of incorrect argument use in the argumentation.

All noted above let us argue we should consider an actually relevant argument as that which meets the requirements of logical, dialectical, and rhetorical relevance. Thus, the holistic view on relevance integrates defined relevance types into one general criterion of relevance.

▭ References

Babiuk, Viktoriia (2020) The relevance criterion of argument evaluation: pragmatic interpretation. *Humanities studies,* Volume 3 (80), 11-21. https://doi.org/10.26661/hst-2019-3-80-01

Blair, Anthony (2004) Argument and its uses. *Informal Logic*. Volume 24, 137–151. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2363-4_14

Blair, Anthony (2012) Premissary relevance. In *Groundwork in the theory of argumentation*. Springer Science & Business Media. Argumentation Library, 21, 61–74. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00154326

Bowles, George (1990) Propositional relevance. *Informal Logic*, Volume 12, 65–77. https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v12i2.2602

Finocchiaro, Maurice (2003) Dialectics, evaluation, and argument. *Informal Logic*, Vol. 23, 19-49, No 1. https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v23i1.2152

Freeman, James (2011) *Argument structure representation and theory*. Springer science+business media.

Johnson, Ralph and Anthony Blair (1994) *Logical self–defense.* New York: Mcgraw-hill, inc.

Hitchcock, David (2011) Inference claims. *Informal logic*. Volume 31 (3), 191-228. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53562-3_8

Hitchcock, David (2017) Non-logical consequence. In *On Reasoning and Argument. Essays in Informal Logic and on Critical Thinking*. Springer International Publishing AG, 97-114. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53562-3_7

Hitchcock, David (2017) *On Reasoning and Argument. Essays in Informal Logic and on Critical Thinking.* Springer International Publishing AG.

Khomenko, Iryna (2018) A Look at Informal Logic. *Future Human Image*. Volume 9, 52-62. https://doi.org/10.29202/fhi/9/5

Macagno, Fabrizio (2008) Dialectical Relevance and Dialogical Context in Walton's Pragmatic Theory. *Informal logic*. Volume 28(2), 102-128. https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v28i2.542

Paglieri, Fabrizio and Cristiano Castelfranchi (2014) Trust, relevance, and arguments. *Argument & Computation*. Volume5 (2-3), 216-236. https://doi.org/10.1080/1946216 6.2014.899270

Tindale, Christopher (2015) *The Philosophy of Argument and Audience Reception.* Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316181645

Walton, Douglas (1979) Ignoratio elenchi: the red herring fallacy. *Informal logic*. Volume 2 (3), 3-5. https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v2i3.2823

Walton, Douglas (1999) Dialectical relevance in persuasion dialogue. *Informal logic.* Volume 19 (2-3), 119-143. https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v19i2.2323

Walton, Douglas (2004) *Relevance in argumentation*. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781410609441